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ABSTRACT 
Do Principles-based Accounting Standards Matter? Evidence from the Adoption of IFRS 
in China 
Yongtao Hong 
Gordian A. Ndubizu, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
This paper compares measures of accounting quality for 654 firms that previously 
used rules-based Chinese GAAP and have transitioned into principles-based International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted in China. In particular, I examine whether 
principles-based standards are associated with less real earnings management, less 
comparability, a higher variance of change in net income, a higher ratio of change in net 
income to change in cash flows, a significantly lower negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flows, more discretionary accruals, higher informative earnings about 
future cash flows and higher value relevance of accounting amounts than rules-based 
standards. The latter accounting regime fosters more check box or compliance mentality, 
provides more detailed implementation guidance, emphasizes more form over substance 
and deploys accounting treatments not based on recognizable principles compared to the 
principles-based standards. These differences between the two accounting regimes are 
likely to affect accounting quality. In an attempt to improve the quality of financial 
reporting in the post-Enron era, Section 108 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 instructs 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct studies on the characteristics 
of rules-based and principles-based standards. This request suggests that results of my 
study might have implications in U.S. and other countries transitioning from rules-based 
to principles-based IFRS. 
 ix
The results suggest that principles-based standards have higher accounting quality 
than rules-based standards. In particular, I find that principles-based standards have less 
comparable accounting numbers, a significantly higher variance of change in net income, 
a higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, and 
a significantly lower negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. Further, 
consistent with lower quality, rules-based standards have a significantly more evidence of 
real earnings management (financial structuring) and a significantly less discretionary 
accruals. The evidence suggests that firms substitute costly real earnings manipulation 
with cheaper accounting earnings management as they transition from rules-based to 
principles-based standards. In addition, consistent with higher quality, principles-based 
standards have significantly higher informative earnings about future cash flows, and 
significantly higher value relevance of accounting amounts. This paper also contributes to 
the regulatory debate by providing evidence that losses and/or bad news are more value 
relevant in the principles-based accounting regime. Findings are similar for state-owned 
firms, while private owned firms have similar but weak results. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives and Motivations 
This paper examines whether the shift from rules-based to principles-based 
accounting standards in China improves or subverts the quality of accounting information. 
From 1992 to 1997, China had an extreme form of rules-based accounting standards 
(Xiang [1998]). This rigid accounting system had major elements of rules-based 
standards that include fostering “check-box” or compliance mentality, presence of 
detailed implementation guide, and existence of standards that are not based on a 
recognizable accounting principle. However, in 2001 the rules-based system was replaced 
with principles-based accounting standards by the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in People’s Republic of China.  
Using the Alexander (1999), Nelson (2003) and Schipper (2003) view of 
principles-based and rules-based accounting systems, Nobes (2005) argues that IFRS is a 
more principles-based standard than U.S. General Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) point out that the elimination of options in 
several standards as part of the International Accounting Standards Board “improvement 
project” makes IFRS a more principles-based system. Guerrera and Norman (2002) and 
AAA (2003) report that the European Commission urges the U.S. to abandon GAAP in 
favor of the more principles-based IFRS, which emphasizes economic substance over 
form in the accounting treatment. This perspective suggests that the current study might 
have implications beyond China, including U.S and other countries that are 
contemplating transitioning from rules-based to principles-based system.  
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This paper is motivated by recent descriptive research that presents a thoughtful 
narrative of the characteristics, costs, and benefits of principles-based versus rules-based 
accounting systems (Largay III [2003], Schipper [2003], and Nelson [2003]). These 
studies were prompted by the fraudulent financial reporting scandals in U.S. (Enron and 
World.com for examples) and instruction in section 108 of the Sarbanes –Oxley Act of 
2002 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct a study on the 
characteristics of rules-based and principles-based accounting standards. By 
characteristics, I mean how each accounting system affects comparability, relevance, and 
reliability of reported accounting numbers. Because of the importance of providing 
empirical analyses of the above issues (Schipper [2003]), this study unlike previous 
studies provides an empirical examination of how the shift from rules-based to principles-
based accounting standards in China affects comparability, earnings management, and 
value relevance of accounting numbers. Measuring comparability poses exceptional 
difficulties, as such, I use volatility of earnings, accruals, and discretionary accruals as 
proxies for the level of comparability in each accounting system. These proxies focus on 
comparability in the application of accounting rules rather than comparability in the use 
of accounting information.1  
For earnings management, I provide separate measures of transactions-based (real) 
and accruals-based (accounting) earnings management. I expect more transactions-based 
earnings management as rules-based accounting fosters “check box” or compliance 
mentality, which creates incentives for financial structuring. Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005) point out that rules-based system tightens standards by limiting the exercise of 
                                                 
1 Accounting research has focused primarily on comparability in the use of accounting numbers (see Lang 
and Lundholm [1993 and 1996], and Lang et al. [2003]).  
 3
managerial judgment and providing detailed guidance. Roychowdhury (2005), Bens et al. 
(2002) and Bens et al. (2003) provide examples of studies that focus on real earnings 
management. Roychowdhury (2005) uses cost of goods sold, change in inventory, 
production costs and discretionary expenses not explained by sales as proxies for real 
earnings management. In contrast, a principles-based system is expected to require the 
exercise of professional judgment. The extant accounting literature uses discretionary 
accruals to capture accruals-based managerial accounting choices (Ndubizu [2007], 
Francis et al. [2005], Dechow et al. [2003], and Dechow and Dichev [2002]). Much of the 
current accounting research focuses on discretionary accruals. However, this research 
offers a setting in which I examine these two types of earnings management and potential 
substitution between them as firms transitioned from rules-based to principles-based 
standards. 
Following prior literature (Leuz et al. [2003], Lang et al. [2003], Lang et al. [2006] 
and Barth et al. [2006]), I interpret higher variance of change in net income, higher ratio 
of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows and lower negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows as evidence of higher accounting quality. I 
compare the above quality metrics used in the literature for principles-based and rules-
based standards. 
Finally, I examine the relevance of reported accounting numbers under the rules-
based and principles-based standards by focusing on (a) the informativeness of 
contemporaneous earnings and their components about future cash flows, and (b) the 
value relevance of accounting numbers in explaining stock prices. The stock price 
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analysis examines the effects of reported accounting numbers from rules-based and 
principles-based on both price levels and returns. 
 
1.2 Contributions of the study 
This study makes three contributions to the extant literature. First, consistent with 
the view that detailed implementation guidance common in rules-based systems increases 
surface comparability, in which dissimilar arrangements are forced into the same 
accounting treatment, I find that reported accounting numbers under a rules-based system 
have lower volatility than do the same numbers in the principles-based system. This 
result is robust across industries, state-owned and private owned firms. Also, the result is 
consistent with the view that information risk (as proxied by volatility) is compromised 
by the rules-based accounting system during the centrally planned Chinese economy. 
Given these findings, I argue that contracts in general (including debt and compensation) 
are not efficiently priced in China under the rules-based system.  
Consistent with higher quality, I find that principles-based standards have a higher 
variance of the change in net income, a higher ratio of the variances of the change in net 
income and change in cash flows and a significantly lower negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flows than do rules-based standards. The weak negative correlation 
suggests that firms do not use accruals to enhance poor cash flows position (Land and 
Lang [2002] and Myers and Skinner [2002]). 
Second, because a rules-based system is less likely to foster earnings management 
through the exercise of managerial judgment, I disentangle the concept into real earnings 
management (driven by financial structuring and operating environments) and accounting 
 5
earnings management that capture managerial choices. Given that principles-based 
system allows more exercises of professional judgment, I expect firms to have less 
discretionary accruals under the rules-based system, ceteris paribus. Consistent with this 
view, I find larger discretionary accruals for the principles-based than for the rules-based 
system. More interesting, the rules-based system appears to have more evidence of real 
earnings management as proxied by abnormal cost of goods sold, change in inventory, 
production costs, and discretionary expenses not explained by sales than do the 
principles-based accounting standards for the same sample firms.2 It appears from the 
results that firms substitute real earnings management with accruals-based earnings 
management as firms shift from rules-based to principles-based system. This substitution 
effect is a major empirical regularity uncovered in the study. These results are generally 
consistent across industries, state-owned and privately-owned firms. Therefore, the 
consistency of results suggests that the substitution effect documented is not driven by 
differences in reporting incentives or operating environments. Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005) documents a similar substitution effect as firm shift from rules-based to 
principles-based system in an analytical research setting. 
Third, managers appear to use accruals-based earnings management (as proxied 
by discretionary accruals) to convey information about future cash flows. I find that 
contemporaneous earnings and discretionary accruals are more informative under the 
principles-based system with larger discretionary accruals. While my results contradict an 
implicit assumption in Leuz et al. (2003) that managers use earnings management to hide 
poor performance, I find that principles-based system rather than rules-based produces 
                                                 
2 Abnormal refers to accounting numbers under rules-based or principles-based system not explained by 
sales. Therefore, abnormal implies numbers due to financial structuring (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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discretionary accruals that are more informative. Incidentally, these discretionary 
accruals are product of accruals-based managerial accounting choices. Ndubizu and Hong 
(2008) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide similar evidence in different research 
settings.  
Given the conflict documented above, I also examine the value relevance of 
earnings and their components in predicting future valuation under rules-based and 
principles-based accounting systems. I find that principles-based accounting numbers are 
more value relevance than are rules-based numbers. I find similar results using both price 
and returns models. In both models, principles-based accounting numbers have more 
value relevance of accounting amounts. This paper contributes to the regulatory debate 
by providing evidence that losses (net income < 0) and bad news (returns < 0) are more 
value relevant in the principles-based regime. This evidence is particularly pertinent in 
light of the current debate on the usefulness of principles-based standards.  
Overall, I find that the shift from a rules-based to a principles-based accounting 
system in China has economically improved information risk as evidenced by higher 
variance of the change in net income, higher volatility, increased managerial intervention 
and enhanced value relevance of accounting amounts. This finding is consistent with 
Schipper (2003) statement that if principles-based system limits scope and treatment 
exceptions, then increased earnings volatility is likely to occur. Given managers concerns 
for volatility, they are likely to intervene by managing earnings to enhance their 
informativeness as well as value relevance. 
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1.3 Implications of results 
The findings reported in this study have implications for assessments of 
accounting quality in rules-based versus principles-based systems. First, I provide 
systematic evidence that the amount of comparability of accounting numbers is greater in 
rules-based than principles-based system. This result suggests that rigid and detailed 
implementation guidance that characterized the Chinese rules-based accounting system 
increased comparability of accounting numbers among firms. However, this 
comparability appears to be sacrificed as China shifts to principles-based accounting 
standards. Therefore, if IFRS is more principles-based than U.S. GAAP as argued in 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and Nobes (2005), then comparability in the application of 
accounting standards is likely to decrease as countries adopt IFRS. 
Second, my results contradict an implicit assumption in the literature (Schipper 
[2003], Barth et al. [1999], and Defond and Park [1997]) and in some policy oriented 
discussions (Schipper [2003]) that lack of comparability impairs relevance and 
diminishes the quality of accounting information. However, it is not clear that these 
studies focus on comparability in the application of standards rather than in the use of 
standards. Nevertheless, I speculate that the two forms of comparability are uncorrelated, 
particularly on their implications for stock prices. The results suggest that 
contemporaneous accounting numbers generated by the principles-based accounting 
system in China are more value relevant than similar numbers from the rules-based 
system. Consistent with this result, I find that accounting numbers from the principles-
based system are also more informative about future cash flows. Therefore, the 
principles-based system appears to reduce surface comparability, in which dissimilar 
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arrangements are forced into the same accounting treatment. These findings support the 
view in some policy discussions (Section 108 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) that a 
shift to more principles-based accounting system enhances quality, which may prevent 
future fraudulent financial reporting scandals in U.S. (e.g., Enron and World.com). 
Third, I provide evidence that accounting-based earnings management as captured 
by discretionary accruals is more common in a principles-based system. However, this 
earnings management appears to improve the informativeness of contemporaneous 
earnings and their components. While previous studies (Healy and Wahlen [1999], Healy 
and Palepu [1993], Leuz et al. [2003], and Krishnan [2003]) are mixed on the effects of 
earnings management on accounting quality, I find that accounting -based earnings 
management in a principles-based system enhances reporting quality. The findings are 
similar in spirit to Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Dutta and Gigler (2002) and Demski et 
al. (2004) results that loosening accounting standards and thereby increase earnings 
management is beneficial to investors. Consistent with Demski (2004), I find that rules-
based standards reduce accounting-based earnings management, while increasing real 
earnings management. This situation reverses as firms transitioned from a rules-based to 
principles-based system, resulting in the substitution between accounting and real 
earnings management modeled in Demski (2004).  
Finally, while cross-jurisdictional studies, such as Ball et al. (2003), Leuz (2006), 
and Burgstahler et al. (2006) concluded that reporting standards (rules-based and 
principles-based) are less important than the reporting incentives, I find that the shift by 
Chinese firms from rules-based to principles-based system improves their accounting 
quality. Because I examined the same firm under the two systems, it appears incentives 
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are not major concern. In particular, state-owned firms and to a large extent private 
owned firms have similar incentives under the rules-based and principles-based systems. 
The results suggest that we do not know the potential effects of cross-jurisdictional 
differences in regulation and legal enforcement on the results. If these factors align 
differently with rules-based or principles-based system, then the relationship documented 
in China may not exist in other jurisdictions. Further studies are needed to shed deeper 
insight on whether the substitution of real earnings management with accounting -based 
earnings management as firms transitioned from rules-based to principles-based is a 
universal phenomenon not peculiar to China.  
1.4 Organization of the Study 
In the next Chapter, I provide relevant literature review and hypotheses 
development. Chapter 3 describes the samples, data collection and model specifications. 
Chapter 4 presents empirical results for each hypothesis, results of robustness tests, and 
additional tests. Summary and conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I review the extant literature on rules-based versus principles-
based standards and accounting quality. Drawing on this review and a discussion of the 
evolution of accounting in China, I argue that informativeness and value relevance of 
earnings and their components are likely to increase, while comparability decreases as 
firms transitioned from rules-based (Phase I) to principles-based (Phase III) accounting 
standards. While the exercise of professional judgment increases managerial choices and 
accruals-based earnings management under principles-based systems, I expect “check 
box” or compliance mentality fostered by rules-based systems to create incentives for 
financial structuring and real earnings management (Roychowdhury [2006]). 
 
2.2 Rules-based versus Principles-based Accounting Standards 
 The recent debate on whether U.S. GAAP is rules-based or principles-based was 
triggered by recent fraudulent financial reporting scandals (Enron, World.com, Adelphia 
and Parmalat) and the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Both the scandals and 
their discussions among regulators raised concern that U.S. GAAP is rules-based, which 
in turn reduces the quality of accounting information. The rules-based accounting 
standards are criticized for fostering “check box” or compliance mentality and forcing 
dissimilar arrangements into the same accounting treatment. For example, AAA (2003) 
points out that SFAS No. 13 on lease accounting (FASB 1976) is a rules-based standard 
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as evidenced by the use of  numerical thresholds to specify criteria for forcing 
transactions into operating and capital lease treatments. The standard also provides 
detailed implementation guidance which fosters the alleged “check box” mentality, 
emphasizes form over economic substance, and prevents managers from exercising 
appropriate professional judgment in the choice of accounting standards. As such, this 
standard commonly results in the substitution of operating leases for capital leases, or 
vice versa, depending on managers’ objectives. In addition, rules-based standards tend to 
be obsolete quickly in the current dynamically changing business world.  
Schipper (2003), AAA (2003), Nelson (2003) and Nobes (2005) point out that 
rules-based system tradeoff economic substance of transactions for the form and assure 
comparability and consistency of accounting numbers across firms and overtime. They 
argue that a rules-based system encourages managers to engage in financial structuring 
and scandals under the guise of complying with the rules. Because rules serve as the 
managers’ justification, auditors’ ability to prevent financial scandals is compromised.  
 There is a general belief in the financial community and in policy discussions that 
principles-based standards, if applied properly, improves the quality of accounting 
information by focusing on economic substance of transactions over form, discouraging 
financial structuring and same accounting treatment for dissimilar transactions. 
Consistent with other studies, I also expect greater emphasis on the use of professional 
judgment to enhance relevance and reliability of accounting numbers. Recognizing these 
benefits of a principles-based system, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 instructs the SEC 
to explore the feasibility of this accounting system in the United States.  
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This study provides an empirical analysis of the economic benefits of transiting 
from rules-based to principles-based standards in China. Historically, the Chinese 
accounting system is a continuum ranging from rigid rules-based on one end to a 
principles-based in the form of IFRS on the other end. Consistent with the continuum, 
Nobes (2005) and Guerrera and Norman (2002) point out that IFRS is more principles-
based than U.S. GAAP. The Chinese accounting reform produces a continuum of 
accounting system that allows empirical analysis of whether principles-based standards 
matter in improving accounting quality. 
 
2.3 Accounting Reform in China: Rules-based versus Principles-based Standards 
China’s economy experienced a fundamental change, from a central-planned 
economy to a market-oriented one, in the last quarter of the twentieth century. As 
economic reforms continue, the Chinese government was under greater pressure from 
both domestic and foreign investors and creditors of firms listed (cross-listed) in China’s 
stock exchanges to adopt a more principles-based accounting system similar to the IFRS 
to meet the market demand for high quality accounting information (Winkle et al. 1994, 
Xiang 1998, Chen et al. 1999). As a consequence, the government undertook the reform 
of the Chinese accounting system, which may be categorized in three phases and 
summarized in Figure 1, Continuum of Rules-based and Principles-based Standards in 
China. 3   
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                 
3 Appendix A shows all standards established since 1997. 
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As Figure 1 shows, the evolution of accounting standards in China has three 
distinct phases. The first phase is unequivocally a rigid rules-based system that ends in 
1997. This system includes the accounting system for pilot enterprises with shareholding. 
Even though rigid rules-based accounting system adopts the Anglo-Saxon form of 
accruals-based accounting standards, it appears not to meet the market demand for high 
quality accounting information. The rigid rules undermine relevance and reliability of 
reported accounting numbers. Although comparability and consistency across firms and 
over time is virtually assured, the rules-based system does not reflect economic substance 
of transactions and therefore subvert high quality financial reporting.  
Phase II is a transition period in which firms are changing from rules-based to 
principles-based. As such, many firms were combining both rules-based and principles-
based systems, includes the accounting system used for shareholding companies between 
1998 and 2000. Chen et al. (1999) finds that the accounting practices during the transition 
period eliminated some of the differences between rigid rules-based and principles-based 
systems. Because of the difficulty of identifying accounting system in place during the 
transition period, years 1998 through 2000 were excluded from the analysis.  
The third phase in the accounting continuum is the principles-based system. It 
began in 2001 with the adoption of IFRS in China for business enterprises. Initially, it 
looks like IFRS was adopted with jurisdictional adjustment for China. Later, it became 
obvious that the adoption is not jurisdictionally adjusted as is the case in European Union. 
4  IFRS is considered a principles-based accounting system (Nobes [2003] and AAA 
[2003] and Guerrera and Norman [2002]). Consistent with the study objectives, I focus 
                                                 
4 Differences still exist between the English version of IFRS and the China-endorsed IFRS, mainly due to 
characteristics of Chinese businesses. Appendix B considers the differences between these two accounting 
systems. 
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my empirical analyses on rules-based and principles-based accounting systems in China. 
Therefore, this study concentrates on the rules-based and the principles-based regimes of 
the accounting continuum in Figure 1.  
[insert Exhibit 1 here] 
 
Exhibit 1 compares the accounting standards in the rules-based and the principles-
based regimes and identifies major differences that have implications for accounting 
quality. This exhibit shows that managers exercise more professional judgment in 
selecting accounting measurement methods in the principles-based system (Phase III) 
than they do in rules-based system (Phase I). Managerial accounting choices appear to 
reflect economic substance of transactions as evidenced in the recording of assets, 
impairment losses, depreciation, cost of inventories, and the timing and amount of 
revenue recognition. The accounting for depreciation expense in these two regimes 
illustrates their distinctive features. In the rules-based system, usually only the straight-
line depreciation method is allowed, unless an enterprise gets the approval from 
governing authority to use accelerated depreciation methods. In contrast, in the 
principles-based system, management may reasonably select among allowable 
depreciation methods (either straight -line, unit of production, sum-of-years’-digits, or 
double-declining-balance). The principles-based system provides flexibility for managers 
to properly record assets consumed as the economic depreciation. If managers know the 
assets consumed more than anyone else, then their accounting choice could be used to 
provide more relevant information.  
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2.4 Hypotheses Development 
This study builds on Schipper (2003), AAA (2003) and Nelson (2003) analysis of 
rules-based and principles-based standards. These studies demonstrated that a principles-
based system is a double-edged sword that when applied properly enhances the quality of 
accounting information through its effects on comparability, earnings management and 
relevancy of accounting numbers. This system also creates incentives for earnings 
manipulation by fostering exercises of professional judgment (Dechow and Sloan [1991]) 
In contrast, rules-based system encourages managers to engage in earnings management 
through real activities (Baber et al. [1991], Bushee [1998], Bens et al. [2002] and Bens et 
al. [2003]). Based on these studies, I develop the following hypotheses: 
2.4.1 Comparability Hypothesis 
The rigid rules-based accounting system in China provides detailed 
implementation guides on how to apply a standard. These guides foster “check box” or 
compliance mentality that in the view of some increased comparability in accounting 
numbers generated by various firms. In China the implementation guide is strictly rigid. 
As such, rules-based system results in surface comparability in which dissimilar 
transactions are forced into the same accounting treatment. Because rules-based 
accounting is strictly rigid, managerial accounting methods choices or exercises of 
professional judgment are heavily constrained. Given the above facts, I expect accounting 
numbers produced under the rules-based in China to be comparable and result in 
decreased volatility in the reported accounting numbers by firms. 
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Principles-based system allows the exercise of professional judgment in selecting 
accounting treatment that best reflect economic substance of the transactions. Managerial 
choices, if properly guided, would result in different accounting treatment for dissimilar 
arrangements that otherwise would be treated the same under rules-based system. This 
practice would reduce comparability under principles-based system. As such, the 
underlying economic volatility of accounting numbers is likely to be different, simply 
because accounting treatment is different for dissimilar transactions. However, the 
volatility is likely to reflect the inherent economic fluctuations, which reflect information 
risk inherent in the accounting numbers. Also, I expect volatility to go up because scope 
and treatment exceptions intended to smooth income are virtually removed under 
principles-based system. 
Using volatility of reported accounting numbers as the proxy for comparability, I 
formalize the prediction that volatility is increasing under principles-based standards; 
stated in the null form, the first hypothesis is 
H1: There is no difference in the volatility of reported accounting numbers under 
rules-based and principles-based standards for the same sample firms. 
I test this hypothesis against the alternative that the rules-based system has more 
comparability than the principles-based system for the same firms. 
2.4.2 Earnings Smoothness Hypothesis 
           Following Lang et al. (2003), Leuz et al. (2003), Lang et al. (2006) and Barth et al. 
(2006), I expect rules-based standards with more comparability to exhibit less earnings 
variability after controlling for other economic determinants of income smoothing. In 
particular, I expect check box or compliance mentality, detailed implementation guidance, 
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emphasis on form over economic substance, and forcing dissimilar transactions into the 
same accounting treatment that are more common in rules-based system to produce more 
earnings smoothness than do principles-based standards. Given these differences and 
their connection to accounting quality, principles-based standards are expected to have 
higher variance of the change in net income and higher ratio of the variances of the 
change in net income and change in cash flows. Land and Lang (2002) and Myers and 
Skinner (2002) argue that if managed earnings reverse, then earnings smoothness is likely 
associated with more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. This 
argument suggests that managers respond to weak (strong) cash flows positions by 
increasing (decreasing) accruals. Therefore, I predict that principles-based standards with 
less earnings smoothness have less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. 
Based on the above discussions, I formulate hypotheses 2 (H2) to 4 (H4) in null forms as 
follows:  
          H2: There is no difference in the variance of change in net income under rules-
based and principles-based standards for the same firms. 
          H3: There is no difference in ratio of the variances in the change in net income and 
change in cash flows under rules-based and principles-based standards for the same firms. 
          H4: There is no difference in the correlation of accruals and cash flows under 
rules-based and principles-based standards for the same firms. 
 I test hypotheses 2 to 4 against the alternative that principles-based standards have 
less earnings smoothing. Therefore, I predict that principles-based standards have higher 
quality than rules-based system. 
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2.4.3 Earnings Management Hypothesis 
The extant accounting literature has identified two types of earnings management 
(Roychowdhury [2006]). The first type is real earnings management that originates from 
financial structuring with direct cash flows consequences. Studies that examine real 
earnings management have concentrated on research and development (Bushee [1998] 
and Bens et al. [2002]). Recently, Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence of real 
earnings management focusing on operational activities such as the use of price discount 
to temporarily increase sales and engaging in overproduction to lower cost of goods sold. 
In the current research setting, managers may use real transactions to subvert or get 
around “check box” or compliance mentality associated with rules-based system. 
Following the literature, I use abnormal cost of good sold, abnormal change in inventory, 
abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses to proxy for real 
earnings management (Dechow and Sloan [1991], Roychowdhury [2006]). If managers 
are not managing real activities, then changes in cost of goods sold, inventory and 
production costs are likely explained by sales. However, if these variables are not 
explained by sales, then I would argue that they are the product of financial structuring to 
get around rigid rules. To the extent that rules-based system creates incentives for real 
earnings management, I expect more abnormal variables under rules-based than 
principles-based system. Given this fact, the fifth hypothesis is formalized in the null 
form as follow: 
H5: There is no difference in real earnings management (proxied by abnormal 
variables) under rules-based versus principles-based standards for the same 
sample. 
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Principles-based standards allow managerial accounting choices and the exercise 
of professional judgment, while rules-based fosters compliance mentality that limits the 
exercise of professional judgment. Also, accruals–based earnings management has no 
direct cash flows consequences. These features create incentives for using more accruals-
based earnings management under a principles-based system. This type of earnings 
management is captured in the literature with discretionary accruals (Ndubizu [2007]). 
Following the literature and the discussions in this chapter, the sixth hypothesis in the 
null form is formalized as follow: 
H6: There is no difference in accruals-based earnings management (proxied by 
discretionary accruals) under principles-based and rules-based systems for the 
same firms. 
I test H6 against the alternative hypothesis that principles-based standards have 
more discretionary accruals than do rules-based standards for the same firms. Corollary, I 
expect rules-based system to have more evidence of real earnings management than do 
principles-based standards. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and Schipper (2003) note that 
transitioning from rules-based to principles-based standards may lead to a substitution 
between real earnings management common in rules-based to accounting earnings 
management prevalent in principles-based system. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), Liang 
(2004) and Christensen et al. (2004) find in analytical settings that principles-based 
standards increase accruals-based earnings management, which improves risk allocation 
and may induce higher value relevance earnings. The result of testing H5 and H6 would 
provide empirical evidence on the substitution effect between real and accounting 
earnings management noted in Schipper (2003) and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and 
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modeled in Demski (2004), which is of great interest to global accounting standards 
setters. 
 
2.4.4 Relevancy Hypothesis 
The analysis of rules-based versus principles-based system in this chapter 
suggests that they have distinct effects on accounting quality. While a principles-based 
system focuses on the underlying economic substance of transactions, the rules-based 
emphasizes the form over substance. Schipper (2003) and AAA (2003) argue that 
principles-based standards, if applied properly, ensure that decisions useful information is 
provided. In contrast, rules-based compromises decision usefulness by forcing dissimilar 
transactions into the same accounting treatment (Schipper [2003]). In an analytical study, 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) find that loosening accounting standards from rules-based 
to principles-based increases the value relevance of reported earnings. To the extent that 
decision usefulness is captured by value relevance and/or informativeness of reported 
accounting numbers (Ndubizu and Hong [2007], Ndubizu and Sanchez [2006], Altamuro 
et al. [2005], Ali and Hwang [2000], Collins et al. [1999], Ohlson [1995] and Brown et al. 
[1999]), I formalize two hypotheses in their null forms as follow: 
H7: There is no difference in the value relevance of reported accounting numbers 
under rules-based versus principles-based systems for the same firms. 
H8: There is no difference in the informativeness of earnings and their component 
under rules-based versus principles-based accounting system for the same firms. 
The alternative hypotheses are that principles-based standards have more 
informative and value relevant accounting numbers than do the rules-based standards. 
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Ndubizu and Hong (2007) and Altamuro et al. (2005) use informativeness of earnings 
and their component of accruals about future cash flows as a measure of accounting 
quality, while Ndubizu and Sanchez (2006), Ali and Hwang (2000), Collins et al. (1999) 
and Brown et al. (1999) rely on value relevance of earnings to capture accounting quality. 
I use both proxies to capture the effects of rules-based and principles-based standards on 
the quality of accounting numbers. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the research literature on the evolution of Chinese 
accounting systems, rules-based versus principles-based standards and accounting quality. 
Based on this review and a discussion of the evolution of accounting in China, I 
hypothesize that the transition from rules-based to principles-based accounting standards 
has an impact on comparability, earnings management, informativeness and value 
relevance of earnings and their components. The next chapter will describe the research 
design and methodology that is used in the empirical study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
3. 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and formulates testable hypotheses. In 
this chapter, I describe the empirical research design, the sample selection process, 
models used to test each hypothesis, and how each hypothesis is tested. The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the data collection and the sample 
procedure. Section 3.3 describes variable measurement.  
3. 2 Data Description 
3.2.1 Data Collection 
The initial sample consists of 1,240 distinct firms (8353 firm-years) that issued A-
shares and listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 1992 to 
2004.5  These firms and their financial accounting data are obtained from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.6  I hand-collect non-financial 
                                                 
5 The classification of shares issued by Chinese publicly traded companies is based on liquidity, target 
investors, listing locations, and trading currencies. For instance, A-shares are stocks traded only in 
domestic markets and are available only to domestic investors before 2002, but are open to international 
investors as well after 2002. B-shares are also domestic market shares, but they target at international 
investors and are priced at U.S. dollars. For more details, please see Appendix C. 
6 The CSMAR China Stock Market Financial Database (Annual Report) is designed and developed by 
Centre for China Financial Research (CCFR) of the University of Hong Kong and GTA Information 
Technology Company Limited (GTA IT Co., Ltd.). It is the only database for Chinese stock market 
adopted in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). From 2000 to 2008, more than 98 English papers 
have used this database.  
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accounting data for all these firms from Compustat Global Vantage, Finance.Google, 
Finance.Yahoo, Finance.Sina, and Tonghuashun Stock Trading System (TSTS).   
As CSMAR does not provide industry identification number for listed firms, I 
obtain the industry code for each firm from the Compustat Global Vantage database. In 
merging these two databases, I took note of two things: First, in 46 cases, company 
names differ between the two databases as a result of translation problems, as well as of 
changes in company names over time. These differences are reconciled by searching 
Chinese company names in Finance.Google and Finance.Yahoo in order to determine the 
correct industry code for each company. Second, Compustat Global Vantage does not 
have industry codes for 83 listed Chinese firms. To maximize the sample size and 
assuming that firm share industry code with competing firms, I assign the industry code 
of a directly competing company to each firm that does not have industry code available 
in Compustat Global Vantage. Direct competing companies are obtained using 
Finance.Google.  
Also, the stock ownership data in each sample firm are hand-collected from 
Finance.Sina.  The data are used to gauge the influence of ownership structure on the 
results. Finance.Sina keeps records of all annual reports and the name of auditors for 
listed firms. The names of the top ten shareholders in each sample firm are hand-
collected from Finance.Sina.  The data are used to gauge ownership concentration levels.   
An important proxy for accounting quality is the value relevance of accounting 
information.  The historical stock prices used in the value relevant analysis are obtained 
from the Tonghuashun Stock Trading System (TSTS).  I download adjusted monthly 
 24
ending stock prices for firms and Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Indexes from TSTS, as a 
proxy for market returns. 7 
 
3.2.2 Sample Procedure 
[insert TABLE 1] 
 
Table 1 Panel A summarizes how the initial 1240 distinct firms with 8353 firm-
years observations result in the final sample of 654 distinct firms with 4096 firm-years 
observations.  Following the literature, I exclude six financial institutions (76 firm-year 
observations) from the initial samples because these firms have different characteristics 
and estimated abnormal accruals that are not comparable to firms in other industries 
(Klein, 2002). I eliminate 12 firm-year observations because of missing values. This 
sampling procedure yields 1,234 firms with 8,265 firm-year observations. Because this 
paper focuses on a comparison of accounting quality between rules-based and principles-
based accounting systems, I exclude 580 firms with 4169 firm-years observations that 
does not represent in both accounting regimes in China. Therefore, the final sample 
consists of 654 distinct firms with 4095 firm-year observations. These firms have 
accounting and market data available under rules-based and principles-based systems, 
two accounting regimes of interest.  
 
                                                 
7 TSTS provides historical trading data adjusted for effects on share prices of rights offerings, cash 
dividends, stock dividends, etc. 
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Table 1 of Panel B presents the number of firm-year observations by calendar 
year from 1992 to 1997 (rules-based period) and 2001 to 2004 (principles-based period), 
number of final firm-year observations in each year for SOE and the percentage of SOE 
in each year, respectively. During rules-based system in China (1992-1997), years 1997 
(654) and 1996 (456) have the largest firm-year observations, with each remaining year 
having data below 300. In contrast, principles-based period appears to have larger firm-
year observations, particularly from 2001 to 2003. I find similar data distribution for SOE. 
These firms have larger firm-year observations than do the private enterprises (PE). Chen 
et al. (2003) provides similar sample distributions between SOE and PE.8  
Table 1 of Panel C provides final sample distribution by first-digit SIC industry 
classification. The sample is distributed across a wide range of industries, with a 
concentration in manufacturing, transportation, trade, and service industries. To check the 
sensitivity of results to industry clustering, I repeat the general analyses for industries 
with high concentration of sample firms and the results are generally consistent with the 
results reported for the final sample. I provide further discussion of industry results on the 
robustness section of chapter 4. 
 
3.2.3 Sub-sample: State-owned (SOE) and private firms (PE) 
One notable feature of Chinese stock ownership structure is that the state has a 
significantly high stake (either directly or indirectly) in the majority of listed firms as a 
result of incomplete privatization of former state-owned enterprises (Chen et al. 2003; Xu 
                                                 
8 Before the sample selection, the percentage of SOEs in the total 1240 distinct firms is 86% in the sample 
period.  
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2004). I define partially privatized firms with state-ownership (shares directly owned by 
the state) and institutional-ownership (shares indirectly owned by the state) as state-
owned firms (SOEs), whereas firms with only private/individual ownership are defined as 
private firms (PEs). Because state-owned enterprises (SOE) and private enterprises (PE) 
have distinctive institutional features that are likely to influence accounting quality, I 
separate the final sample into SOE and PE sub-samples and repeat the analyses on the 
total samples to gouge the effect of their differences on the results. The differences 
between the two sub-samples are manifested in various forms, including level of 
government supervision (SASAC), financing sources, managerial compensation, 
government support, ownership structure and level of bureaucracy. These differences are 
likely to shape accounting quality in rules-based and principles-based accounting regimes. 
Exhibit 2 summarizes the differences between SOE and PE discussed below:  
 [insert exhibit 2] 
 
Levels of bureaucracy. Thibodeau et al. (2007) and Ndubizu et al. (2008) find 
that private and state-owned enterprises have distinctly different levels of bureaucracy, 
with SOEs being more bureaucratic than private enterprises. Because rules-based 
accounting shares major features of bureaucracy, I expect SOE to have more rigid rules-
based accounting than do the PE. Also, the cost of implementing rules-based is likely to 
vary with SOE having lower costs. For these reasons, I argue that SOEs are less likely to 
provide high quality accounting information to investors. 
Ownership concentration. Leuz (2006) and Ndubizu and Hong (2008) find that 
ownership concentration shapes the quality of accounting information. In particular, they 
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find that firms with a concentrated ownership structure have weaker incentives to convey 
private, insider-value-relevant information (through reported financial statements) to 
investors because the large stock-holders presumably have direct access to virtually all of 
a company’s inside information. Given that SOEs tend to have more concentrated 
ownership structure, I argue that these firms have less incentive to provide more 
informative public disclosure. 
Governmental support. When state-owned enterprises experience serious and 
consecutive losses, they might obtain various types of support from the local government. 
Article 157 of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994) stipulates that 
if a firm reports losses for three consecutive years, its shares should be suspended from 
trading or de-listed from stock exchanges. Firms in this category are labeled with an 
initial of ST in stock exchanges. To save them from further losses, the local or even the 
central government might offer these firms more favorable policies, tax reduction, or a 
lower cost of debt from commercial banks.  
The most direct support local governments offers is fiscal subsidies, which 
comprise of refund of value added tax actually received or any lump-sum subsidy 
determined based on volume of sales or work performed and any other form of subsidy 
under the State’s economic subvention plan”. 9 Chen et al. (2003) argue that local 
government officials have incentives to offer more subsidies to SOEs than PE because 
their promotion and compensations are linked to the success of SOEs. These officials 
prefer to use fiscal subsidies rather than taxes to rescue financially distress SOEs for two 
reasons: First, they have unsupervised authority to determine the amount of subsidies to 
SOEs. Second, they can increase budget for subsidies when necessary. Private firms may 
                                                 
9 Article 106 section (4) of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises. 
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also receive subsidies from local governments. However, because of their incentive 
structure, officials channel most of the subsidies to SOEs. Given the differences in 
subsidies, I argue that SOEs have less incentive to improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 10 
Managerial compensation. SOEs and PE have different managerial 
compensation plan. Dechow (1994) argues that managerial compensation plan creates 
reporting incentives. Empirical evidence reveals that CEOs manage earnings to meet 
thresholds (e.g., positive earnings, increase in earnings, or market expectations about 
stock prices) to support stock price performance (Degeorge et al.[1999]; Matsunaga and 
Park [2001]). Also, managers manipulate earnings downward before stock-option award 
dates in order to increase the possibility of in-the-money options (Subramanyam [1996] 
and Moehrles [2002]). In Chinese setting, local government officials appoint the 
management team of the SOEs and cover up their inefficiencies with large amount of 
subsidies, if needed. The presence of governmental intervention weakens SOE managers’ 
control over businesses as well as the pay-for-performance relationship. In contrast to PE, 
CEOs of SOEs are not awarded stock options or other performance based compensation 
plan. 11 Therefore, SOEs are less likely than PEs to manage earnings for private gains. 12     
                                                 
10 One might argue that fiscal subsidies might spoil state-owned firms, by giving them fewer incentives to 
improve economic performance. I cannot rule out this possibility. However, we know that the use of fiscal 
subsidies must have limits. Local government support is subject to budget constraints; therefore, they can 
only grant subsidies to help firms that will survive or perform better after having received these subsidies 
for a limited period of time. Therefore, state-owned firms still have incentives to work better and harder in 
order to stay in business. 
11 The rule regulating stock awards to CEOs in state-owned listed firms have come into force since 
September 30, 2006. Because this is outside our sample period, I do not consider the impact of stock 
awards on earnings management.  
12 Contrary to this expectation, Chen et al. (2001b) argue that CEOs in state-owned firms have incentives to 
manage earnings in order to prevent adverse reactions from the labor market. These executives receive 
significant perks, such as larger houses, luxury commodities, and more liberal expense accounts. Such 
benefits are forfeited if the executive is fired for poor performance. Accordingly, the managers have 
incentives to manage earnings in order to mask poor performance. (The presumption is that managers’ 
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 Financing sources. The differences between debt and equity financing could 
have implications for accounting quality. The extant literature finds that firms manage 
earnings to maximize cash infusions at the initial equity offerings (Teoh et al. [1998a] 
and [1998b]) and to avoid technical violations of existing lending agreements (Healy and 
Palepu [1990] and DeAngelo [1994]). The evidence also shows that managers manipulate 
earnings prior to stock acquisitions (Erickson and Wang [1998]). In China’s emerging 
capital market, state-owned firms and private firms differ significantly in their financing 
sources. Because state owns banks in China, SOEs obtain most of their financing through 
debt, while PEs receive financing through equity offerings. The existence of common 
control for SOEs and banks creates little incentive for SOEs to manage earnings to avoid 
technical defaults on their loan. Private enterprises and their lenders, by contrast, are 
separate entities and avoiding technical default is an important incentive to manage 
earnings. Therefore, the discretionary component of accruals in PEs’ reported earnings 
contains more noise than that in SOEs’ reported earnings. On the other hand, PEs are 
more reliant upon the stock market than SOEs, so they have incentives to provide high 
quality financial information in order to win investors’ confidence. In view of these two 
conflicting argument, I give no directional prediction on the effect of the difference in 
debt-versus equity-financing ability between SOEs and PEs on the quality of accounting 
information. 
Level of governmental supervision (SASAC). In addition to CSRC supervision 
and corporate governance for all listed firms, state-owned firms, unlike private ones, are 
also under the supervision of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
                                                                                                                                                 
compensation and firms’ performance are connected.) Nevertheless, Lin (2001) contends that there is no 
managerial job market in the state sector and SOE managers receive relatively fixed and standardized 
remunerations. My personal experience conforms to Lin’s (2001) argument.  
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Commission (SASAC). The ultimate owner of state shares in each state-owned firm is the 
State Council of China (SCC). The SASAC of the SCC functions as the regulating and 
supervising body for all state-owned companies, including both those publicly listed and 
those not publicly listed (for the sake of simplicity, these are all considered SOEs). The 
total number of large-scale SOEs, as of 2004, is 31,750. Given this huge number, and the 
fact that the firms are scattered throughout China, the SASAC has to delegate the 
monitoring tasks to a local agency, the Bureau of State Property Management (BSPM). 
However, the effectiveness of this monitoring remains questionable. Consider, for 
instance, that two-thirds of the firms that received CSRC enforcement actions in 2002 
and 2003 were state-owned firms. One might argue, however, that this number is lower 
than expected, since over 80 percent of listed firms are state-owned. Because there is no 
direct evidence that the SASAC is ineffective, I argue that the SASAC enhances 
corporate governance structure in SOEs and discourage firms from engaging in an 
aggressive earnings management. 
In summary, I argue that the differences between SOEs and PEs as discussed 
above may affect the quality of accounting information. As such, I explicitly control for 
the differences in the research design. The advantage of examining SOEs’ and PEs’ sub-
samples separately is to alleviate the confounding effects of the differences on the results. 
 
3.3 Variable Measurement 
In this section, I discuss how I estimate the amount of comparability, earnings 
management (accounting and real earnings management), informativeness of 
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contemporaneous earnings and their components and value relevance of earnings for 
rules-based and principles-based systems in China.  
 
3.3.1 Estimating Comparability 
 I use two approaches to estimate comparability. First, I measure the volatility of 
earnings, accruals, and discretionary accruals, without controls for other sources of 
volatility not directly related to rules-based and principles-based standards. I use 
volatility as a proxy for comparability among firms under each accounting regime. 
Second, I measure volatility after controlling for other sources of volatility. 
 
3.3.1.1 First Approach: No Controls for Volatility Relevant Variables 
Measuring the amount of comparability poses exceptional difficulties, as such, I 
use volatility of earnings (Earn), accruals (ACCR), and discretionary accruals (DA), 
without controls, as proxies for comparability (Cmpb=σ2) in each accounting system. 
Earn is the bottom-line net income. ACCR and DA are measured in line with the 
literature and discuss below:  
ACCR. Because cash flow statements are available only after 1998 in China, I 
first use the traditional balance sheet model (Healy 1985; Jones 1991)13 to estimate total 
accruals consistently over different accounting regimes. The balance-sheet-based 
modified Jones model is expressed as follows: 
ACCR (i,t) = ΔCA(i,t)  – ΔCL (i,t)  – ΔCash (i,t)  + ΔSTD(i,t ) – DEP (i,t)                   (1) 
                                                 
13 Dechow et al. (1995) specify the balance sheet model of total accruals as: Total accruals=current period 
(change in current assets - change in current liabilities - change in cash + change in short-term debt – 
change in accumulated depreciations)/total assets in period t-1.  
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where ACCR (i,t)  = total accruals for firm i in year t, ΔCA (i,t ) = change in current assets 
for firm i from year t-1 to t, ΔCL (i,t ) = change in current liabilities for firm i from year t-1 
to t, ΔCash (i,t ) = change in cash and cash equivalent for firm i from year t to t-1, ΔSTD 
(i,t)  = change in short-term debt for firm i from year t to t-1, and DEP (i,t)  = depreciation 
and amortization expenses in year t. 
DA. In the extant literature, various models are used to estimate discretionary 
accruals.14 Among them, the modified Jones model initiated in Dechow et al. (1995) is 
widely used to capture earnings management. Kothari et al. (2005) fine-tune this model, 
showing that performance-controlled modified Jones model mitigates model 
misspecification in the estimation of discretionary accruals. Build on the finding in 
Kothari et al. (2005), I use a performance controlled version of the modified Jones model, 
as specified in expression (2), for the purpose of estimating discretionary accruals, as 
follows: 
ACCR(i,t) = b0  + b1(ΔREV(i,t) – ΔREC(i,t) ) + b2 PPE (i,t) + b3ROA(i,t) + e (i,t)       (2) 
where ΔREV (i,t)  = net sales for firm i in year t less net sales in year t-1, ΔREC (i,t)  = 
receivables for firm i in year t less receivables in year t-1, PPE (i,t) = property, plants, and 
equipment for firm i in year t, ROA(i,t) =return on assets for firm i in year t, and e (i,t)  = 
error term. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets to control for scaling effect.  
Subtracting the change in accounts receivables in the non-discretionary model (1) 
assumes that credit sales are discretionary (Dechow et al. [1995] and [2003]). The 
                                                 
14 For example, Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998), and 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) use aggregate accruals models, while McNichols and Wilson (1988), 
Petroni (1992), Beaver and Engel (1996), Beneish (1997),  Beaver and McNichols (1998), and Phillips, 
Pincus and Rego (2003) use specific accruals models. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999), Myers and Skinner (1999), and Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) examine frequency 
distributions around important earnings thresholds (avoiding losses, avoiding earnings declines and 
avoiding negative forecast errors). 
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regression is estimated for each first-two-digit SIC industry of at least 10 firms in each 
fiscal year.15 The coefficient estimates in the non-discretionary equation (2) are used to 
compute discretionary accruals, which comprise the difference between the total accruals 
and the non-discretionary accruals from equation (2). 
 
3.3.1.2 Second Approach: Controls for Volatility Relevant Variables 
Second, based on existing theory and economic intuition, I control for variables 
other than accounting standards that may explain the variance in the amount of 
comparability. Residuals are obtained through annual cross-sectional estimations of 
equation (3) and form the basis for the comparability metric (Cmpb=σ2e). Large (small) 
variance (of residuals) signals low (high) comparability. 
DV (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t)   
                       + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t)  
                + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t)  
                + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                              (3) 
 
where DV = interested comparability variables, including net income (Earn), total 
accruals (ACCR), and discretionary accruals (DA). The control variables include China-
specific factors, state-ownership and cultural numerology, that have potential effects on 
the quality of accounting information as well as universal earnings-quality relevant 
factors (e.g., growth, risk, leverage, etc) documented in the literature (Firth et al. [2007], 
Lang et al. [2006], etc). These control variables are discussed below:  
                                                 
15 If not enough firms are available in a two-digit SIC industry classification, I use the first digit of the sic 
code to estimate industry-specific parameters. 
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State-ownership (SO). I first control for the effect of state-ownership on 
reporting quality because the differences between SOE and PE may influence the amount 
of comparability. Holthausen (2003), Ball et al. (2000), Ball et al. (2003), Burgstahler et 
al. (2006), and Ndubizu and Hong (2008) provide evidence indicating that differences in 
institutional features determine accounting quality. In the context of Chinese accounting, 
Firth et al. (2007) find that the market’s assessment of accounting earnings is conditional 
on the ownership structures of firms in their sample period (1998-2003). In light of the 
noted differences between SOEs and PEs that may affect accounting quality (discussed in 
Section 3.2.3), I control for the level of state-ownership in equation (3), assuming a linear 
relationship between accounting information and state-ownership. State-ownership is 
measured as the percentage of state- or institutional-owned shares in the total shares. 
Cultural Numerology (PE*FD). Based on the numerology literature and 
Areddy’s (2007) finding of numerological investing strategies in China, I also control for 
cultural numerology in equation (3). The extant literature is scanty on how cultural 
numerology affects financial reporting quality. However, the numerology literature has 
found evidence that listed firms, for the purpose of pleasing investors, may take 
advantage of cognitive limitations, manipulating numbers upward (e.g., manage earnings 
per share upward from 1.99 to 2.01) or downward (e.g., from -2.01 to -1.99). Similar 
evidence is found in New Zealand (Carslaw [1988]), and United States (Thomas [1989]). 
More recently, Das and Zhang (2003) provide evidence that firms round up earnings per 
share in order to meet the behavioral thresholds (positive earnings, maintenance of 
performance, and analysts’ forecasted earnings) documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). These studies all suggest that the figures contained in 
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accounting numbers have meanings beyond their literal value. This phenomenon is even 
more widespread in Chinese culture. 
It is not uncommon that Chinese hold philosophical belief that numbers may 
signal good and bad luck in addition to its face value. In particular, in both Mandarin and 
Cantonese, the number eight (four) is associated with good (bad) luck for wealth or 
fortune. The appearance of multiple number eights (“88”, “888”, “8,888”) in a numeric 
code is considered even more auspicious than a single “8.” For example, if a company’ 
earnings per share (EPS) is eight in Chinese currency, this conveys two separate types of 
information. First, it conveys information about financial profitability that is necessary in 
determining future valuation. Second, according to numerology, the number eight in the 
EPS suggests that the company has good fortune and will be more profitable in the future. 
It is therefore not surprising that the kickoff time for next year’s Olympic Games in 
China is to be 8 p.m., on 8-8-2008. Similarly, the Bank of China trading room is located 
on the eight floor of the building. Also, the tallest skyscraper in China, the Jin Mao 
Tower, has 88 floors. 
Areddy (2007 Wall Street Journal May 24) provides numerous examples 
indicating that Chinese investors use culture-based numerological trading strategy (like 
gambling on the luck versus unlucky numbers in the stock market). One argument 
challenging Areddy’s (2007) finding is that in an efficient, matured market marginal 
investors may take advantage of the trading strategy and obtain abnormal returns. I 
cannot exclude this possibility. However, we note that China has, so far, a 17-year old 
developing stock market where individual investors make up about 80 percent of the 
daily trading volume. Most of the individuals are not sophisticated enough. Some of them 
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are not sophisticated enough to understand the risk inherent in the Chinese stock markets. 
This market condition gives management an opportunity to please Chinese investors by 
showing more luck number eights (less unlucky number fours) in reported accounting 
numbers. Even though this strategy may hardly affect stock prices, it may enhance the 
liquidity of a stock, thus, lowering the cost of equity capital.   
Management using cultural numerology to please investors need to use either costly 
real earnings management or accruals-based accounting earnings management. In either 
case, the mapping of current reported earnings into future cash flows realization is 
negatively affected. Therefore, firms pleasing investors by means of cultural 
numerological strategies are more likely to provide low quality of accounting information.  
However, the literature provides no guidance on the control of culture 
numerology effect, thus, I conduct preliminary tests (based on Feller, 1966) first to 
examine in which cases management are more likely to use cultural numerology as a tool 
to please investors.  
 
[insert Figure 2] 
Feller (1966) developed a proof that the empirical distribution of any integer N 
appearing as the first digit for numeric figures taken at random from a large body of 
physical or observational data is log10(N+1)-log10N. Feller's proof implies that the 
expected frequency of small digits (e.g., one, two, three, and four) should be higher than 
large digits (e.g., seven, eight, and nine). However, the expected frequency of each digit 
converges to ten percent as the value of figures increases. Based on this finding, I 
examine the realized frequency in reported earnings. The realized frequency of a digit 
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(from 0 to 9) is the sum of this digit’s frequency in reported earnings divided by the sum 
of all digits in the sample period. Figure 2 compares the differences in realized frequency 
between number “4” and “8” in the full sample, state-owned firms (SOEs), and non-state-
owned firms (PEs) over the sample period. No evidence is found in either the full sample 
or the SOEs that the frequency distribution of number “4” and “8” violates the Feller’s 
rule, suggesting that Chinese firms, in general, and the SOEs, in particular, do not use 
cultural numerology as a tool to please investors. However, I observe an obvious 
violation of the Feller’s rule in the PEs sample, where the realized frequency of number 
“4” is lower than that of number “8” in most sample years, or consistently over time.  
 
[insert Table 3] 
 
However, the observed difference between digit “4” and “8” could be suspicious 
if similar differences exist between other small and large digits. In view of this 
probability, I further investigate the realized frequency of all digits. Table 3 reports the 
result. The column under each digit shows the observed frequency. In Panel A (Full 
Sample) and Panel B (State-owned Firms), we observe no noticeable violation of Feller’s 
rule among other small and large digits. However, we can see, in Panel C (Non-state-
owned Firms) a sudden drop (increase) in the realized frequency of digit “4” (“8”), 
compared with its neighboring digits (e.g., “3” and “5”). This break in frequency 
distribution suggests that PEs are more likely to take advantage of culture numerology, 
even though the extent is limited. The observed frequency of digit “8” is no more than 
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one percent higher than that of digit “4”.16  Given a priori that digit “4” should have 
greater frequency than digit “8”, then the observed higher frequency for digit “8” is likely 
to be economically more significant. In light of this finding, I use the interaction between 
a dummy variable ( PE) and the frequency difference (FD) as a measure of numerology. 
PE is coded one for private firms and 0 otherwise. FD is calculated by subtracting the 
frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”.  
Ownership concentration (OC).  Leuz (2006) and Ndubizu and Hong (2008) 
argue that firms with high ownership concentration are more likely to use accounting 
earnings management to mask poor performance. To tease out this artificial increase in 
earnings, I control for ownership concentration in equation (3).  Ownership-concentration 
level is measured as the percentage of common shares controlled by the top three 
shareholders in firm i in year t. 
Audit quality (Audit). Auditing serves are an effective tool in reducing 
information asymmetries that exists between management and investors. Based on the 
conservatism principle, I expect auditors to object to earnings management that increases 
earnings. Becker et al. (1998) find that lower audit quality is associated with more 
discretionary accruals. Given the effect of audit on accounting numbers, I include audit 
quality in the model. I code firms with Big-6 audit firms in China as one and zero 
otherwise.  
 Loss. The Chinese companies face potential delisting if they make a loss for two 
consecutive years, or have a negative return on equity (ROE) for 3 consecutive years. 
Therefore, in order to meet the positive earnings threshold, managers have incentives to 
                                                 
16 I also examine the realized frequency of each digit in positive (negative) earnings. I observe similar 
results, which suggest that PEs are more likely to please investors’ by means of showing more lucky (less 
unlucky) numbers “8” (“4”) in reported earnings. 
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use discretionary accruals to boost earnings as documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997). For this reason, I use a dummy variable (Loss) coded one to represent loss firms 
and zero otherwise in equation (3).  
Lagged discretionary accruals (DA t-1). Choy (2004) documents that prior 
discretionary accruals have impact on managers’ accounting choices in the current 
accounting period, hence, affecting the reported earnings. Therefore, I control for last 
year discretionary accruals in equation (3).  
Cash flows (CFO). Lang et al. (2006) argue that cash flows may affect 
accounting characteristics, including volatility. Following Lang et al. (2006), I control for 
cash flows scaled by average total assets in equation (3). 
Absolute change in prior income (Abs∆NIt-1) and Leverage (Lev). Previous 
studies suggest that the absolute change in the previous year’s income and leverage have 
positive relation with current period discretionary accruals (Bartov et al.[2000]). 
Following this literature, I include absolute change in prior income and leverage (total 
debt over total equity) in the model to control for their effects on the volatility of 
discretionary accruals. 
Size.  I control for size because large firms are subject to more scrutiny from 
capital market participants, regulators, and supervising bodies (Holland and Jackson, 
2004), which inturn affect the characteristics of their accounting number, including 
volatility. For example, these firms are less inclined to engage in earnings management to 
boost profit or adopt income increasing accounting standards, cetris paribus. Size is 
measured as the nature log of market value of firm i in year t. 
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Risk and Growth (Grow). Firth (2007) argues that managers are more likely to 
exploit the discretionary latitude in a risky and high growth operating environment. This 
exploitation may produce accounting numbers with different characteristics. Following 
Firth (2007), I use the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock as a proxy 
for Risk and the market-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. 
Change in common stock (∆CS), change in long term debt (∆LBT) and assets 
turnover ratio (ATTO). Lang et al. (2006) suggest that managers have incentives to 
manage earnings when raising new capital. Furthermore, they believe captial intensity is 
associated with accruals behavior. Based on discussions in Lang et al. (2006), I control 
for captial-raising related effect by adding change in common stock, change in long term 
debt, and assets turnover ratio (sales divided by total assets) in equation (3). 
Finally, I control for Sales (Sale) and change in sales (∆Sale) in equation (3). 
Intuitively, sales and change in sales have positively impact on earnings. When sales 
increase, one reasonable expectation is that the accruals will increase as well (e.g., when 
sales increase, if the credit sale policy hold constant, the amount of accounting 
receivables will increase proportionally). However, management has both opportunistic 
and managerial incentives to use the accruals part to manipulate earnings either upward 
or downward in light of directional change in sales. Therefore, we expect a non-
directional, potential relation between sales and change in sales and accounting numbers. 
 
3.3.2 Estimating Earnings Management 
  The extant literature document two types of earnings management: real 
(transaction-based) earnings management and accounting (accruals-based) earnings 
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management (Ewert and Wagenhofer [2005] and Fan [2007]). I discuss below how each 
type of earnings management is measured, following the literature.  
3.3.2.1 Real (Transactions-based) Earnings Management 
Substantial evidence exists in the literature that executives engage in earnings 
management through two primary means. First is earnings management by manipulation 
of accruals. This type of earnings management is discussed in the next section. The 
second means of managing earnings is by real activites during an accounting period to 
meet important thresholds. This type of earnings management often have cash flows 
consequences. Following Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) models of 
abnormal activities, I estimate real earnings management by measuring abnormal 
inventory, cost of goods sold, production cost and discretionary expenditure, hereafter 
referred to as abnormal activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers engage in a 
range of activities. These models capture abnormal activities using residuals (e) and are 
discussed below: All variables are scaled by average total assets. 
First, the cost of goods sold (COGS) modles is expressed as:  
COGS(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t)   + e(i,t)                                                            (4) 
where COGS(i,t) = cost of goods sold for firm i in year t, and SALE(i,t) = sales for firm i in 
year t. The error term e is an estimate of abnormal COGS, a proxy for real earnings 
management . 
Equation (5) specifies the change in inventory model: 
∆INV(i,t) = b0  + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t)                           (5) 
 42
where ∆INV(i,t) = year-to-year change in inventory for firm i in year t, ∆SALE(i,t) = year-
to-year change in sales for firm i in year t. The error term e is an estimate of abnormal 
change in inventory ∆INV.  
Equation (6) is the production cost model: 
PROD(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t) + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t)      (6) 
where production costs (PROD) = sum of COGS and ∆INV. The error term e is an 
estimate of abnormal production costs PROD.  
Equation (7) is the model for abnormal discretionary expenses: 
DISEXP(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t)                                                    (7) 
where discretionary expenses (DISEXP) = sum of selling expenses and general and 
administrative expenses. The error term e is an estimate of abnormal discretionary 
expenses DISEXP.  
 
3.3.3.2 Accounting (Accruals-based) Earnings Management 
Earnings management by manipulation of accruals with no direct cash flows 
effect is hereafter referred to as accounting or accrual earnings management. In the extant 
literature, this type of earnings management is measured using discretionary accruals 
from Jones model as an empirical proxy. Dechow et al. (1995) provide evidence that 
modified Jones model better captures the discretionary accruals. Following the literature, 
I use modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) as improved by Kothari et al. (2005) to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) add a constant term to the model to 
alleviate misspecifications problems. I specify this model in Section 3.2.1.1. Because 
management may use accounting earnings management to push earnings either upward or 
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downward, the mean or median of signed discretional accruals is likely to be biased to 
zero, thus, underestimating the magnitude of accounting earnings management. 
Therefore, I measure the magnitude of account earnings management as the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. 
I first compare the mean (median) of the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
in the rules-bsed versus principles-based accounting regimes.  This research design does 
not require an assumption that a linear relation exists between accounting standards and 
the magnitude of discretioanry accruals. However, it does not control for confounding 
factors that may also explain the difference in the magnitude of discretioanry accruals 
across accounting regimes. In order to control for these factors, I modify equation (3) to 
directly examine the effect of accounting standards on the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals (AbsDA (i,t)) is the dependent 
variable described below in equation 3b.   
AbsDA (i,t) = b0  +  b1 Flex (i,t) + b2SO (i,t) + b3PE*FD (i,t) + b4OC (i,t) + b5Audit(i,t)  
        + b6 Loss(i,t)  + b7 DA (i,t-1) + b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t)  
        + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + b15 ATTO(i,t)  
        + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                              (3b) 
 
where AbsDA (i,t) = absolute value of performance controlled discretionary accruals, and 
Flex=accounting standards/flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for the principles-based 
accounting regime (Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I).  
 
3.3.3 Estimating Value relevance 
 In the extant literature, both price level models and stock return models are widely 
used to test the value relevance of earnings. Based on the price level model in Ohlson 
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(1995), Collins et al. (1999), Lang et al. (2006), and Ndubizu and Sanchez (2006), I 
examine the value relevance of accounting numbers in rules-based and principles-based 
regimes controlling for the potential confounding factors discussed in equation 4 above. 
The price level models are described in equations 8a and 8b below: 
 
P (i,t) =  b0 + b1 EPS(i,t)  + b2 Flex*EPS (i,t) + b3SO(i,t) + b4PE*FD (i,t) + b5OC (i,t)  
                 + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  + b8 Lev (i,t) + b9 Risk(i,t) + b10 Grow (i,t)  
                 + b11 BPS (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                                            (8a) 
 
P (i,t) = b0  + b1 Cash(i,t)  + b2 Flex*Cash(i,t)  + b3NDA (i,t) + b4Flex*NDA (i,t) + b5 DA(i,t)  
            + b6 Flex*DA (i,t) + b7SO (i,t) + b8PE*FD (i,t) + b9OC (i,t) + b10Audit(i,t) + b11 Size(i,t)   
                 + b12 Lev (i,t) + b13 Risk(i,t) + b14 Grow (i,t) + b11 BPS (i,t) + e (i,t)         (8b) 
 
where P(i,t)  =monthly ending stock price for firm i four months after the end of fiscal year 
t, EPS (i,t)= earnings per share for firm i in year t, Flex*EPS(i,t)= interaction between 
accounting flexibility and earnings per share for firm i in year t, Cash(NDA and DA) (i,t) = 
cash flows (non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals) scaled by number of 
shares for firm i in year t, and BPS(i,t) = book value per share for firm i in year t. 
To provide evidence based on a battery of empirical tests, I substitute price in 
equation 8a with stock returns, hereafter referred to as returns model.  This model is 
expressed as follows: 
  
R (i,t)     =  b0 + b1 ΔEPS(i,t)  + b2 Flex*ΔEPS (i,t) + b3SO(i,t) + b4PE*FD (i,t)  
                 + b5OC (i,t) + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  + b8 Lev (i,t) + b9 Risk(i,t)  
                 + b10 Grow (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                                    (9) 
 
where R(i,t)  = accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Index returns from four months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current 
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fiscal year end, ΔEPS (i,t) = change in earnings per share for firm i in year t, and 
Flex*ΔEPS (i,t) = interaction between accounting flexibility and change in earnings per 
share for firm i in year t. 
3.3.4 Estimating Earnings Informativeness 
Following Altamuro et al. (2005), I formalize the earnings-informative model in 
which cumulative future cash flows are regressed on the contemporaneous earnings and 
their component of cash flows, accruals and discretionary accruals. Because the focus of 
this study is on the informativeness of accounting numbers between rules-based and 
principles-based standards, I add accounting regimes dummy (Flex = 1 for principles-
based and zero for rules-based system) and their interaction with earnings and their 
components in the model. The coefficients on the interactive dummy capture the 
differences in earnings informativeness between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting regimes.  
As mentioned before, I also control for the following variables: I control for state-
ownership, cultural numerology, ownership concentration, audit quality, size, leverage, 
risk, and growth in the informativeness model described in equations 10a (total earnings 
model) and 10b (decomposed earnings [components] model) below: 17   
CFO (i,t+y) = b0  +  b1 Earn(i,t)  + b2 Flex*Earn(i,t) + b3SO (i,t) + b4PE*FD (i,t)  
                    + b5OC (i,t) + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  + b8 Lev (i,t) + b9 Risk(i,t)  
                                                 
17 Ndubizu and Hong (2008) also document that investor protection and financial transparency positively 
affect the informativeness of discretionary accruals. However, since the Economic Freedom of the World: 
1998/1999 Interim Report (1998) and Lang et al. (2006) rank China as one of the low-investor-protection 
countries, therefore, I suspect that this variable has a constant impact on the informativeness of 
discretionary accruals. I acknowledge that CSRC does take measures to enhance financial transparency, but 
I do not control for it for two reasons. First and foremost, there is no reliable measure of it in China. Second, 
to have a dummy variable set for 1 for high transparency for firm years in principles-based system and 0 for 
low transparency in rules-based system would perfectly correlate with the accounting flexibility dummy 
variable. In view of the multicollinearity problem, I intentionally omit this variable.  
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                    + b10 Grow (i,t) + e (i,t)                                            (10a) 
  
CFO (i,t+y) = b0  + b1 CFO(i,t)  + b2 Flex*CFO(i,t)  + b3NDA (i,t)  + b4Flex*NDA (i,t)  
                    + b5 DA(i,t) + b6 Flex*DA (i,t) + b7SO (i,t) + b8PE*FD (i,t) + b9OC (i,t)  
                    + b10Audit(i,t) + b11 Size(i,t)  + b12 Lev (i,t) + b13 Risk(i,t) + b14 Grow (i,t)  
                    + e (i,t)                                            (10b) 
 
where CFO (i,t+y) =cumulative future cash flows scaled by year-end total assets for firm i 
one, two, three, and four years ahead, Earn(i,t) =total earnings scaled by total assets for 
firm i in year t,  Flex*Earn(i,t) =interaction between accounting flexibility and earnings 
scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, CFO (i,t) = cash flows scaled by total assets for 
firm i in year t, Flex*CFO(i,t) =interaction between accounting flexibility and cash flows 
scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, NDA (i,t) = non-discretionary accruals scaled by 
total assets for firm i in year t, Flex*NDA(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility 
and non-discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, DA (i,t)= ROA 
controlled discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, and 
Flex*DA(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility and discretionary accruals scaled 
by total assets for firm i in year t. 
Following the literature (Altamuro et al. 2005; Lang et al. 2006), I control for 
fixed year- and firms-effects when using panel data in the model (8a), (8b), (9), (10a) and 
(10b). I control for fixed year-effects because year specific factors in the sample period 
may have an impact on cash flows and stock prices. For example, Chinese government 
supports economic growth by means of massive increase in government expenditure 
during 1990s, especially after Asian financial crisis. This economic expansion policy 
benefits a number of industries, including manufacturing, construction, and services. 
However, since the new millennium, the state takes tight monetary policy to control for 
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overheated economy. These two policies, obviously, have opposite effects on firms’ sales 
and earnings. Since macroeconomic factors are year specific and may be correlated with 
the independent variables, these effects could bias the regression coefficients. Therefore, 
I include fixed year-effect in the above model to control for macroeconomic and other 
year-specific omitted variables. Similarly, even though I control for a number of firm-
level institutional factors in both price and return models, omitted variables still raise 
concerns of model misspecification. For example, corporate social responsibility and 
corporate culture both are likely to have effects on accountants’ application of accounting 
standards, thus, altering the reported accounting numbers. If these firm-specific effects 
are constant over time, they should be controlled for by including fixed firm-effects in the 
above model. Since I have controlled for fixed year-effects and the accounting standards 
dummy variable (Flex) is correlated with fixed year-effects, I drop Flex from the 
informativeness, price and return models. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 In this chapter, I discuss findings from univariate and multivariate analyses on 
each of the hypothesis. To ensure that the findings reported are not an artifact of the 
research method, I use a battery of test statistics including alternative measures of 
discretionary accruals. Also, I provide detailed robustness tests to enhance the reliability 
of inferences.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
[insert Table 3] 
Table 3, Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for 
the sample firms and the differences between rules-based and principles-based systems. 
The differences between these two accounting regimes are significant for all test 
variables, with the rules-based system having higher earnings (Earn), accruals (ACCR), 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA), production cost (PROD), change in inventory ( INV), 
and returns (R) than do the principles-based standards. In contrast, the principles-based 
system has more discretionary accruals (DA). These findings are consistent with the 
characteristics of rules-based and principles-based systems. Therefore, descriptive 
statistics line up for each accounting regime as expected. Also, firms report significantly 
higher discretionary expenses (DISEXP), cash flows (CFO), and stock prices in 
principles-based regime. However, stock market adjusted twelve month accumulated 
returns (R) are lower in the principles-based system. 
The control variables are significantly different between rules-based and 
principles-based systems, with the exception of lagged discretionary accruals and 
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ownership concentration (OC). This finding suggests that the control variables are 
important factors in the research setting. Among all control variables, I find that state-
ownership (SO) is significantly higher in rules-based than in the principles-based regime. 
This result suggests that government effort to privatizing Chinese economy appears to be 
working. The difference in cultural numerology (PE*FD) between the two groups is 
marginally significant.  
Table 3, Panel B provides a correlation matrix for test and control variables, with 
Spearman correlations in the upper quadrant and Pearson correlations in the lower 
quadrant. Although correlations between variables are significant in most cases, they are 
generally modest in economic terms, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a substantive 
concern in the predictive models used in the study. 
 
4.2 Tests of H1 (Comparability Hypothesis) 
[insert Table 4] 
Table 4 presents the volatility of earnings (Earn) and their components of accruals 
(ACCR) and discretionary accruals (DA) in rules-based and principles-based standards 
and the differences between these two accounting regimes for the full sample (Panel A), 
state-owned firms (Panel B) and private firms (Panel C). I find that the volatility of 
earnings (p=0.00) and their components of ACCR (p=0.04) and DA (p=0.00) are 
significantly higher in the principles-based regime than do in the rules-based system. 
Similar results are documented in Panels B and C of Table 4 for state-owned and private 
firms, respectively. These results support the alternative hypothesis that the principles-
 50
based system has more accounting volatility than the rules-based regime. Therefore, it 
appears that professional judgment or managerial accounting method choices common in 
a principles-based regime are forcing different accounting treatment for dissimilar 
arrangements that otherwise would be treated the same under a rules-based system. 
 
[insert Table 5] 
Because accounting volatility may change due to factors unrelated to rules and 
principles-based standards, I repeated the analysis in Table 4 controlling potential 
confounding variables. The volatility for each variable (Earn, ACCR and DA) is 
measured as the variance of the residuals from the pooled regression on independent and 
control variables. Table 5 presents results on volatility and differences between rules and 
principles-based regimes for the full sample in (Panel A), state-owned firms (Panel B), 
and private firms (Panel C). The coefficients on the independent and control variables are 
reported in Panel D of Table 5. These coefficients are significant suggesting that the 
control variables explain some portion of accounting volatility. Consistent with results in 
Table 4, I find that the volatility of earnings (Earn, p=0.00), accruals (ACCR, p=0.00) 
and discretionary accruals (DA, p=0.00) is significantly higher in the principles-based 
regime than do in the rules-based system. I find similar results across the sub-samples of 
state-owned and private firms. It appears that the increased volatility in the principles 
based regime is not influenced by confounding factors. Therefore, it appears that 
managerial accounting choices and the removal of both scope and treatment exception 
intended to smooth income increase accounting volatility in the principles-based regime. 
Given that principles-based standards capture economic substance more than rules-based 
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system, I speculate that the increased volatility reflects the inherent economic fluctuation, 
including information risk.  
In summary, Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence that comparability of accounting 
information decreases after the adoption of IFRS, principles-based standards in China. 
Therefore, principles-based accounting standards matter. It increases accounting quality 
in China.  
4.3 Tests of H2-4 (Earnings Smoothness Hypotheses) 
                                                [insert Table 6] 
Because principles-based standards have more earnings volatility, I provide 
additional insight on accounting quality using earnings smoothness metrics for rules-
based and principles-based standards. This proxy for earnings management is developed 
following Lang et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2006).18 Table 6 presents results for the 
new proxy referred to as variance of change in net income (σ2∆NI), ratio of the variance in 
the change in net income and change in cash flows from operation (σ2∆CFO) and 
correlation (Corr) of accrual (ACCR) and cash flows (CFO) in the two accounting 
regimes. Consistent with higher accounting quality, I find that principles-based standards 
have a significantly higher variance of the change in net income, a higher ratio of the 
variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows and a significantly lower 
                                                 
18 Following Lang et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2006), I first obtained residuals of change in net income, 
change in cash flows, accruals, and cash flows for samples by regressing them on control variables, 
including state ownership (not controlled in the private firm subsample), cultural numerology (not 
controlled in the state-owned firm subsample), ownership concentration, audit quality, loss, lagged 
discretionary accruals, cash flows (not controlled in the accruals and cash flows models), absolute value of 
lagged net income, size, leverage ratio, risk, growth opportunity, change in common stock, change in long-
term liabilities, and assets turnover ratio. I measure variability of ΔNI (ΔCFO) as the variance of residuals 
from the above regression of the ΔNI (ΔCFO) on the control variables. The variability of ΔNI over ΔCFO 
is the ratio of the variability of ΔNI scaled by the variability of ΔCFO. Correlation of ACCR and CFO is 
the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CF regressions. 
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negative correlation between accruals and cash flows (σ2∆Earn_Principles=0.0030 versus 
σ2∆Earn_rules=0.0023, p<0.001). However, consistent with lower quality, I find that rules-
based standards have a significantly more negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flows (CorrPrinciples= -0.8527 versus Corrrules =-0.9012). Comparing state owned and 
private firms, I find that the former sub-sample has similar results, while private firms 
have insignificant results. Therefore, state owned firms appear to have higher quality 
standards in principles-based system.  
 
4.4 Tests of H5 (Real Earnings Management Hypothesis) 
[insert Table 7] 
Because a rules-based system fosters “check box” or compliance mentality, I 
expect managers to engage in real earnings management such as the use of price discount 
to temporary increase sales and/or over production to lower cost of goods sold. Following 
the literature (Roychowdhury [2006] and Dechow and Sloan [1991]), I use measures of 
abnormal operating activities as indicators of real earnings management. These measures 
include abnormal cost of goods sold (AbCOGS), abnormal production cost (AbPROD), 
abnormal change in inventory (AbINV) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABDISEXP). The abnormal values (residuals) are the unexplained portion of each 
dependent variable (cost of goods sold, change in inventory, production cost and 
discretionary expenses) in a pooled regression of independent and control variables. 
Larger residuals suggest more real earnings management.  
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Table 7 presents measures of real earnings management and the differences 
between rules-based and principles-based regimes for the full sample (Panel A), state-
owned firms (Panel B) and private firms (Panel C). The coefficients on the independent 
and control variables used to estimate the residuals are reported in Panel D of Table 7. 
Consistent with the alternative hypothesis, I find that the rules-based regime has 
significantly more abnormal cost of goods sold (p = 0.00), production cost (p = 0.00), 
change in inventory (p = 0.00) discretionary expenses (p = 0.00) than do the principles-
based regime. Similar results are reported across sub-samples of state-owned and private 
owned firms. Both mean and median tests provide consistent results. It appears from the 
results that rules-based system creates more incentives for managers to engage in costly 
real earnings management to subvert “check box” or compliance mentality of the system. 
I find evidence consistent with firms trying to manage earnings under the rules-based 
system with cost of goods sold, production costs, change in inventory and discretionary 
expenditure not explained by sales. In contrast, the same firms have relatively less 
abnormal cost of goods sold, production cost, inventory changes and discretionary 
expenditure in the principles-based regime. Therefore, this paper contributes to the 
literature by providing empirical evidence that firms engage in more real earnings 
management in the rules-based than in the principles-based accounting regime. The 
evidence provided is particularly pertinent in light of the current debate in U.S. on the 
merits of transitioning into the principles-based standards. 
In summary, Table 7 provides evidence that firm is likely to engage in real 
activities manipulation (use transactions to manage earnings) in the rules-based than in 
the principles-based accounting system. Therefore, the evidence supports the alternative 
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hypothesis that the rules-based system is associated with more real earnings management 
than the principles-based standards. 
 
4.4 Tests of H6 (Accounting Earnings Management Hypothesis) 
[insert Table 8] 
Table 8 presents discretionary accruals in rules-based and principles-based 
regimes and the differences between the two systems for the full sample (Panel A), state-
owned firms (Panel B) and private firms (Panel C). I find that the rules-based regime has 
significantly lower discretionary accruals than do the principles-based standards (t = -
4.19 and z = -2.95). Similar results are observed for state-owned firms (t = -4.21 and z = -
3.46), while the differences in discretionary accruals between the two accounting regimes 
are insignificant for private firms. However, the direction of the differences between 
accounting regimes is consistent across the sample groups. It appears from the results that 
accounting earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals is more evident 
in the principles-based regime than in the rules-based system. This result is not surprising 
in light of the fact that principles-based standards foster the exercise of professional 
judgment and create incentives for managerial accounting choices. 
[insert Table 9] 
Because of the limitation of Table 8 univariate tests in controlling potential 
confounding factors, I repeat the tests using multivariate tests and results are presented in 
Table 9. In the multivariate tests, absolute discretionary accruals are regressed on a 
dummy variable (Flex) representing accounting regimes (1 for principles-based and zero 
for rules-based) and control variables. The coefficients on Flex are 0.031 (t = 6.26) for 
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the full sample, 0.031 (t = 5.78) for state-owned firms and 0.028 (t = 2.22) for private 
firms. The positive and significant coefficients suggest that principles-based standards 
have more discretionary accruals than do the rules-based standards. Therefore, the 
principles-based system is more associated with accounting earnings management than 
the rules-based system. 
In summary, taken the results in Tables 7 to 9 together, it appears that firms 
engage in real earnings management in the rules-based regime but as these firms 
transition into principles-based standards they replace their costly real earnings 
management with less costly accounting earnings management. I refer to this dynamic as 
a substitution effect. Incidentally, Schipper (2003) and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) 
cautioned that substitution effect is likely as firms transition into the principles-based 
regime. Their prediction is based partially on the cost of earnings management imposed 
by the two accounting regimes. The rigid nature of rules-based system limits exercise of 
professional judgment and accounting earnings management in relation to real earnings 
management. In contrast, firms have incentives to exercise professional judgment and 
make accounting choices in a principles-based system. This paper contributes to the 
regulatory debate by providing empirical evidence consistent with managers relying on 
real earnings management in a rules-based system and accounting earnings management 
in a principles-based system (the substitution effect) as they transitioned into IFRS in 
China. This contribution is particularly pertinent in light of the current policy concerns 
that rules-based standards create incentives for firms to engage in the fraudulent financial 
reporting scandals.  
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4.6 Tests of H7 (Value Relevance Hypothesis)  
[insert Table 10] 
Given the findings above, H7 examines whether the value relevance of accounting 
numbers improves as firms transition from rules-based to principles-based accounting 
standards. Table 10 presents results of regressing stock prices per share on earnings 
(EPS), interaction of EPS and an accounting regime dummy (Flex =1 for principles-based 
and zero otherwise) and control variables. The variable of significant interest is the 
interaction term (Flex*EPS). The coefficients on Flex*EPS are 5.096 (t = 2.56) for full 
sample, 4.086 (t = 1.82) for state-owned firms and 10.647 (t = 2.08) for private firms. 
The positive and significant coefficients suggest that earnings in the principles-based 
regime are more associated with stock prices than earnings in the rules-based regime. 
Consistent with the alternative hypothesis, I find that principles-based earnings have 
more value relevant information. This finding contributes to the literature by providing 
evidence that principles-based standards produce higher quality accounting information.  
The adj-R2 for the price level model is high in economic terms. One reason for 
this high ajd-R2 is the incorporation of controls for fixed firm- and year-effects in the 
price model. These fixed effects are controlled for macro-economic effects and firm-
specific characteristics that may otherwise be omitted in explaining stock price reaction 
to reported earnings. Excluding these fixed effects reduces adj-R2 to 0.26 for all firm 
years, which is comparable to the finding (adj-R2 is 0.25 for firm years 1991-1998) in 
Chen et al. (2001a), but is higher than those reported in Alford et al. (1993) and Collins et 
al. (1997) based on U.S. stock markets. Second, Haw et al. (1999) and Chen et al. 
(2001a) attribute the observed high adj-R2  to fewer alternative information sources in 
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China, rare voluntary disclosure, more frequent trading based on accounting information, 
and investors’ functional fixation on Chinese firms’ earnings. 
 
[insert Table 11] 
 
One interest of this study is to examine if earnings components, especially the 
discretionary part of accruals, convey more information than earnings. Therefore, I repeat 
the analysis in Table 10 on the earnings components and interaction of accounting regime 
dummy (Flex) and cash flow (Flex*Cash), nondiscretionary accruals (Flex*NDA) and 
discretionary accruals (Flex*DA) and results are reported in Table 11. I find that the 
coefficients on Flex*cash and Flex*NDA are positive and significant for the full sample 
(4.721 [t = 5.33] and 4.664 [t = 2.31]) respectively. I find similar results for the state-
owned sub-sample. However, I find positive and significant coefficient on Flex*DA for 
only state-owned firm (3.377, t = 2.42). This finding suggests that earnings components, 
including the measure of accounting earnings management, are more closely associated 
with stock prices in principles-based accounting regime. 
 
[insert Table 12] 
Collins et al. (1999) and Ndubizu and Sanchez (2006) find that loss has different 
valuation properties from profit in the simple earnings capitalization model augmented 
with book value of equity. They find that negative earnings are not informative for firms 
that use U.S. GAAP in Chile and IAS in Peru. For this reason, I use similar earnings 
valuation model in rules-based and principles-based regimes in China and results 
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reported in Table 12, Panel A for profit (net income > 0) and loss (net income< 0) firms. I 
find that principles-based standards have positive and significant coefficients on earnings 
for profit (20.859, t = 5.46) and loss (15.099, t = 8.88) firms, while rules-based standards 
have insignificant coefficients. I find similar results for the returns model except that 
rules-based standards have positive and significant coefficient on change in EPS for 
profit firms. 
Because timely loss recognition increases the value relevance of accounting 
amounts for bad news (Ball et al. [2000]), I repeat the above analyses by adding 
interaction of accounting regime dummy and earnings (Flex*EPS) for bad news (returns 
< 0) and good news (returns > 0) firms and results are presented in Panel B of Table 12. 
Given that principles-based standards are coded one and rules-based coded zero 
(accounting regime dummy = Flex), a positive and significant coefficient on Flex*EPS 
suggests higher value relevance for principles-based standards. Prior studies suggest that 
higher quality accounting amounts are more value relevant (Lang et al. [2003], Lang et 
al. [2006] and Barth et al. [2006]), I expect principles-based standards to have more value 
relevance of accounting amounts for bad news firms. Without controlling for potential 
confounding factors, I find that the coefficients on the interaction of accounting regime 
dummy and earnings (Flex*EPS) are positive and significant in the good news and bad 
news analyses for full sample and state-owned sub-sample. I find similar results in the 
bad news model for private firms. When I include the control variables in the models 
(Panel C), I find that the coefficients on Flex*EPS are positive and significant only in the 
bad news models for full sample (5.967, t = 3.00), state-owned firms (5.435, t =2.52) and 
private firms (11.259, t = 2.00). Consistent with Ball et al. (2000), the results suggest that 
 59
bad news is more informative in the principles-based regime in China. This evidence is 
pertinent in light of the current regulatory debate on the merits of transitioning into the 
principles-based standards. In contrast, bad news is less informative in rules-based 
regime in which accounting choices are constrained. This finding is consistent with 
Collins et al. (1999) and Ndubizu and Sanchez (2006) results suggesting that losses are 
not informative about future operation in countries that use U.S. GAAP, rules-based 
standards. This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence consistent with 
profit (good news) and loss (bad news) having different valuation properties under rules-
based and principles-based regimes.  
 
                                                         [insert Table 13] 
 
Following the literature (Firth et al. 2007), I also examine the ability of earnings 
to explain variation in returns in different accounting regimes. Table 13 presents results 
for change in earnings, book value of equity and control variables based on equation (9). 
Consistent with the literature, change in earnings per share (∆EPS) is positive and 
significantly associated with market adjusted stock returns for the full sample and the 
sub-samples. However, the coefficients on the variable of interest (Flex*∆EPS) are 
insignificant, but appear to have the predicted sign.  
                                         [insert Table 14] 
Following Ball et al. (2000) and Barth et al. (2006), I break the returns analysis 
down into good news and bad news groups using simple and complex models. In the 
simple model, returns are regressed on change in earnings (∆EPS), change in book value 
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per share (∆BPS) and interaction of accounting regime dummy and earnings 
(Flex*∆EPS). The complex model includes the control variables. Table 14 presents 
results for simple model in Panel A and complex model in Panel B. In both Panels A and 
B, the coefficients on Flex*∆EPS are insignificant except in bad news analysis for state-
owned firms. I find that state firms with bad news have positive and significant 
coefficients on Flex*∆EPS for simple model (0.509, t = 2.31) and complex model (0.460, 
t = 2.09). This finding suggests that bad news has more value relevance earnings in 
principles-based regime than do in the rules-based system. 
In summary, the evidence in Tables 10 to 14 together appears to support the 
alternative hypothesis that principles-based standards improve the value relevance of 
accounting information. In particular, losses appear to be more informative in principles-
based regime than in rules-based system. Therefore, I cannot reject the proposition that 
earnings reported under principles-based IFRS are more value relevant to investors in 
China.  
 
4.7 Tests of H8 (Informative Earnings Hypothesis) 
[insert Table 15] 
To provide additional evidence on the quality of earnings in rules-based and 
principles-based regimes, I compare the informativeness of earnings between the two 
accounting systems in predicting one-year ahead, two-year ahead and three-year ahead 
cash flows. Following the literature (Altamuro et al. [2005]), I regress future cash flows 
on earnings (Earn), interaction of earnings and accounting regime dummy (Earn*Flex) 
and control variables. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 15. I find that the 
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coefficients on Earns are positive and significant at the 0.01 levels for the full sample and 
state-owned firms. The finding suggests that the contemporaneous earnings predict future 
cash flows up to three-year ahead. However, the variable of great interest is the 
coefficients on Earn*Flex. These coefficients are positive and significant in three-year 
ahead-model for full sample and private firms. 
Consistent with the value relevance results, earnings (Earn) and the interaction of 
accounting regime dummy and Earn (Flex*Earn) are positively associated with future 
cash flows. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant in the one- and 
two-years-ahead models. The significant and positive coefficients on state-ownership 
variable (SO) in the one- and two-years-ahead models suggest that the higher the state-
ownership the more predictable is the future cash flows. The significant and negative 
coefficient on cultural numerology (PE*FD) indicates that private firms which take 
advantage of cultural belief in numbers have less predictable future cash flows. This 
negative effect is more evident for the sub-sample of private firms, see in Panel C.   
[insert Table 16] 
To provide additional insight, I disaggregate earnings in the above analysis into 
their components of cash flows, discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals and 
provide new results in Table 16. I find that the coefficients on Flex*Cash are positive and 
significant in all analyses for the full sample and one-year and two-year ahead analyses 
for the state-owned firms. The coefficients on Flex*NDA are positive and significant in 
one-year ahead analysis for full sample and state-owned firms. The results suggest that 
principles-based standards have more informative contemporaneous cash flows and non-
discretionary accruals. I also find similar results for discretionary accruals in all analyses 
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for the full sample and in one-year and two-year ahead-models for the sub-sample of 
state-owned firms. Because discretionary accruals are proxy for accounting earnings 
management, the results suggest that principles-based standards have more informative 
earnings management than do rules-based system. Therefore, I contribute to the literature 
by providing evidence indicating that accounting numbers from principles-based 
standards are more informative than the corresponding numbers from the rules-based 
system.  
 
4.8 Additional Tests 
4.8.1. Robustnes Test One: Total Population  
[insert Tables 17] 
 As part of the robustness tests, I repeat all analyses on the sample firms on the 
total population of publicly listed firms in rules-based and principles-based regimes. The 
untabulated results on value relevance and earnings informativeness are qualitatively 
similar to the results reported for the sample firms. For brevity, I provide results for 
comparability and earnings management on Table 17. Consistent with the sample firms 
results, in Panel A, I find that principles-based standards have more volatility of earnings 
(Earn; -0.001, p = 0.00), accruals (ACCR: -0.005, p = 0.00) and discretionary accruals 
(DA: -0.004, p = 0.00) than do the rules-based standards. This evidence supports the 
notion that principles-based system allows different accounting treatments for dissimilar 
arrangements that otherwise would be treated the same under rules-based system.  
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            Panel B of Table 17 presents results on real earnings management, while Panel C 
presents results for accounting earnings management. Consistent with sample firms’ 
results, I find more evidence of real earnings management in rules-based system than in 
the principles-based regime for all listed firms. In particular, rules-based system has more 
abnormal cost of goods sold (0.030, t = 14.87), production costs (0.014, t = 4.78), change 
in inventory (0.020, t = 7.82) and discretionary expenditure (0.008, t = 4.46) than do the 
principles-based standards. This evidence supports the notion that managers use real 
activities to subvert “check box” or compliance mentality inherent in rules-based system. 
In contrast, I find in Panel C that principles-based standards are associated with more 
discretionary accruals than the rules-based system. This evidence is consistent with the 
notion that principles-based standards foster greater exercise of professional judgment, 
which in turn allows greater managerial accounting choices. Therefore, the consistency of 
results across various groups (samples and population) enhances the reliability of 
inferences from the results. It also demonstrates that the sampling procedures capture the 
essential elements of the population. 
 
4.8.2. Robustness Tests: Industry Samples 
                                                [insert Table 18] 
To shed light on the influences of industry differences on the results, I repeat the 
analyses on the sample firms on four industries for which data are available. These 
industries are manufacturing with first-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
2, manufacturing with SIC code 3, trade with SIC code 5 and services with SIC code 9. 
Table 18 presents results for comparability (Panel A), real earnings management (Panel 
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B) and accounting earnings management (Panel C) in the rules-based and principles-
based regimes. Consistent with the sample firms’ results, I find that rules-based standards 
have more comparability, real earnings management and less discretionary accruals than 
the principles-based standards in all industries examined except transportation and 
utilities. Also, the untabulated results on value relevance and earnings informativeness 
for each industry are qualitatively similar to the sample results with the exception of 
transportation and utilities. This paper contribute to the literature by providing evidence 
suggesting that comparability, earnings management and informativeness of accounting 
numbers do not appear to be affected as firms transitioned from rules-based to principles-
based system in the transportation and utilities industry  
 
4.8.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this paper, I measure discretionary accruals based on Jones model as modified 
by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). However, because of potential model 
misspecification due to growth opportunity (see, e.g., Bernard and Skinner, 1996), I 
control for growth (using sales growth or book-to-market ratio as proxies) and re-
estimated the discretionary accruals. For brevity, the results of these tests are untabulated. 
However, the new results are qualitatively similar to the results reported in the paper 
(e.g., growth-controlled DA(mean, rules)=0.095, DA(mean, principles)=0.118, t-value for the 
difference (principles – rules) =2.53; no-intercept-estimated DA(mean, rules)=0.086, DA(mean, 
principles)=0.097, t-value for the difference (principles-rules) =3.45) and that the DA’s predictive 
power of future cash flows improves as well (b(DA_growth,t+1)=0.285, t(DA_growth,t+1)=4.03; 
b(DA_growth,t+2)=0.232, t(DA_growth,t+2)=1.72; b(DA_growth,t+3)=0.670, t(DA_growth,t+3)=2.98). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
This study compares measures of accounting quality for firms that applied rules-
based Chinese GAAP from 1992 to 1997 and transitioned into the principles-based IFRS 
adopted in China in 2001. Because accounting quality is a multi-dimensional concept, I 
focus on quality metrics that reflect the major differences between rules-based and 
principles-based standards. Consistent with the literature (Schipper [2003], Nelson [2003] 
and Ewert and Wagenhofer [2005]), I expect check box or compliance mentality, detailed 
implementation guidance, and focus on form over economic substance to reduce the 
quality of rules-based standards. In addition, Nobes (2005) argue that rules-based 
standards’ provision of accounting treatments not based on recognizable accounting 
principles is expected to lower accounting quality in relation to the principles-based 
system. Given these differences and their connections to accounting quality, I examine 
whether principles-based standards are associated with less real earnings management, 
less comparability, higher variance of the change in net income, higher ratio of the 
variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, lower negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows, more discretionary accruals, more 
informative earnings about future cash flows and higher value relevance of accounting 
amounts than the rules-based standards.  
The results suggest that principles-based standards generally have higher 
accounting quality than rules-based standards. In particular, principles-based standards 
have significantly lower comparability, lower real earnings management, higher 
informative earnings about future cash flows and higher value relevance of accounting 
amounts. In addition, they have a significantly higher value relevance of losses (net 
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income < 0), bad news (returns < 0), and induce firms to substitute costly real earnings 
manipulation during the rules-based regime with relatively cheaper accounting earnings 
management as firms transition into the principles-based system. Consistent with higher 
accounting quality, principles-based standards have a higher variance of the change in net 
income, a higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash 
flows and a significantly lower negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. 
 I also compare accounting quality in rules-based and principles-based accounting 
regimes for sub-samples of state owned and private firms. The results of this comparison 
reveal clear pattern of differences in accounting quality between rules-based and 
principles-based standards. Consistent with higher quality, principles-based standards 
have a significantly lower comparability, a lower real earnings management, higher 
discretionary accruals, more informative earnings about future cash flows and higher 
value relevance of accounting amounts for state owned firms. However, consistent with 
lower accounting quality, rules-based standards have a significantly lower variance of the 
change in net income, a lower ratio of the variances of the change in net income and 
change in cash flows and more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows for 
state owned firms. In contrast, private firms have similar but weak results in relation to 
state owned firms. Consistent with Chinese cultural numerology, private firms appear to 
have higher frequency of lucky number “8” in their earnings, an indication of lower 
quality. 
This paper contributes to the regulatory debate that rules-based system be 
abandoned in favor of principles-based standards by providing evidence on the 
accounting quality of the two accounting regimes. As instructed in section 108 of the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC is interested in conducting studies on the 
desirability of principles-based standards. The evidence in this paper is particularly 
pertinent in answering the policy questions. Although, China provides a setting to exploit 
the current regulatory debate, it has distinctly different institutional features from U.S. 
Therefore, a major policy change based on the evidence provided may be premature.  
Another limitation of the study is the use of crude proxy to capture earnings 
management. It is difficult to measure earnings management in the absence of a direct 
link with incentives and/or clear evidence that firms manage earnings. To alleviate this 
concern, I use batteries of measures and improve the existing models to control for 
performance and growth in the modified Jones models used to estimate the discretionary. 
It is obvious that the attempt made to improve the models is not an exhaustive remedy. 
Therefore, readers should be aware of the limitations of the metrics generally used in the 
literature.  
Omitted variable problem is another concern and possibly a limitation of the study. 
However, I alleviate the problem by providing both univariate and multivariate tests 
controlling for relevant factors. In the multivariate models, I control for a number of 
accounting quality relevant economic determinants as well as the fixed year- and firm-
effects. The adj-R2 is generally high in economic terms. Even though I cannot totally 
eliminate the possibility of omitted variables problem, the control measure adopted is 
likely to significantly alleviate the problem.  
This study can be extended to countries transitioning from rules-based GAAP to 
IFRS. The numbers of these countries have grown significantly in the last few years. 
Future extension of this paper will confirm whether the present results can be generalized 
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to other countries with similar accounting revolution. Future studies are also needed to 
improve the metrics used in the study. 
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LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE AND INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION 
Panel A: Sample Selection   
  
Number of 
Distinct Firms Firm-years 
Initial CSMAR Sample for 1992–2004 (1240 distinct firms) 1240 8353 
   Less: Financial firms (6 distinct firms) (6) (76) 
   Less: Firm-years with missing financial accounting data 0  (12) 
Sample available (1234 distinct firms, 85.33% are state-owned) 1234  8265  
   Less: Firms did not represent in both rules- and principles-
based accounting regimes (580 distinct firm) (580) (4169) 
Final sample (654 distinct firms) 654  4096  
 
Panel B: Number of Initial Public Offerings by Calendar Year 
Year 
Number of 
Firms 
Number of State-owned Firms 
(SOEs) a SOEs in Percentage of Total b
1992 48 31 64.58 
1993 153 112 73.20 
1994 253 195 77.08 
1995 275 212 77.09 
1996 456 363 79.61 
1997 654 545 83.33 
2001 653 544 83.31 
2002 650 542 83.38 
2003 652 530 81.29 
2004 302 237 78.48 
Total 4096 3311 80.83 
 
Panel C: Number of Initial Public Offerings by Industry Classification 
Industry SIC code c Number of Listings Percent of Listings 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0 11 1.68 
Mining, Construction 1 2 0.31 
Manufacturing 2 163 24.92 
Manufacturing 3 214 32.72 
Transportation and Public Utilities 4 68 10.40 
Trade 5 84 12.84 
Services 7 20 3.06 
Services 8 21 3.21 
Services 9 71 10.86 
a I define state-owned firms as firms having direct and/or indirect state-ownership. The other 
firms are private firms. 
b represents the weight of state-owned firms in total listed firms. 
c represents the first digit of SIC industry code. 
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TABLE 2 
REALIZED FREQUENCY OF DIGITS FOR ANNUAL EARNINGS 
      Digita      
Panel A: Full Sample 
Year Nb 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1992 49 0.2074 0.1037 0.0704 0.0370 0.0704 0.1000 0.0667 0.1037 0.0333 0.2074 
1993 156 0.0591 0.1080 0.0864 0.1841 0.1216 0.0841 0.0750 0.1227 0.0864 0.0727 
1994 258 0.2271 0.1113 0.1030 0.0779 0.0771 0.0853 0.0804 0.0799 0.0815 0.0766 
1995 281 0.0918 0.1197 0.1191 0.1034 0.0965 0.0967 0.0941 0.0948 0.0896 0.0942 
1996 463 0.0944 0.1221 0.1065 0.1055 0.0903 0.1012 0.1047 0.0931 0.0862 0.0960 
1997 661 0.0943 0.1202 0.1082 0.1025 0.1015 0.0995 0.0930 0.0972 0.0935 0.0901 
1998 756 0.0899 0.1154 0.1102 0.1017 0.0991 0.1028 0.0962 0.0974 0.0975 0.0896 
1999 852 0.0879 0.1169 0.1077 0.1050 0.0969 0.1029 0.0958 0.0971 0.0928 0.0969 
2000 986 0.0846 0.1189 0.1129 0.1007 0.0961 0.1008 0.0955 0.0973 0.0947 0.0985 
2001 1065 0.0849 0.1163 0.1128 0.1082 0.1032 0.0951 0.0922 0.0942 0.0995 0.0935 
2002 1133 0.0934 0.1244 0.1090 0.1011 0.1022 0.0993 0.0990 0.0917 0.0940 0.0858 
2003 1197 0.0891 0.1215 0.1097 0.1024 0.1014 0.0995 0.0940 0.0969 0.0910 0.0944 
2004 496 0.0823 0.1195 0.1089 0.1034 0.1011 0.0954 0.0952 0.0960 0.1034 0.0947 
            
Panel B: State-owned Firms 
1992 32 0.2000 0.1000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0500 0.1500 0.1000 0.1000 0.0500 0.2000 
1993 115 0.0675 0.1091 0.0844 0.1818 0.1104 0.0961 0.0857 0.1117 0.0701 0.0831 
1994 198 0.2439 0.1062 0.1049 0.0749 0.0692 0.0837 0.0805 0.0815 0.0803 0.0749 
1995 216 0.0894 0.1165 0.1175 0.1015 0.1022 0.0923 0.0977 0.0907 0.0917 0.1005 
1996 368 0.0986 0.1203 0.1041 0.1063 0.0877 0.0985 0.1079 0.0940 0.0900 0.0927 
1997 550 0.0952 0.1200 0.1080 0.1033 0.1025 0.0989 0.0933 0.0969 0.0920 0.0899 
1998 634 0.0885 0.1150 0.1122 0.1006 0.0998 0.1036 0.0979 0.0969 0.0969 0.0886 
1999 714 0.0874 0.1183 0.1083 0.1043 0.0962 0.1039 0.0955 0.0989 0.0913 0.0959 
2000 833 0.0842 0.1179 0.1127 0.0999 0.0966 0.1017 0.0953 0.0980 0.0937 0.1001 
2001 901 0.0842 0.1145 0.1142 0.1066 0.1053 0.0960 0.0916 0.0936 0.1001 0.0941 
2002 963 0.0928 0.1245 0.1083 0.0994 0.1040 0.0992 0.1004 0.0936 0.0927 0.0850 
2003 996 0.0883 0.1214 0.1111 0.1033 0.1015 0.1005 0.0925 0.0979 0.0902 0.0932 
2004 397 0.0832 0.1202 0.1086 0.1048 0.1003 0.0918 0.0939 0.0972 0.1022 0.0977 
            
Panel C: Non-state-owned Firms  
1992 17 0.2222 0.1111 0.1111 0.1111 0.1111 0.0000 0.0000 0.1111 0.0000 0.2222 
1993 41 0.0000 0.1000 0.1000 0.2000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.0000 
1994 60 0.1704 0.1283 0.0965 0.0880 0.1035 0.0907 0.0801 0.0743 0.0856 0.0825 
1995 65 0.0998 0.1304 0.1246 0.1100 0.0775 0.1115 0.0820 0.1086 0.0827 0.0730 
1996 95 0.0784 0.1291 0.1156 0.1023 0.1008 0.1115 0.0925 0.0898 0.0712 0.1088 
1997 111 0.0898 0.1210 0.1090 0.0983 0.0970 0.1028 0.0918 0.0988 0.1008 0.0907 
1998 122 0.0972 0.1176 0.1003 0.1074 0.0954 0.0989 0.0872 0.0999 0.1009 0.0952 
1999 138 0.0907 0.1094 0.1046 0.1090 0.1008 0.0975 0.0977 0.0876 0.1007 0.1020 
2000 153 0.0865 0.1243 0.1139 0.1051 0.0937 0.0957 0.0966 0.0936 0.1005 0.0900 
2001 164 0.0892 0.1264 0.1051 0.1170 0.0920 0.0906 0.0959 0.0975 0.0961 0.0902 
2002 170 0.0968 0.1235 0.1130 0.1110 0.0926 0.1000 0.0912 0.0806 0.1011 0.0903 
2003 201 0.0931 0.1218 0.1025 0.0981 0.1011 0.0945 0.1017 0.0921 0.0948 0.1002 
2004 99 0.0785 0.1166 0.1103 0.0978 0.1040 0.1102 0.1002 0.0914 0.1084 0.0825 
Notes: a represents digits from 0 to 9. b represents the number of observations. Numbers in each cell 
report the realized frequency of each digit for annual earnings. 
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TABLE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
          
Panel A: Univariate Statistics        
 
Rules-based 
System (R) 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
Differences between Rules- versus Principles-based 
System 
 (N=1839)a (N=2257) Mean Median 
 Mean Median Mean Median R-Pb R-P 
t-value of 
Mean 
Difference 
z-value of 
Median 
Difference 
Test Variables         
Earn 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 21.55 *** 22.09 *** 
ACCR -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.02 5.06 *** 5.41 *** 
DA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.65 * 2.46 ** 
NDA -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.03 8.92 *** 11.39 *** 
COGS 0.43 0.34 0.46 0.34 -0.03 -0.01 -2.00 ** -2.20 ** 
∆INV 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33  1.75 * 
PROD 0.45 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.03 0.05 2.04 ** 3.05 *** 
DISEXP 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -11.35 *** -10.78 *** 
CFO 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.19 -0.05 -0.05 -7.56 *** -8.25 *** 
P 5.93 5.15 7.43 6.80 -1.50 -1.65 -13.27 *** -16.11 *** 
R  0.04 0.01 -0.13 -0.12 0.16 0.13 15.76 *** 15.10 *** 
          
Control Variables        
SO 0.38 0.43 0.35 0.38 0.03 0.04 4.39 *** 4.38 *** 
PE*FD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.68 * -1.40  
OC 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.00 -0.14  -0.17  
Audit 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.80 * 1.80 * 
Loss 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -8.95 *** -8.83 *** 
DA(t-1) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.30  -0.88  
AbsNI(t-
1) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 3.30 *** 4.75 *** 
Size 20.28 20.20 21.33 21.28 -1.05 -1.08 -38.11 *** -32.89 *** 
Lev 0.96 0.74 1.42 1.03 -0.47 -0.29 -12.53 *** -12.02 *** 
Risk 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 23.11 *** 21.06 *** 
Grow 2.29 1.81 5.01 3.50 -2.72 -1.69 -18.75 *** -23.71 *** 
∆CS 0.19 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.08 12.25 *** 15.84 *** 
∆LBT 0.36 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.09 5.84 *** 7.10 *** 
ATTO 0.58 0.47 0.56 0.44 0.02 0.03 1.72 * 2.81 *** 
Sale 0.60 0.49 0.58 0.46 0.02 0.04 1.30  2.44 ** 
∆Sale 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -2.12 ** -2.51 ** 
***, **, * indicates significant difference between the rules-based and principles-based 
accounting system at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test 
(Wilcoxon-median test). 
a The number in parentheses presents the number of firm-year observations. 
b report the difference between rules-based and principles-based accounting regimes. 
Variable definition: 
Earn=total earnings scaled by average total assets;   
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash 
and equivalent + change in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average total 
assets;   
NDA= non-discretionary accruals is estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model developed in 
 80
Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-
CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross 
amount of property, plant, and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are scaled 
by average total assets; 
DA= discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between ACCR and NDA; 
COGS= cost of goods sold scaled by average total assets; 
∆INV = year-to-year change in inventory scaled by average total assets;  
PROD = production costs are calculated as the sum of COGS and ∆INV; 
DISEXP = discretionary expenses are the sum of selling expenses and general and 
administrative expenses scaled by average total assets; 
CFO = cash flows are estimated by deducting ACCR from Earn;  
P = monthly ending stock price four months after the end of fiscal year;  
R =accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen Index returns from 
four months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current fiscal year end; 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state; 
PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 
1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” 
from digit “8”);  
OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares 
controlled by the top three shareholders in firm I in year t; 
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms 
and zero otherwise; 
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals; 
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute year-to-year change in prior income; 
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity;  
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock; 
Grow  = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio; 
∆CS = year-to-year change in common stock equity; 
∆LBT = year-to-year change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; 
∆Sale = year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix            
Pearson (Spearman) above (below) the diagonal         
Variables Earn ACCR DA NDA COGS ∆INV PROD DISEXP CFO P R SO PE*FD OC 
Earn   0.21***  0.23*** -0.01  0.16***  0.15***  0.18*** -0.29***  0.25***  0.08***  0.26***  0.07*** -0.00  0.09*** 
ACCR  0.13***   0.86***  0.51*** -0.03  0.11*** -0.02 -0.14*** -0.68***  0.03  0.08*** -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.03 
DA  0.15***  0.82***   0.03**  0.02  0.13***  0.03 -0.11*** -0.53***  0.03  0.07*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.01 
NDA -0.00  0.45*** -0.05***  -0.08*** -0.00 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.47***  0.02  0.02 -0.08*** -0.02 -0.03** 
COGS  0.13*** -0.05***  0.01 -0.11***   0.06***  0.97***  0.36***  0.11***  0.05***  0.04**  0.06*** -0.01  0.04** 
∆INV  0.14***  0.05***  0.08*** -0.04**  0.09***   0.18*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04**  0.00 -0.02 
PROD  0.15*** -0.03**  0.02 -0.09***  0.94***  0.22***   0.33***  0.10*** -0.02  0.01  0.05*** -0.01  0.03** 
DISEXP -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.09***  0.44*** -0.02  0.39***  -0.01  0.11*** -0.08*** -0.01  0.01 -0.03 
CFO  0.21*** -0.67*** -0.48*** -0.47***  0.17*** -0.00  0.16***  0.04**  -0.00  0.03*  0.19*** -0.03  0.20*** 
P  0.08***  0.03*  0.03*  0.02  0.04** -0.04** -0.06***  0.10***  0.01   0.25***  0.01  0.01  0.08*** 
R   0.27***  0.06***  0.06***  0.01  0.04** -0.01 -0.02 -0.09***  0.04**  0.24***   0.06***  0.02  0.03** 
SO  0.07*** -0.03** -0.00 -0.06***  0.09*** -0.03*  0.08***  0.01  0.18***  0.02  0.05***  -0.01  0.52*** 
PE*FD -0.00  0.05***  0.07*** -0.02 -0.02  0.00 -0.03*  0.01 -0.04**  0.01  0.01 -0.01  -0.02 
OC  0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.05*** -0.02  0.04** -0.02  0.18***  0.08***  0.02  0.55*** -0.02  
Audit  0.02  0.00  0.01 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.02  0.06***  0.00  0.01  0.04*** -0.03*  0.13*** 
Loss -0.29***  0.01 -0.02  0.06*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.10***  0.09*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.04** -0.07*** -0.00 -0.03 
DA(t-1)  0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03 -0.01  0.02 -0.01 -0.07***  0.09***  0.02 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
AbsNI(t-1)  0.43*** -0.04**  0.05*** -0.13***  0.08***  0.05***  0.08***  0.07***  0.13***  0.13***  0.07*** -0.02  0.01  0.01 
Size -0.09*** -0.01  0.06*** -0.11***  0.06*** -0.04** -0.03  0.00  0.13***  0.50***  0.01  0.15***  0.02  0.18*** 
Lev -0.34*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.02  0.15***  0.09***  0.13***  0.13*** -0.07***  0.03* -0.07*** -0.03** -0.01 -0.02 
Risk  0.01  0.09*** -0.02  0.20*** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.14*** -0.01  0.08***  0.02  0.01  0.04** 
Grow -0.27*** -0.01 -0.04**  0.03* -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.15***  0.14*** -0.03*  0.50*** -0.12*** -0.02  0.01  0.11*** 
∆CS  0.63***  0.24***  0.20***  0.10***  0.10***  0.15***  0.14*** -0.16***  0.02  0.04**  0.20*** -0.05***  0.01 -0.05*** 
∆LBT  0.13*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.20***  0.07***  0.37***  0.11*** -0.04**  0.22*** -0.07***  0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.04** 
ATTO  0.23***  0.02  0.04*** -0.06***  0.92***  0.07***  0.87***  0.46***  0.15*** -0.01  0.06***  0.10*** -0.00  0.06*** 
Sale  0.29***  0.01  0.04** -0.07***  0.91***  0.12***  0.87***  0.43***  0.18***  0.01  0.07***  0.09*** -0.02  0.05*** 
∆Sale  0.29*** -0.04**  0.02 -0.11***  0.40***  0.27***  0.41***  0.13***  0.19***  0.03**  0.11***  0.00 -0.03  0.01 
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Panel B Continued            
Variable Audit Loss DA(t-1) AbsNI(t-1) Size Lev Risk Grow ∆CS ∆LBT ATTO Sale ∆Sale 
Earn  0.03** -0.29***  0.11***  0.16*** -0.06*** -0.31***  0.03* -0.29***  0.52***  0.11***  0.21***  0.26***  0.27*** 
ACCR  0.01  0.02 -0.06***  0.00 -0.02 -0.07***  0.08***  0.00  0.28*** -0.27***  0.02  0.01 -0.03 
DA  0.01 -0.01 -0.07***  0.06***  0.05*** -0.07***  0.00 -0.02  0.25*** -0.21***  0.05***  0.04**  0.02 
NDA -0.01  0.07***  0.00 -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.01  0.15***  0.05***  0.11*** -0.20*** -0.03* -0.05*** -0.09*** 
COGS -0.03* -0.09*** -0.01  0.03**  0.03**  0.10*** -0.10*** -0.05***  0.08***  0.05***  0.95***  0.95***  0.54*** 
∆INV  0.00 -0.07***  0.02  0.04** -0.06***  0.07*** -0.04** -0.08***  0.12***  0.29***  0.02  0.07***  0.20*** 
PROD -0.02 -0.09*** -0.01  0.04** -0.02  0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10***  0.10***  0.07***  0.92***  0.93***  0.54*** 
DISEXP -0.02  0.10*** -0.06***  0.10***  0.03*  0.11*** -0.06***  0.14*** -0.18*** -0.05***  0.41***  0.39***  0.17*** 
CFO  0.06*** -0.07***  0.08***  0.05***  0.14*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.03*  0.21***  0.10***  0.12***  0.15*** 
P  0.00 -0.07***  0.01  0.11***  0.48***  0.02 -0.02  0.37***  0.04** -0.03  0.01  0.04**  0.07*** 
R   0.02 -0.03 -0.01  0.05*** -0.01 -0.06***  0.12*** -0.09***  0.18***  0.04**  0.05***  0.07***  0.12*** 
SO  0.04** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.04**  0.14*** -0.03  0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05***  0.08***  0.06*** -0.01 
PE*FD -0.02 -0.00 -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00 -0.00  0.01 -0.04**  0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
OC  0.14*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.00  0.21*** -0.01  0.03**  0.04** -0.06*** -0.03*  0.04***  0.04**  0.01 
Audit  -0.07***  0.03 -0.01  0.21*** -0.07***  0.09*** -0.03* -0.00 -0.03 -0.03** -0.02 -0.03 
Loss -0.07***  -0.08***  0.31*** -0.10***  0.26***  0.12***  0.28*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.04** 
DA(t-1)  0.03 -0.10***  -0.11***  0.05*** -0.10***  0.00 -0.04**  0.04**  0.06*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
AbsNI(t-1)  0.00  0.15*** -0.06***   0.00 -0.06***  0.05***  0.10***  0.07***  0.05***  0.01  0.03*  0.02 
Size  0.21*** -0.13***  0.08***  0.02   0.04** -0.15***  0.20*** -0.04** -0.10*** -0.02  0.01  0.02 
Lev -0.07***  0.17*** -0.11*** -0.20***  0.06***  -0.01  0.50*** -0.18***  0.05***  0.05***  0.06***  0.09*** 
Risk  0.07***  0.19*** -0.03* -0.00 -0.15***  0.01  -0.03 -0.01 -0.04** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 
Grow -0.02  0.22*** -0.03 -0.02  0.32***  0.26***  0.01  -0.23*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.04** 
∆CS -0.00 -0.19***  0.03  0.20*** -0.07*** -0.09***  0.02 -0.23***   0.08***  0.08***  0.15***  0.24*** 
∆LBT -0.04** -0.18***  0.05**  0.06*** -0.10***  0.17*** -0.07*** -0.14***  0.12***  -0.02  0.07***  0.25*** 
ATTO -0.00 -0.11*** -0.01  0.03* -0.00  0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10***  0.16***  0.01   0.99***  0.52*** 
Sale  0.01 -0.14*** -0.00  0.05***  0.01  0.10*** -0.09*** -0.12***  0.23***  0.11***  0.99***   0.58*** 
∆Sale -0.02 -0.07*** -0.03  0.03*  0.02  0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08***  0.30***  0.30***  0.43***  0.47***  
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TABLE 4 
COMPARING COMPARABILITY OF RAW ACCOUNTING INFORMATIONA IN RULES-BASED 
VERSUS PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING REGIMESB 
         
   
Differences between Rules- versus 
Principles-based System 
 
Volatility in 
Rules-based 
System (σ2R)  
Volatility in 
Principles-based 
System  (σ2P)  σ2R -σ2P       P-value 
Panel A: Full sample  
Variables (N=1839)c   (N=2257)      
         
Earn 0.003  0.005  -0.002  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.021  0.023  -0.002  0.040 ** 
DA 0.014  0.018  -0.005  0.000 *** 
         
Panel B: State-owned Firmsd 
 (N=1458)  (N=1853)      
Earn 0.002  0.005  -0.002  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.020  0.022  -0.002  0.146  
DA 0.013  0.018  -0.005  0.000 *** 
         
Panel C: Private Firms 
 (N=1458)  (N=1853)      
Earn 0.004  0.005  -0.001  0.084 * 
ACCR 0.023  0.028  -0.006  0.039 ** 
DA 0.017  0.022  -0.005  0.023 ** 
***, **, * indicates significant difference between the rules-based and principles-based accounting system at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-sample variance tests. 
a Volatility (σ2)is measured as the variance of interested variables. Large (small) volatility signals low (high) 
comparability of accounting information across firms. 
b Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period covers the more flexible, 
jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
c The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. 
d I define state-owned firms as firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership. The other firms are classified as private 
firms. 
Earn=total earnings scaled by average total assets;   
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash and equivalent + change 
in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average total assets;   
DA= discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between ACCR and non-discretionary accruals (NDA), 
which is estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model developed in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. 
(2005) as follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross amount of property, plant, 
and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are scaled by average total assets; 
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TABLE 5 
COMPARING COMPARABILITY OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATIONA AFTER 
CONTROLLING FOR VOLATILITY RELEVANT FACTORS IN RULES-BASED VERSUS 
PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING REGIMESB 
         
   
Differences between Rules- versus 
Principles-based System 
 
Volatility in 
Rules-based 
System (σ2R)  
Volatility in 
Principles-based 
System  (σ2P)  σ2R -σ2P       P-value 
Panel A: Full sample  
Variables (N=719)c   (N=2247)     
Earn 0.002  0.003  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.005  0.011  -0.006  0.000 *** 
DA 0.005  0.010  -0.005  0.000 *** 
         
Panel B: State-owned Firmsd 
 (N=549)  (N=1844)      
Earn 0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.005  0.011  -0.006  0.000 *** 
DA 0.005  0.010  -0.005  0.000 *** 
         
Panel C: Private Firmse 
 (N=170)  (N=404)      
Earn 0.002  0.003  0.000  0.375  
ACCR 0.006  0.014  -0.008  0.000 *** 
DA 0.007  0.013  -0.005  0.000 *** 
 
Panel D: Coefficient Estimates     
Earn (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t)  + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 
∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t)  + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                         
ACCR (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t)  + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 
∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t)  + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                         
DA (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t)  + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 CFO(i,t) 
+  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + 
b15ATTO(i,t)  + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                         
Full Sample       
 Dependent Variables 
 EARN  ACCR  DA 
Intercept -0.046 **  -0.021   -0.145 *** 
(t-value) (-2.06)   (-0.45)   (-3.28)  
SO -0.003   -0.008   0.013  
(t-value) (-0.60)   (-0.84)   ( 1.42)  
PE*FD -0.002   0.068 *  0.100 *** 
(t-value) (-0.09)   ( 1.92)   ( 2.93)  
OC 0.038 ***  0.032 **  0.016  
(t-value) ( 4.86)   ( 2.01)   ( 1.07)  
Audit 0.005   0.008   0.005  
(t-value) ( 1.58)   ( 1.29)   ( 0.81)  
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Loss -0.026 ***  -0.015 ***  -0.017 *** 
(t-value) (-9.57)   (-2.76)   (-3.15)  
DA(t-1) 0.028 ***  0.037 **  0.010  
(t-value) ( 4.03)   ( 2.57)   ( 0.70)  
CFO 0.052 ***  -0.524 ***  -0.418 *** 
(t-value) (10.16)   (-50.3)   (-41.6)  
AbsNI(t-1) 0.208 ***  -0.093 **  0.043  
(t-value) (10.21)   (-2.23)   ( 1.06)  
Size 0.001   -0.001   0.007 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.94)   (-0.31)   ( 3.51)  
Lev -0.007 ***  -0.001   -0.003 * 
(t-value) (-8.90)   (-0.95)   (-1.91)  
Risk 0.002   -0.054   -0.171 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.08)   (-1.42)   (-4.64)  
Grow 0.017 ***  0.024 ***  0.028 *** 
(t-value) ( 6.79)   ( 4.57)   ( 5.65)  
∆CS 0.097 ***  0.135 ***  0.110 *** 
(t-value) (27.68)   (18.96)   (16.07)  
∆LBT -0.005 ***  -0.047 ***  -0.031 *** 
(t-value) (-2.80)   (-12.6)   (-8.78)  
ATTO -0.045 **  -0.215 ***  -0.153 *** 
(t-value) (-2.42)   (-5.68)   (-4.19)  
Sale 0.056 ***  0.217 ***  0.151 *** 
(t-value) ( 3.15)   ( 5.92)   ( 4.27)  
∆Sale 0.037 ***  -0.026 **  0.006  
(t-value) ( 6.22)   (-2.10)   ( 0.49)  
Adj-R2     0.485       0.552       0.457  
 
State-owned Firms      
 Dependent Variables 
 EARN  ACCR  DA 
Intercept -0.046 *  -0.064   -0.129 *** 
(t-value) (-1.92)   (-1.30)   (-2.72)  
OC 0.031 ***  0.021   0.015  
(t-value) ( 4.22)   ( 1.38)   ( 1.05)  
Audit 0.005   0.007   0.003  
(t-value) ( 1.40)   ( 0.98)   ( 0.41)  
Loss -0.026 ***  -0.017 ***  -0.018 *** 
(t-value) (-8.51)   (-2.86)   (-3.10)  
DA(t-1) 0.028 ***  0.042 ***  0.015  
(t-value) ( 3.61)   ( 2.64)   ( 0.98)  
CFO 0.041 ***  -0.497 ***  -0.402 *** 
(t-value) ( 7.48)   (-44.7)   (-37.4)  
AbsNI(t-1) 0.213 ***  -0.067   0.052  
(t-value) ( 9.35)   (-1.45)   ( 1.17)  
Size 0.001   0.001   0.007 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.98)   ( 0.57)   ( 3.05)  
Lev -0.007 ***  -0.001   -0.002  
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(t-value) (-8.59)   (-0.54)   (-1.53)  
Risk 0.003   -0.034   -0.170 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.13)   (-0.82)   (-4.27)  
Grow 0.020 ***  0.019 ***  0.026 *** 
(t-value) ( 6.63)   ( 3.21)   ( 4.60)  
∆CS 0.103 ***  0.145 ***  0.122 *** 
(t-value) -25.65   -17.78   -15.51  
∆LBT -0.007 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.034 *** 
(t-value) (-3.25)   (-13.1)   (-8.64)  
ATTO -0.057 ***  -0.190 ***  -0.117 *** 
(t-value) (-2.88)   (-4.72)   (-3.00)  
Sale 0.067 ***  0.195 ***  0.115 *** 
(t-value) ( 3.49)   ( 4.99)   ( 3.05)  
∆Sale 0.038 ***  -0.030 **  0.009  
(t-value) ( 5.90)   (-2.28)   ( 0.69)  
Adj-R2     0.495      0.556      0.463 
 
Private Firms       
 Dependent Variables 
 EARN  ACCR  DA 
Intercept -0.017   0.068   -0.280 ** 
(t-value) (-0.32)   ( 0.59)   (-2.48)  
PE*FD 0.006   0.073 *  0.106 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.33)   ( 1.90)   ( 2.81)  
OC 0.052 ***  0.071 **  0.074 ** 
(t-value) ( 3.21)   ( 2.15)   ( 2.27)  
Audit 0.006   0.009   0.011  
(t-value) ( 0.90)   ( 0.63)   ( 0.80)  
Loss -0.027 ***  -0.005   -0.010  
(t-value) (-4.24)   (-0.34)   (-0.78)  
DA(t-1) 0.028 *  0.033   -0.001  
(t-value) ( 1.80)   ( 1.03)   (-0.03)  
CFO 0.105 ***  -0.646 ***  -0.501 *** 
(t-value) ( 7.92)   (-23.5)   (-18.5)  
AbsNI(t-1) 0.176 ***  -0.177 *  0.004  
(t-value) ( 3.86)   (-1.87)   ( 0.04)  
Size -0.001   -0.005   0.013 ** 
(t-value) (-0.23)   (-0.97)   ( 2.35)  
Lev -0.005 ***  -0.003   -0.004  
(t-value) (-2.61)   (-0.78)   (-0.99)  
Risk -0.035   -0.135   -0.158  
(t-value) (-0.74)   (-1.38)   (-1.64)  
Grow 0.014 **  0.036 ***  0.038 *** 
(t-value) -2.58   -3.29   -3.54  
∆CS 0.084 ***  0.101 ***  0.076 *** 
(t-value) (11.70)   ( 6.76)   ( 5.19)  
∆LBT 0.001   -0.029 ***  -0.024 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.28)   (-3.37)   (-2.89)  
ATTO 0.042   -0.372 ***  -0.327 *** 
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(t-value) ( 0.86)   (-3.71)   (-3.30)  
Sale -0.023   0.367 ***  0.318 *** 
(t-value) (-0.49)   ( 3.79)   ( 3.33)  
∆Sale 0.038 **  -0.012   -0.002  
(t-value) ( 2.57)   (-0.40)   (-0.08)  
Adj-R2     0.477      0.557      0.447 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
a I base the analysis on regressions including controls as specified in Panel D. However, I do not control 
for state-ownership (cultural-numerology) for the sub-sample of private firms (state-owned firms) due to 
the sub-sample classification. The number of observations is reported in parentheses. 
I use volatility of earnings (Earn), total accruals (ACCR), and discretionary accruals (DA) as proxies for 
accounting comparability. The volatility (σ2) is measured as the variance of the residuals from the pooled 
regression of the interested variables on the control variables. Large (small) volatility signals low (high) 
accounting comparability across firms. The residuals are winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. 
Panel D reports the estimated coefficient.  
b Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period covers the more 
flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
c The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. 
d I define state-owned firms as firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership. The other firms are 
classified as private firms. 
Variable definition: 
Earn=total earnings scaled by average total assets;   
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash and 
equivalent + change in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average total assets;   
NDA= non-discretionary accruals is estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model developed in Dechow 
et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross amount of 
property, plant, and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are scaled by average total 
assets; 
DA= discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between ACCR and NDA; 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state; 
PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for 
private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”);  
OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares controlled 
by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t; 
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and zero 
otherwise; 
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals; 
CFO = cash flows are estimated by deducting ACCR from Earn;  
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute year-to-year change in prior income; 
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity;  
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock; 
Grow  = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio; 
∆CS = year-to-year change in common stock equity; 
∆LBT = year-to-year change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; 
∆Sale = year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
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TABLE 6  
EARNINGS SMOOTHNESS TESTS  
     
 Rules-based a Principles-based p-value 
Panel A: Full Sample b  
 (N=719) c (N=2248)   
Variability of ∆NI 0.0023 0.0030 0.000 *** 
Variability of ∆NI over ∆CFO 0.2745 0.3064  
Correlation of ACCR and CFO -0.9012 -0.8527 0.000 *** 
     
Panel B: State-owned Firms d  
 (N=549) (N=1844)   
Variability of ∆NI 0.0021 0.0029 0.000 *** 
Variability of ∆NI over ∆CFO 0.2562 0.2962  
Correlation of ACCR and CFO -0.9018 -0.8534 0.000 *** 
     
Panel C: Private Firms  
 (N=170) (N=404)   
Variability of ∆NI 0.0029 0.0032 0.354  
Variability of ∆NI over ∆CFO 0.3428 0.2884  
Correlation of ACCR and CFO -0.8591 -0.8491 0.690  
 
Panel D: Coefficient Estimates      
ΔNI (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 
∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t) + e (i,t)    
ΔCFO (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 
∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t) + e (i,t)    
ACCR (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
AbsNI(i,t-1) + b8 Size(i,t)  + b9 Lev (i,t) + b10 Risk(i,t) + b11 Grow (i,t) + b12 ∆CS (i,t) + b13 ∆LBT(i,t) + 
b14ATTO(i,t) + e (i,t)    
CFO (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) + b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 
AbsNI(i,t-1) + b8 Size(i,t)  + b9 Lev (i,t) + b10 Risk(i,t) + b11 Grow (i,t) + b12 ∆CS (i,t) + b13 ∆LBT(i,t) + 
b14ATTO(i,t) + e (i,t)   
         
 Dependant Variables 
 ∆NI ∆CFO ACCR CFO 
Full sample        
Intercept    -0.074 ***     0.215 ***     0.169 **    -0.312 *** 
(t-value) (-2.87)  ( 3.69)  ( 2.09)  (-3.81)  
SO     0.003     -0.000     -0.037 **     0.041 ** 
(t-value) ( 0.66)  (-0.03)  (-2.25)  ( 2.46)  
PE*FD     0.014      0.032      0.055     -0.027  
(t-value) ( 0.69)  ( 0.72)  ( 0.88)  (-0.43)  
OC     0.016 *    -0.014      0.016      0.034  
(t-value) ( 1.83)  (-0.67)  ( 0.57)  ( 1.18)  
Audit     0.001     -0.004      0.000      0.009  
(t-value) ( 0.39)  (-0.49)  ( 0.01)  ( 0.80)  
Loss     0.053 ***     0.088 ***     0.014     -0.046 *** 
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(t-value) (16.86)  (12.44)  ( 1.45)  (-4.66)  
DA(t-1)    -0.025 ***     0.811 ***    -0.132 ***     0.190 *** 
(t-value) (-3.07)  (44.28)  (-5.27)  ( 7.44)  
CFO     0.011 *     0.623 ***    
(t-value) ( 1.83)  (47.67)     
AbsNI(t-1)     0.449 ***     0.394 ***     0.249 ***    -0.117  
(t-value) (19.13)  ( 7.43)  ( 3.39)  (-1.57)  
Size     0.001     -0.013 ***    -0.011 ***     0.016 *** 
(t-value) ( 0.60)  (-4.59)  (-2.94)  ( 4.11)  
Lev    -0.000      0.002      0.003     -0.004  
(t-value) (-0.14)  ( 0.87)  ( 1.09)  (-1.59)  
Risk     0.022      0.072      0.232 ***    -0.307 *** 
(t-value) ( 1.03)  ( 1.47)  ( 3.43)  (-4.46)  
Grow     0.008 ***    -0.018 ***     0.006      0.021 ** 
(t-value) ( 2.58)  (-2.62)  ( 0.69)  ( 2.20)  
∆CS     0.085 ***    -0.014 *     0.127 ***     0.027 ** 
(t-value) (23.18)  (-1.69)  (11.05)  ( 2.29)  
∆LBT    -0.002      0.026 ***    -0.069 ***     0.071 *** 
(t-value) (-1.23)  ( 6.24)  (-12.2)  (12.38)  
ATTO     0.010 ***    -0.010      0.021 **    -0.001  
(t-value) ( 3.90)  (-1.61)  ( 2.55)  (-0.15)  
N 2950  2950  2951  2951  
Adj-R2     0.358      0.645      0.114      0.127  
 
State-owned Firms        
Intercept    -0.069 **     0.208 ***     0.115     -0.239 ***
(t-value) (-2.44)  ( 3.15)  ( 1.25)  (-2.58)  
SO    -0.000     -0.020     -0.036      0.050 * 
(t-value) (-0.06)  (-1.05)  (-1.39)  ( 1.91)  
OC     0.018      0.005      0.021      0.007  
(t-value) ( 1.64)  ( 0.21)  ( 0.58)  ( 0.19)  
Audit     0.003      0.004     -0.002      0.012  
(t-value) ( 0.67)  ( 0.46)  (-0.17)  ( 0.92)  
Loss     0.053 ***     0.090 ***     0.014     -0.050 ***
(t-value) (15.17)  (11.09)  ( 1.26)  (-4.38)  
DA(t-1)    -0.032 ***     0.827 ***    -0.123 ***     0.172 ***
(t-value) (-3.47)  (38.95)  (-4.15)  ( 5.80)  
CFO    -0.002      0.585 ***    
(t-value) (-0.30)  (40.00)     
AbsNI(t-1)     0.449 ***     0.369 ***     0.341 ***    -0.199 ** 
(t-value) (17.03)  ( 6.00)  ( 3.96)  (-2.31)  
Size     0.001     -0.013 ***    -0.009 **     0.014 ***
(t-value) ( 0.41)  (-3.95)  (-2.13)  ( 3.06)  
Lev    -0.000      0.001      0.003     -0.004  
(t-value) (-0.11)  ( 0.60)  ( 0.93)  (-1.30)  
Risk     0.019      0.064      0.286 ***    -0.368 ***
(t-value) ( 0.81)  ( 1.17)  ( 3.72)  (-4.78)  
Grow     0.011 ***    -0.012      0.003      0.027 ** 
 90
(t-value) ( 3.16)  (-1.52)  ( 0.27)  ( 2.41)  
∆CS     0.089 ***    -0.018 *     0.123 ***     0.036 ** 
(t-value) (20.79)  (-1.76)  ( 8.82)  ( 2.58)  
∆LBT    -0.003      0.030 ***    -0.075 ***     0.076 ***
(t-value) (-1.42)  ( 6.26)  (-11.5)  (11.55)  
ATTO     0.009 ***    -0.009      0.027 ***    -0.008  
(t-value) ( 3.33)  (-1.37)  ( 2.94)  (-0.85)  
N 2377  2377  2378  2378  
Adj-R2     0.364      0.624      0.113      0.131  
 
Private Firms        
Intercept    -0.069      0.325 ***     0.315 *    -0.542 ***
(t-value) (-1.08)  ( 2.67)  ( 1.93)  (-3.02)  
PE*FD     0.019      0.029      0.063     -0.026  
(t-value) ( 0.90)  ( 0.71)  ( 1.14)  (-0.43)  
OC     0.016     -0.047      0.023      0.079  
(t-value) ( 0.88)  (-1.33)  ( 0.48)  ( 1.50)  
Audit    -0.002     -0.027 *    -0.001      0.010  
(t-value) (-0.25)  (-1.83)  (-0.05)  ( 0.45)  
Loss     0.056 ***     0.080 ***     0.016     -0.034  
(t-value) ( 7.56)  ( 5.68)  ( 0.83)  (-1.60)  
DA(t-1)    -0.008      0.734 ***    -0.155 ***     0.243 ***
(t-value) (-0.43)  (21.36)  (-3.43)  ( 4.87)  
CFO     0.069 ***     0.808 ***    
(t-value) ( 4.61)  (28.41)     
AbsNI(t-1)     0.427 ***     0.442 ***    -0.048      0.131  
(t-value) ( 8.15)  ( 4.41)  (-0.35)  ( 0.88)  
Size     0.001     -0.017 ***    -0.017 **     0.024 ***
(t-value) ( 0.22)  (-2.92)  (-2.13)  ( 2.84)  
Lev    -0.000      0.002     -0.001     -0.001  
(t-value) (-0.14)  ( 0.41)  (-0.10)  (-0.21)  
Risk     0.001      0.049      0.001     -0.081  
(t-value) ( 0.02)  ( 0.47)  ( 0.00)  (-0.52)  
Grow     0.000     -0.029 **     0.012      0.010  
(t-value) ( 0.06)  (-2.47)  ( 0.75)  ( 0.59)  
∆CS     0.078 ***    -0.002      0.134 ***     0.008  
(t-value) (10.55)  (-0.14)  ( 7.03)  ( 0.37)  
∆LBT     0.000      0.011     -0.046 ***     0.056 ***
(t-value) ( 0.11)  ( 1.37)  (-4.38)  ( 4.83)  
ATTO     0.010     -0.022     -0.004      0.022  
(t-value) ( 1.46)  (-1.58)  (-0.23)  ( 1.10)  
N 559  559  560  560  
Adj-R2     0.356      0.744      0.121      0.112  
 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, 
based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period 
covers the more flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
b The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based 
accounting periods.  
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c Represents the number of firm-year observations. 
d I classify firms as state-owned firms if they have state- and/or institutional-ownership, and as 
private firms otherwise. 
I base the analysis on pooled regressions including controls as specified in Panel D. I do not 
control for CFO for ACCR and CFO regressions. For state-owned (private) firm subsamples, 
there is no control for PE*FD (SO) because they are controlled in the sample partition process. 
I measure variability of ΔNI (ΔCFO) as the variance of residuals from the above regression of 
the ΔNI (ΔCFO) on the control variables. The variability of ΔNI over ΔCFO is the ratio of the 
variability of ΔNI scaled by the variability of ΔCFO. Correlation of ACCR and CFO is the partial 
Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CF regressions. All variables 
are scaled by average total assets. All variables in each of the regressions used in this table 
are winsorized at the 1% level to control for the effect of outliers. 
Control variables are defined as follows: 
ΔNI= year-to-year change in earnings scaled by average total assets; 
ΔCFO = year-to-year change in cash flows scaled by average total assets; 
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash 
and equivalent + change in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average total 
assets;  
CFO = cash flows are estimated by deducting ACCR from Earnings scaled by average total 
assets; 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state; 
PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 
1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” 
from digit “8”);  
OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares 
controlled by the top three shareholders in firm I in year t; 
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms 
and zero otherwise; 
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals calculated as the difference between total accruals 
(ACCR) and Non-discretionary accruals (NDA), where NDA are estimated using modified 
Jones (1991) Model developed in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as 
follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross 
amount of property, plant, and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are scaled 
by average total assets.; 
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute change in prior income; 
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity; 
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock; 
Grow = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio; 
∆CS = change in common stock equity; 
∆LBT = change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets. 
∆Sale = change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
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TABLE 7 
COMPARING ABNORMAL OPERATING ACTIVITIES IN RULES- VERSUS PRINCIPLES-
BASED ACCOUNTING REGIMES a 
           
 
Differences between Rules- versus 
Principles-based System  
 
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Mean 
(R-P) 
Median 
(R-P) 
t-value of 
mean 
differenceb 
z-value of 
median 
difference 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variable (N=1839)c (N=2255)       
AbCOGS 0.072 0.042 0.052 0.039 0.020 0.003 7.87 *** 2.40 ** 
AbPROD 0.094 0.067 0.073 0.053 0.021 0.015 6.60 *** 5.73 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.061 0.029 0.046 0.024 0.015 0.005 5.65 *** 4.03 *** 
AbDISEXP 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.003 0.001 3.29 *** 3.05 *** 
          
Panel B: State-owned Firmsd        
 (N=1458) (N=1853)       
AbCOGS 0.070 0.040 0.053 0.039 0.018 0.000 6.39 *** 0.61  
AbPROD 0.088 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.014 0.010 4.11 *** 3.79 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.055 0.026 0.043 0.023 0.013 0.004 4.35 *** 2.76 *** 
AbDISEXP 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.003 0.001 2.52 ** 2.56 ** 
          
Panel C: Private Firms         
 (N=381) (N=404)       
AbCOGS 0.076 0.049 0.051 0.035 0.025 0.014 4.59 *** 3.83 *** 
AbPROD 0.113 0.079 0.071 0.046 0.042 0.033 5.52 *** 5.03 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.080 0.043 0.058 0.031 0.021 0.012 3.14 *** 2.55 ** 
AbDISEXP 0.030 0.022 0.025 0.020 0.004 0.002 1.80 * 1.52  
 
Panel D: Coefficient Estimates        
COGS(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t)   + e(i,t) 
∆INV(i,t) = b0  + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
PROD(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t) + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
DISEXP(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
            
Full sample           
 Dependent Variables 
Variables COGS  ∆INV  PROD  DISEXP 
Intercept    -0.054 ***      0.009 ***     -0.087 ***      0.042 ***
(t-value) (-15.3)   ( 5.13)   (-22.7)   (35.98)  
Sale     0.861 ***        0.915 ***   ***
(t-value) (180.1)     (132.3)     
∆Sale        0.095 ***     -0.025 *    
(t-value)    (11.85)   (-1.84)     
∆Sale(t-1)        0.011      -0.104 ***    
(t-value)    ( 1.36)   (-8.15)     
Sale(t-1)            0.024  
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(t-value)        (14.12)  
Adj-R2     0.904       0.052       0.912       0.062  
            
State-owned Firms           
Intercept    -0.052 ***      0.007 ***     -0.089 ***      0.043 ***
(t-value) (-12.8)   ( 3.79)   (-21.1)   (32.33)  
Sale     0.861 ***        0.917 ***    
(t-value) (159.8)     (124.4)     
∆Sale        0.095 ***     -0.020     
(t-value)    (11.27)   (-1.37)     
∆Sale(t-1)        0.015 *     -0.107 ***    
(t-value)    ( 1.80)   (-7.64)     
Sale(t-1)            0.024 ***
(t-value)        (13.33)  
Adj-R2     0.902       0.060       0.918       0.068  
 
Private Firms           
Intercept    -0.058 ***      0.017 ***     -0.079 ***      0.042 ***
(t-value) (-8.70)   ( 3.70)   (-8.57)   (16.19)  
Sale     0.855 ***        0.909 ***    
(t-value) (81.67)     (45.99)     
∆Sale        0.094 ***     -0.045     
(t-value)    ( 4.39)   (-1.29)     
∆Sale(t-1)       -0.008      -0.099 ***    
(t-value)    (-0.38)   (-3.15)     
Sale(t-1)            0.017 ***
(t-value)        ( 4.21)  
Adj-R2     0.908       0.029       0.877       0.028  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
a I base the analysis on regressions including controls as specified in Panel D. I use abnormal operating 
activities, including the absolute value of abnormal cost of goods sold (AbCOGS), change in inventory 
(Ab∆INV), production costs (AbPROD), and discretionary expenses (AbDISEXP), as proxies for real 
earnings management. The abnormal part of each interested variable is the residual from the pooled 
regression of the interested variables on the control variables. Large (small) residuals signals more (less) 
real (activities-based) earnings management. The residuals are winsorized at the 1% level to control for 
outliers. Panel D reports the estimated coefficient.  
Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period covers the more 
flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
b presents test statistics, including values of two sample t-tests, Wilcoxon median z-tests, and p-values.  
c The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. d I define state-owned firms as 
firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership. The other firms are classified as private firms. 
Variable definition:           
COGS= cost of goods sold scaled by average total assets; 
∆INV = year-to-year change in inventory scaled by average total assets;  
PROD = production costs are calculated as the sum of COGS and ∆INV; 
DISEXP = discretionary expenses are the sum of selling expenses and general and administrative 
expenses scaled by average total assets; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; 
∆Sale = year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
∆Sale(t-1) = lagged year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
Sale(t-1) = lagged sales scaled by average total assets. 
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TABLE 8 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS IN 
RULES-BASED VERSUS PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING REGIMESa 
          
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
Principles-base 
System (P) 
Differences between Rules- versus Principles-based System 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Mean 
(R-P) 
Median 
(R-P) 
t-value of mean 
difference b 
z-value of median 
difference 
Panel A: Full Sample 
(N=1839)c (N=2257)       
0.0832 0.0599 0.0981 0.0671 -0.0149 -0.0072 -4.1900 *** -2.9545 *** 
         
Panel B: State-owned Firmsd       
(N=1458) (N=1853)       
0.0788 0.0574 0.0951 0.0666 -0.0163 -0.0093 -4.2070 *** -3.4614 *** 
         
Panel C: Private Firms        
(N=382) (N=382)      
0.0986 0.0704 0.1120 0.0730 -0.0134 -0.0026 -1.7371 * -0.3181  
          
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-
test (Wilcoxon-median test). 
a Discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between total accruals (ACCR=change in current 
accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash and equivalent+change in short-term debt-change in 
depreciation) and Non-discretionary accruals (NDA), where NDA are estimated using modified Jones 
(1991) Model developed in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: 
ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where ACCR is the total accruals scaled by beginning-of-period assets, CREV is the change in net sales,  
CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross amount of property, plant, and equipment, ROA is 
the return on assets. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. I use the absolute value 
of performance (ROA) controlled discretionary accruals as the proxy for the magnitude of accounting 
(accruals-based earnings) management. 
Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period covers the more 
flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
b presents test statistics, including t-values based on two sample t-tests, z-values based on two sample 
Wilcoxon median tests, and p-values. 
c The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. 
d I define state-owned firms as firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership. The other firms are 
classified as private firms. 
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TABLE 9 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
IN RULES-BASED VERSUS PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING REGIMES a 
AbsDA (i,t) = b0  +  b1 Flex (i,t) + b2SO (i,t) + b3PE*FD (i,t) + b4OC (i,t) + b5Audit(i,t) + b6 Loss(i,t)  + b7 DA (i,t-1) 
                + b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 ∆CS (i,t)  
+ b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + b15 ATTO(i,t) + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)                                                   
         
Variable Full Sample  State-ownedb  Private 
Intercept 0.292 ***  0.243 ***  0.457 *** 
(t-value) ( 6.86)   ( 5.30)   ( 4.20)  
Flex 0.031 ***  0.031 ***  0.028 ** 
(t-value) ( 6.26)   ( 5.78)   ( 2.22)  
SO -0.005   -0.012     
(t-value) (-0.64)   (-0.93)     
PE*FD 0.023      0.018  
(t-value) ( 0.73)      ( 0.49)  
OC 0.002   0.023   -0.063 ** 
(t-value) ( 0.16)   ( 1.32)   (-2.03)  
Audit -0.005   -0.004   -0.004  
(t-value) (-0.80)   (-0.70)   (-0.27)  
Loss 0.006   0.005   0.009  
(t-value) ( 1.22)   ( 0.83)   ( 0.73)  
DA(t-1) 0.033 **  0.014   0.089 *** 
(t-value) ( 2.54)   ( 1.00)   ( 2.98)  
CFO -0.134 ***  -0.130 ***  -0.155 *** 
(t-value) (-14.1)   (-12.9)   (-6.05)  
AbsNI(t-1) 0.274 ***  0.268 ***  0.318 *** 
(t-value) ( 7.25)   ( 6.40)   ( 3.60)  
Size -0.012 ***  -0.010 ***  -0.018 *** 
(t-value) (-5.61)   (-4.37)   (-3.41)  
Lev 0.006 ***  0.005 ***  0.012 *** 
(t-value) ( 4.25)   ( 3.41)   ( 3.17)  
Risk 0.066 *  0.069 *  0.056  
(t-value) ( 1.79)   ( 1.74)   ( 0.58)  
Grow -0.003   -0.005   -0.001  
(t-value) (-0.60)   (-0.87)   (-0.11)  
∆CS 0.055 ***  0.056 ***  0.046 *** 
(t-value) ( 8.47)   ( 7.50)   ( 3.30)  
∆LBT 0.050 ***  0.053 ***  0.037 *** 
(t-value) (14.89)   (14.35)   ( 4.67)  
ATTO 0.117 ***  0.131 ***  0.026  
(t-value) ( 3.41)   ( 3.59)   ( 0.28)  
Sale -0.131 ***  -0.139 ***  -0.065  
(t-value) (-3.93)   (-3.91)   (-0.72)  
∆Sale 0.014   -0.007   0.089 *** 
(t-value) ( 1.26)   (-0.57)   ( 3.10)  
N 2947   2374   556  
Adj-R2 0.196   0.195   0.207  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-
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tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-median test). 
a Discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between total accruals (ACCR=change 
in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash and equivalent+change in 
short-term debt-change in depreciation) and Non-discretionary accruals (NDA), where NDA are 
estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model developed in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in 
Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where ACCR is the total accruals scaled by beginning-of-period assets, CREV is the change in 
net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross amount of property, plant, and 
equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are scaled by beginning-of-period total 
assets. I use the absolute value of performance (ROA) controlled discretionary accruals as the 
proxy for the magnitude of accounting (accruals-based earnings) management. 
Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period covers 
the more flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
b I define state-owned firms as firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership. The other firms 
are classified as private firms. 
Data definition:       
Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for principles-based accounting regime 
(Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I); 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state; 
 PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 
1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” 
from digit “8”); OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of 
common shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t; 
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms 
and zero otherwise;  
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals;  
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute year-to-year change in prior income;  
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity;  
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock;  
Grow = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio;  
∆CS = year-to-year change in common stock equity;  
∆LBT = year-to-year change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio;  
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; and  
∆Sale = year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
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TABLE 10 
        REGRESSIONS OF STOCK PRICE ON EARNINGS PER SHARE  
P(i,t) = b0 + b1EPS(i,t)  + b2Flex*EPS(i,t) + b3SO(i,t) + b4PE*FD(i,t) + b5OC(i,t) + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  + 
b8Lev(i,t) + b9Risk(i,t) + b10Grow(i,t) + b11BPS(i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                    
    
 Full Samplea State-ownedb Private 
Intercept -18.099*** -20.726***   1.215 
(t-value) (-4.82) (-4.67) ( 0.17) 
EPS  14.824***  16.502***   7.963*** 
(t-value) (11.77) (10.93) ( 3.22) 
Flex*EPS   5.096**   4.086*  10.647** 
(t-value) ( 2.56) ( 1.82) ( 2.08) 
SO   0.254   1.759**  
(t-value) ( 0.45) ( 2.20)  
PE*FD   1.086    0.866 
(t-value) ( 1.27)  ( 0.92) 
OC  -1.452  -3.968*   4.703 
(t-value) (-0.89) (-1.92) ( 1.47) 
Audit   0.109   0.348  -0.802 
(t-value) ( 0.29) ( 0.72) (-1.13) 
Size   1.221***   1.415***   0.483 
(t-value) ( 7.54) ( 7.43) ( 1.32) 
Lev  -0.184***  -0.236***  -0.034 
(t-value) (-3.35) (-3.85) (-0.25) 
Risk   1.272   1.649  -2.967 
(t-value) ( 0.99) ( 1.13) (-1.03) 
Grow  -1.457***  -1.834***  -0.139 
(t-value) (-7.06) (-7.73) (-0.31) 
BPS  -0.234**  -0.347***   0.054 
(t-value) (-2.18) (-2.79) ( 0.21) 
Number of Fixed effects 654 554 137 
Nc 2944 2354 551 
R-Square 0.715 0.721 0.762 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed 
t-test.  
a The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. 
Firms with state- and/or institutional-ownership are classified state-owned firms, and private firms otherwise.  
b Represents the number of firm-year observations. 
Variable Definition: 
P(i,t)  =monthly ending stock price for firm i four months after the end of fiscal year t, EPS (i,t)= earnings per share for 
firm i in year t,Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for principles-based accounting regime (Phase 
III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I), Flex*EPS(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility 
and earnings per share for firm i in year t, SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the state, PE*FD (i,t) = interaction 
between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is 
calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”), OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is 
measured as the percentage of common shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t, Audit(i,t) = 
audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = 
the nature log of market value of firm i in year t, Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-term debt and book value of 
shareholder’s equity for firm i in year t, Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock, Grow 
(i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as book-market ratio, and BPS(i,t) = book value per share for firm i 
in year t. 
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TABLE 11 
REGRESSIONS OF STOCK PRICE ON EARNINGS COMPONENTS PER SHARE 
P (i,t) = b0  + b1 Cash(i,t)  + b2 Flex*Cash(i,t)  + b3NDA (i,t) + b4Flex*NDA (i,t) + b5 DA(i,t)  
+ b6 Flex*DA (i,t) + b7SO (i,t) + b8PE*FD (i,t) + b9OC (i,t) + b10Audit(i,t) + b11 Size(i,t)      
+ b12 Lev (i,t)+ b13 Risk(i,t) + b14 Grow (i,t) + b11 BPS (i,t) + e (i,t) 
    
 Full Sample a State-owned b Private 
Intercept -12.624*** -13.660***   0.168 
(t-value) (-3.28) (-2.99) ( 0.02) 
Cash   2.136***   1.955***   2.340* 
(t-value) ( 5.36) ( 4.70) ( 1.73) 
Flex*Cash   4.721***   6.153***   0.987 
(t-value) ( 5.33) ( 6.19) ( 0.44) 
NDA   2.512   1.899   2.400 
(t-value) ( 1.58) ( 1.03) ( 0.70) 
Flex*NDA   4.664**   6.650***  -2.047 
(t-value) ( 2.31) ( 2.81) (-0.47) 
DA   5.968***   5.173***   7.507*** 
(t-value) ( 6.60) ( 4.91) ( 3.75) 
Flex*DA   1.523   3.377**  -3.908 
(t-value) ( 1.26) ( 2.42) (-1.44) 
SO   0.060   1.658**  
(t-value) ( 0.10) ( 1.99)  
PE*FD   0.763    0.378 
(t-value) ( 0.86)  ( 0.39) 
OC  -0.328  -3.474   6.492** 
(t-value) (-0.20) (-1.62) ( 2.01) 
Audit  -0.258   0.012  -0.942 
(t-value) (-0.66) ( 0.03) (-1.31) 
Size   0.876***   1.009***   0.455 
(t-value) ( 5.31) ( 5.16) ( 1.23) 
Lev  -0.199***  -0.254***  -0.014 
(t-value) (-3.52) (-3.98) (-0.10) 
Risk   1.450   1.909  -3.327 
(t-value) ( 1.09) ( 1.26) (-1.14) 
Grow  -0.470**  -0.655***   0.342 
(t-value) (-2.39) (-2.95) ( 0.78) 
BPS  -0.086  -0.212*   0.309 
(t-value) (-0.79) (-1.68) ( 1.28) 
Number of Fixed effects 654 554 137 
Nc 2944 2354 551 
R-Square 0.698 0.702 0.761 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. Firms with state- 
and/or institutional-ownership are classified as state-owned firms, and private firms otherwise.  
b Represents the number of firm-year observations. 
Variable Definition: 
P(i,t)  =monthly ending stock price for firm i four months after the end of fiscal year t, Cash(NDA and 
DA) (i,t) = cash flows (non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals) scaled by number of shares 
for firm i in year t , Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for principles-based accounting 
regime (Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I), Flex* Cash(NDA and DA) (i,t) 
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=interaction between accounting flexibility and cash flows (non-discretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals) scaled by number of shares for firm i in year t, SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the 
state, PE*FD (i,t) = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 
1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit 
“8”), OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares 
controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t, Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for 
a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = the nature log of market 
value of firm i in year t, Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s 
equity for firm i in year t, Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock, Grow (i,t) = 
a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as book-market ratio, and BPS(i,t) = book value per share for 
firm i in year t. 
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TABLE 12 
VALUE RELEVANCE OF RULES-BASED AND PRINCIPLES-BASED STANDARDS 
Panel A: Profit (net income>0) and Loss (net income<0) Firms Analysis for the Full 
Samplea 
 Profit Firms  Loss Firms 
 
Principles-based 
System b 
Rules-based 
System 
Principles-based 
System 
Rules-based 
System 
Price Model: P(i,t) = b0 + b1EPS(i,t) + b2BPS(i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                               
Intercept   5.834***   3.096**   4.413***   6.491*** 
(t-value) ( 4.42) ( 2.24) ( 3.46) ( 4.58) 
EPS  20.859***  -0.147  15.099***   4.979 
(t-value) ( 5.46) (-0.09) ( 8.88) ( 0.57) 
BPS  -0.116   1.019***   0.177   0.100 
(t-value) (-0.79) ( 4.48) ( 1.37) ( 0.13) 
Number of Fixed effects 604 270 82 15 
Nc 1453 1185 247 59 
R-Square 0.774 0.792 0.77 0.89 
     
Return Model: R (i,t)  = b0 + b1ΔEPS(i,t)  + b2 ΔBPS (i,t) + e (i,t)   
Intercept  -0.203   0.412  -0.222*   0.068 
(t-value) (-1.54) ( 1.11) (-1.69) ( 0.19) 
∆EPS   2.131***   1.897***   1.440***  -0.575 
(t-value) (10.20) ( 7.66) (10.35) (-0.33) 
∆BPS  -0.013   0.082**  -0.014   0.445* 
(t-value) (-1.00) ( 1.98) (-1.16) ( 2.26) 
Number of Fixed effects 604 270 82 15 
N 1453 1185 247 59 
R-Square 0.54 0.457 0.545 0.821 
 
Panel B: Good (R>0) and Bad (R<0) News Firms Analysis Using Prime Models d 
P(i,t) = b0 + b1EPS(i,t)  + b2Flex*EPS(i,t) + b3BPS(i,t) + e (i,t)                                                                               
 Full Sample  State-owned Firms e  Private Firms 
 
Good 
News Bad News  
Good 
News Bad News  
Good 
News 
Bad 
News 
Intercept   9.033***   6.186***    9.724***   6.391***    2.660 
 
12.260***
(t-value) ( 4.43) ( 4.76)  ( 4.81) ( 5.14)  ( 0.90) ( 9.72) 
EPS   5.194**   3.201***    5.673**   2.123    2.236   1.537 
(t-value) ( 2.40) ( 2.67)  ( 2.29) ( 1.53)  ( 0.44) ( 0.54) 
Flex*EPS 13.226*** 12.491***  15.172*** 13.696***    1.001 14.032***
(t-value) ( 2.71) ( 6.50)  ( 2.83) ( 6.46)  ( 0.06) ( 2.67) 
BPS  -0.279*   0.028   -0.455**  -0.021    0.279   0.314 
(t-value) (-1.76) ( 0.34)  (-2.54) (-0.22)  ( 0.67) ( 1.29) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 422 596  340 494  81 122 
N 680 1434  525 1118  116 256 
R-Square 0.737 0.761  0.755 0.769  0.739 0.785 
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Panel C: Good (R>0) and Bad (R<0) News Firms Analysis Using Complete Models 
P(i,t) = b0 + b1EPS(i,t)  + b2Flex*EPS(i,t) + b3BPS(i,t) + b4SO(i,t) + b5PE*FD(i,t) + b6OC(i,t) + b7Audit(i,t) + b8 Size(i,t)  + 
b9Lev(i,t) + b10Risk(i,t) + b11Grow(i,t)  + e (i,t)                                                                               
Intercept -22.173***  -8.213**  -19.745** -15.990***  -25.621  10.160 
(t-value) (-3.08) (-2.33)  (-2.47) (-4.04)  (-1.36) ( 1.20) 
EPS  14.368***   9.028***   16.071***  10.040***    4.572   2.769 
(t-value) ( 5.81) -6.85  ( 5.59) ( 6.63)  ( 0.79) ( 0.91) 
Flex*EPS   1.356   5.967***    1.544   5.435**   -2.593  11.259** 
(t-value) ( 0.27) -3  ( 0.28) ( 2.52)  (-0.16) ( 2.00) 
BPS  -0.504** -0.019   -0.728***  -0.154   -0.150   0.400 
(t-value) (-2.39) (-0.18)  (-3.03) (-1.29)  (-0.25) ( 1.37) 
SO  -1.533 -0.271   -0.692   1.588**    
(t-value) (-1.19) (-0.52)  (-0.37) ( 2.29)    
PE*FD   0.914 0.007       0.468  -0.296 
(t-value) ( 0.47) -0.01     ( 0.20) (-0.27) 
OC  -0.716 -0.474   -7.305*  -0.843    5.291   1.754 
(t-value) (-0.22) (-0.34)  (-1.69) (-0.53)  ( 0.94) ( 0.50) 
Audit  -1.202 0.513   -1.107   0.932**   -1.889  -0.434 
(t-value) (-1.28) -1.35  (-0.91) ( 2.08)  (-1.06) (-0.49) 
Size   1.602***   0.749***    1.696***   1.101***    1.411   0.069 
(t-value) ( 4.86) -4.86  ( 4.64) ( 6.30)  ( 1.56) ( 0.16) 
Lev  -0.343***  -0.129**   -0.387***  -0.201***   -0.724   0.099 
(t-value) (-2.81) (-2.25)  (-3.06) (-3.08)  (-1.44) ( 0.67) 
Risk   0.775 -1.126    1.618  -1.119  -10.033  -3.746 
(t-value) ( 0.32) (-0.83)  ( 0.63) (-0.77)  (-1.45) (-1.04) 
Grow  -1.734***  -1.597***   -1.651***  -1.957***   -0.782  -0.812 
(t-value) (-4.68) (-7.53)  (-3.93) (-8.30)  (-0.88) (-1.47) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 422 596  340 494  81 122 
N 672 1426  518 1111  109 249 
R-Square 0.758 0.776  0.776 0.792  0.756 0.79 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a I define profit (loss) firms as firms with net income larger (less) than zero. The full sample include all firms that represent in both the 
rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. b Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based 
period covers the more flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. c Represents the number of firm-year 
observations. d I define good (bad) news firms as firms with stock returns larger (less) than zero. e Firms are classified as state-owned firms 
if they have state- and/or institutional-ownership, and as private firms otherwise. 
I base the analysis on pooled regressions including controls as specified in the above equation. For state-owned 
(private) firm subsamples, I do not control for PE*FD (SO) because they are controlled in the sample partition 
process. All variables are defined as follows: 
P(i,t)  =monthly ending stock price for firm i four months after the end of fiscal year t, EPS (i,t)= earnings per 
share for firm i in year t,Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for principles-based accounting 
regime, and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime, Flex*EPS(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility 
and earnings per share for firm i in year t, SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the state, PE*FD (i,t) = 
interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for private firms and 0 
otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”), OC (i,t) = ownership-
concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares controlled by the top three 
shareholders in firm i in year t, Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any 
of Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = the nature log of market value of firm i in year t, Lev (i,t) = 
the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity for firm i in year t, Risk(i,t) = the 
standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock, Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured 
as book-market ratio, and BPS(i,t) = book value per share for firm i in year t. 
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TABLE 13 
       REGRESSIONS OF STOCK RETURNS ON THE CHANGE IN EARNINGS PER SHARE  
R (i,t)  = b0 + b1ΔEPS(i,t)  + b2 Flex*ΔEPS (i,t) + b3SO(i,t) + b4PE*FD (i,t) + b5OC (i,t) + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  
+ b8 Lev (i,t) + b9 Risk(i,t)  + b10Grow (i,t) + e (i,t)   
    
 Full Samplea State-ownedb Private 
Intercept  -0.198   0.450  -0.917 
(t-value) (-0.46) ( 0.85) (-1.18) 
∆EPS   1.287***   1.309***   1.153*** 
(t-value) ( 9.46) ( 8.26) ( 4.14) 
Flex*∆EPS   0.183   0.099   0.755 
(t-value) ( 0.86) ( 0.41) ( 1.50) 
SO   0.096   0.078  
(t-value) ( 1.32) ( 0.73)  
PE*FD   0.080    0.141 
(t-value) ( 0.73)  ( 1.23) 
OC   0.128  -0.174   0.511 
(t-value) ( 0.61) (-0.63) ( 1.33) 
Audit  -0.030  -0.060   0.038 
(t-value) (-0.62) (-0.94) ( 0.44) 
Size  -0.015  -0.034*   0.008 
(t-value) (-0.94) (-1.70) ( 0.20) 
Lev   0.006   0.010  -0.002 
(t-value) ( 0.99) ( 1.47) (-0.12) 
Risk   0.633***   0.322*   1.366*** 
(t-value) ( 3.93) ( 1.70) ( 3.93) 
Grow   0.149***   0.165***   0.097** 
(t-value) ( 6.57) ( 6.20) ( 2.01) 
Number of Fixed effects 654 554 137 
Nc 2944 2354 551 
R-Square 0.428 0.443 0.427 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. Firms with state- 
and/or institutional-ownership are classified as state-owned firms, and private firms otherwise.  
b Represents the number of firm-year observations. 
Variable Definition: 
R(i,t)  =accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen Index returns from four 
months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current fiscal year end, ∆EPS (i,t)= change in 
earnings per share for firm i from year t-1 to t, Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for 
principles-based accounting regime, and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime, Flex*∆EPS(i,t)= 
interaction between accounting flexibility and change in earnings per share for firm i from year t-1 to t, 
SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the state, PE*FD (i,t) = interaction between a dummy variable, 
PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by 
subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”), OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is 
measured as the percentage of common shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t, 
Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and 
zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = the nature log of total assets of firm i in year t, Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-
term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity for firm i in year t, Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of 
the monthly returns on the stock, and Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as book-
market ratio. 
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TABLE 14 
THE STOCK RETURN BASED VALUE RELEVANCE ANALYSIS ON FIRMS WITH GOOD OR BAD RETURN 
NEWS A 
 
 Full Sample b  State-owned Firms  Private Firms 
 
Good 
News Bad News  
Good 
News Bad News  
Good 
News Bad News 
Panel A: Prime Models 
R (i,t)  = b0 + b1ΔEPS(i,t)  + b2 Flex*ΔEPS (i,t) + b3∆BPS (i,t) + e (i,t)   
Intercept   0.127  -0.386***    0.159  -0.335***   -0.076  -0.439*** 
(t-value) ( 0.85) (-4.04)  ( 1.01) (-3.63)  (-0.57) (-3.91) 
∆EPS   0.662***   0.649***    0.743***   0.524***    0.380   1.139*** 
(t-value) ( 3.98) ( 4.81)  ( 3.83) ( 3.45)  ( 1.09) ( 3.54) 
Flex*∆EPS   0.053   0.296    0.131   0.509**    0.759  -0.317 
(t-value) ( 0.16) ( 1.49)  ( 0.35) ( 2.31)  ( 0.93) (-0.62) 
∆BPS   0.024   0.008    0.019   0.016    0.057  -0.028 
(t-value) ( 1.38) ( 0.85)  ( 0.91) ( 1.48)  ( 1.59) (-1.18) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 331 574  260 471  68 118 
Nc 480 1250  367 968  79 230 
R-Square      0.569      0.579       0.567      0.619       0.630      0.499 
         
Panel B: Complete Models 
R (i,t)  = b0 + b1ΔEPS(i,t)  + b2 Flex*ΔEPS (i,t) + b3∆BPS (i,t) + b4SO(i,t) + b5PE*FD (i,t) + b6OC (i,t) + b7Audit(i,t) 
+ b8 Size(i,t)  + b9 Lev (i,t) + b10 Risk(i,t)  + b11Grow (i,t) + e (i,t) 
Intercept   0.360  -0.747**    0.143  -0.436   -0.580  -1.561** 
(t-value) ( 0.61) (-2.57)  ( 0.19) (-1.23)  (-0.41) (-2.16) 
∆EPS   0.525***   0.679***    0.478**   0.565***    0.343   1.149*** 
(t-value) ( 3.17) ( 5.01)  ( 2.43) ( 3.69)  ( 0.94) ( 3.50) 
Flex*∆EPS   0.118   0.266    0.369   0.460**    0.619  -0.330 
(t-value) ( 0.37) ( 1.34)  ( 0.97) ( 2.09)  ( 0.71) (-0.64) 
∆BPS   0.013   0.002    0.001   0.011    0.025  -0.032 
(t-value) ( 0.73) ( 0.17)  ( 0.03) ( 0.92)  ( 0.64) (-1.29) 
SO  -0.110  -0.029   -0.238  -0.005    0.000   0.000 
(t-value) (-0.86) (-0.52)  (-1.09) (-0.07)    
PE*FD   0.111   0.057    0.000   0.000    0.141   0.085 
(t-value) ( 0.64) ( 0.66)     ( 0.85) ( 0.83) 
OC   0.642**  -0.265    0.911*  -0.589***    0.603  -0.091 
(t-value) ( 2.08) (-1.62)  ( 1.96) (-2.95)  ( 1.37) (-0.25) 
Audit  -0.216***  -0.005   -0.213**  -0.079*   -0.097   0.137 
(t-value) (-2.93) (-0.13)  (-2.15) (-1.66)  (-0.82) ( 1.63) 
Size  -0.036   0.026**   -0.029   0.015    0.009   0.059* 
(t-value) (-1.56) ( 1.97)  (-1.01) ( 0.97)  ( 0.16) ( 1.69) 
Lev  -0.003  -0.004    0.004  -0.007   -0.104***   0.002 
(t-value) (-0.32) (-0.79)  ( 0.37) (-1.09)  (-3.05) ( 0.19) 
Risk   0.583***  -0.342**    0.525**  -0.423**   -0.174   0.066 
(t-value) ( 2.83) (-2.40)  ( 2.18) (-2.57)  (-0.37) ( 0.19) 
Grow   0.105***   0.040**    0.140***   0.036   -0.004   0.028 
(t-value) ( 3.64) ( 1.98)  ( 3.96) ( 1.55)  (-0.07) ( 0.55) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 331 574  260 471  68 118 
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Nc 472 1242  360 961  72 223 
R-Square      0.605      0.586       0.605      0.628       0.693      0.514 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a I define good (bad) news firms as firms with stock returns larger (less) than zero.  
b The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. I classify firms as 
state-owned firms if they have state- and/or institutional-ownership, and as private firms otherwise. 
c Represents the number of firm-year observations.     
I base the analysis on pooled regressions including controls as specified in the above equation. For state-
owned (private) firm subsamples, I do not control for PE*FD (SO) because they are controlled in the 
sample partition process. All variables are defined as follows: 
R(i,t)  =accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen Index returns from four 
months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current fiscal year end, ∆EPS (i,t)= change in 
earnings per share for firm i from year t-1 to t, Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for 
principles-based accounting regime (Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I), 
Flex*∆EPS(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility and change in earnings per share for firm i from 
year t-1 to t, ∆BPS = change in book value per share, SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the state, 
PE*FD (i,t) = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for 
private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”), 
OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares controlled 
by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t, Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year 
if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = the nature log of total assets of firm i 
in year t, Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity for firm i in 
year t, Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock, and Grow (i,t) = a proxy for 
growth opportunities, measured as book-market ratio. 
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TABLE 15 
REGRESSIONS OF FUTURE OPERATING CASH FLOWS ACCUMULATED ONE-, TWO-, AND THREE-YEARS-AHEAD ON EARNINGS 
CFO (i,t+y) = b0  +  b1 Earn(i,t)  + b2 Flex*Earn(i,t) + b3SO (i,t) + b4PE*FD (i,t)  + b5OC (i,t)  
                    + b6Audit(i,t) + b7 Size(i,t)  + b8 Lev (i,t) + b9 Risk(i,t) + b10 Grow (i,t) + e (i,t)                                             
             
Panel A: Full Samplea  Panel B: State-owned Firms  Panel C: Private Firms 
 Dependent Variables  Dependent Variables  Dependent Variables 
IVb CFO(t+1)  CFO(t+2)  CFO(t+3)  CFO(t+1) CFO(t+2) CFO(t+3)  CFO(t+1) CFO(t+2) CFO(t+3) 
Intercept  -0.410   -0.128    1.665**   -0.176   0.772   2.027**    0.264  -0.629   3.297** 
(t-value) (-1.03)  (-0.24)  ( 2.23)  (-0.37) ( 1.20) ( 2.34)  ( 0.44) (-0.78) ( 2.17) 
Earn   0.674***    0.763***    0.664**    0.934***   0.865***   0.883***    0.170   0.526*   0.505 
(t-value) ( 3.67)  ( 3.44)  ( 2.50)  ( 3.87) ( 3.02) ( 2.59)  ( 0.67) ( 1.72) ( 1.32) 
Flex*Earn   0.007    0.072    0.955**   -0.296  -0.245  -0.256    0.243   0.288   3.297*** 
(t-value) ( 0.03)  ( 0.23)  ( 1.97)  (-0.98) (-0.63) (-0.45)  ( 0.63) ( 0.57) ( 3.43) 
SO   0.213***    0.185*    0.070    0.216**   0.246   0.127     
(t-value) ( 2.83)  ( 1.65)  ( 0.42)  ( 2.09) ( 1.62) ( 0.54)     
PE*FD  -0.150   -0.265*   -0.240       -0.209**  -0.393***  -0.329** 
(t-value) (-1.29)  (-1.68)  (-1.24)      (-2.16) (-3.08) (-2.10) 
OC   0.289*    0.346    0.351    0.384*   0.351   0.700**    0.114   0.158  -0.423 
(t-value) ( 1.72)  ( 1.64)  ( 1.25)  ( 1.75) ( 1.30) ( 2.01)  ( 0.48) ( 0.53) (-1.00) 
Audit   0.053    0.165**    0.199*    0.022   0.058   0.073   -0.164**  -0.244**  -0.141 
(t-value) ( 1.03)  ( 2.13)  ( 1.96)  ( 0.32) ( 0.51) ( 0.49)  (-2.29) (-2.56) (-1.10) 
Size   0.009   -0.008   -0.080**   -0.004  -0.052**  -0.107**    0.001   0.037  -0.139* 
(t-value) ( 0.59)  (-0.37)  (-2.25)  (-0.23) (-2.03) (-2.57)  ( 0.05) ( 0.92) (-1.97) 
Lev   0.009   -0.005   -0.024*    0.011  -0.016  -0.048***   -0.018   0.012   0.044 
(t-value) ( 1.35)  (-0.58)  (-1.72)  ( 1.46) (-1.61) (-3.17)  (-1.13) ( 0.55) ( 1.21) 
Risk  -0.296**   -0.306*   -0.014   -0.429**  -0.326  -0.044    0.234   0.201   0.458 
(t-value) (-1.99)  (-1.66)  (-0.06)  (-2.48) (-1.56) (-0.18)  ( 0.91) ( 0.60) ( 1.18) 
Grow  -0.020   -0.036   -0.023   -0.010  -0.025  -0.022   -0.079**  -0.070*  -0.021 
(t-value) (-1.06)  (-1.50)  (-0.82)  (-0.45) (-0.91) (-0.69)  (-2.27) (-1.70) (-0.43) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 658  572  359  555 477 288  125 108 73 
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Nc 2720  2073  1425  2195 1667 1128  525 406 297 
R-square 0.458  0.571  0.619  0.481 0.611 0.646  0.496 0.606 0.629 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. 
b Represents all independent variables. c Represents the total number of observations. 
CFO (i,t+y) =cumulative future cash flows scaled by year-end total assets for firm i one, two, and three years ahead;  
Flex=accounting flexibility dummy variable, set to 1 for principles-based accounting regime (Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime 
(Phase I);  
Earn(i,t) =total earnings scaled by total assets for firm i in year t; 
Flex*Earn(i,t) =interaction between accounting flexibility and earnings scaled by total assets for firm i in year t; 
SO (i,t) = percentage of shares owned by the state; 
PE*FD (i,t) = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by 
subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”); 
OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year 
t; 
Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise; 
Size(i,t) = the nature log of market value of firm i in year t; 
Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity for firm i in year t; 
Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock; and  
Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio. 
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TABLE 16 
REGRESSIONS OF FUTURE OPERATING CASH FLOWS ACCUMULATED ONE-, TWO-, AND THREE-YEARS-AHEAD  
ON EARNINGS COMPONENTS 
CFO (i,t+y) = b0  + b1 CFO(i,t)  + b2 Flex*CFO(i,t)  + b3NDA (i,t)  + b4Flex*NDA (i,t)  + b5 DA(i,t) 
                              + b6 Flex*DA (i,t) + b7SO (i,t) + b8PE*FD (i,t) + b9OC (i,t)  + b10Audit(i,t) + b11 Size(i,t)   
                               + b12 Lev (i,t) + b13 Risk(i,t) + b14 Grow (i,t) + e (i,t) 
             
 Panel A: Full Samplea  Panel B: State-owned Firms  Panel C: Private Firms 
 Dependent Variables  Dependent Variables  Dependent Variables 
IVb CFO(t+1)  CFO(t+2)  CFO(t+3)  CFO(t+1) CFO(t+2) CFO(t+3)  CFO(t+1) CFO(t+2) CFO(t+3) 
Intercept   1.035***    1.807***    3.262***    1.473***   2.557***   3.769***    0.590  -0.017   0.915 
(t-value) ( 3.37)  ( 3.91)  ( 4.65)  ( 4.07) ( 4.56) ( 4.44)  ( 1.18) (-0.03) ( 0.73) 
Cash   0.779***    0.996***    0.934***    0.736***   0.757***   0.750***   0.888***   0.999*** 1.306***
(t-value) (20.69)  (11.42)  ( 5.81)  (18.69) ( 7.24) ( 3.84)  ( 5.79) ( 5.54) ( 5.27) 
Flex*Cash   0.322***    0.438***    1.349***    0.388***   0.471**   0.564   -0.356  -0.142   0.781 
(t-value) ( 3.51)  ( 2.68)  ( 4.57)  ( 3.73) ( 2.52) ( 1.51)  (-1.53) (-0.43) ( 1.23) 
NDA  -0.242**    0.064    0.207   -0.346***  -0.354*  -0.063    0.281   0.616*  0.854** 
(t-value) (-2.12)  ( 0.37)  ( 0.81)  (-2.67) (-1.72) (-0.21)  ( 1.02) ( 1.93) ( 2.04) 
Flex*NDA   0.385**   -0.019    0.354    0.455**   0.061  -1.206*   -0.605  -1.298***  -0.122 
(t-value) ( 2.15)  (-0.07)  ( 0.65)  ( 2.20) ( 0.18) (-1.68)  (-1.58) (-2.60) (-0.13) 
DA  -0.090    0.241**    0.407**   -0.116   0.055   0.319    0.040   0.207   0.477* 
(t-value) (-1.32)  ( 2.17)  ( 2.26)  (-1.49) ( 0.41) ( 1.45)  ( 0.23) ( 1.04) ( 1.74) 
Flex*DA   0.450***    0.374**    1.104***    0.433***   0.345*   0.315   -0.033  -0.164   1.190 
(t-value) ( 4.10)  ( 2.12)  ( 3.57)  ( 3.49) ( 1.73) ( 0.84)  (-0.13) (-0.44) ( 1.57) 
SO   0.112*    0.108    0.028    0.068   0.098   0.046     
(t-value) ( 1.94)  ( 1.14)  ( 0.18)  ( 0.86) ( 0.75) ( 0.21)     
PE*FD   0.057   -0.009   -0.050       -0.008  -0.093  -0.037 
(t-value) ( 0.63)  (-0.07)  (-0.27)      (-0.10) (-0.86) (-0.25) 
OC   0.029    0.134    0.122    0.096   0.242   0.507   -0.043   0.058  -0.394 
(t-value) ( 0.22)  ( 0.75)  ( 0.47)  ( 0.58) ( 1.04) ( 1.58)  (-0.22) ( 0.24) (-1.04) 
Audit   0.050    0.127*    0.184**    0.012   0.098   0.084   -0.089  -0.165**  -0.092 
(t-value) ( 1.26)  ( 1.95)  ( 1.97)  ( 0.24) ( 0.99) ( 0.61)  (-1.48) (-2.17) (-0.81) 
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Size  -0.046***   -0.088***   -0.159***   -0.067***  -0.126***  -0.197***   -0.018   0.004  -0.029 
(t-value) (-3.88)  (-4.85)  (-4.73)  (-4.77) (-5.74) (-4.81)  (-0.73) ( 0.14) (-0.49) 
Lev  -0.017***   -0.022***   -0.041***   -0.017***  -0.030***  -0.053***   -0.027**  -0.003  -0.024 
(t-value) (-3.39)  (-2.83)  (-3.29)  (-3.12) (-3.56) (-3.84)  (-1.98) (-0.16) (-0.77) 
Risk  -0.198*   -0.121   -0.045   -0.246*  -0.134  -0.043    0.103   0.133   0.266 
(t-value) (-1.73)  (-0.77)  (-0.22)  (-1.87) (-0.74) (-0.19)  ( 0.48) ( 0.49) ( 0.78) 
Grow  -0.009   -0.017   -0.009   -0.006  -0.016  -0.013   -0.041  -0.025   0.015 
(t-value) (-0.61)  (-0.84)  (-0.36)  (-0.45) (-0.91) (-0.69)  (-1.40) (-0.74) ( 0.34) 
Number of 
Fixed effects 658  572  359  555 477 288  125 108 73 
Nc 2720  2073  1425  2195 1667 1128  525 406 297 
R-square 0.678  0.699  0.685  0.697 0.712 0.698  0.661 0.760 0.727 
***, **, * Indicates significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test.  
a The full sample include all firms that present in both the rules-based and principles-based accounting periods. 
b Represents all independent variables. c Represents the total number of observations. 
CFO (i,t+y) =cumulative future cash flows scaled by year-end total assets for firm i one, two, three, and four years ahead, Flex=accounting flexibility 
dummy variable, set to 1for principles-based accounting regime (Phase III), and 0 for the rules-based accounting regime (Phase I), Cash (i,t) = cash flows 
scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, Flex*Cash(i,t) =interaction between accounting flexibility and cash flows scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, 
NDA (i,t) = non-discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, Flex*NDA(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility and non-
discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, DA (i,t)= ROA controlled discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, 
Flex*DA(i,t)= interaction between accounting flexibility and discretionary accruals scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, SO (i,t) = percentage of shares 
owned by the state, PE*FD (i,t) = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; 
FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” from digit “8”), OC (i,t) = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of 
common shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t, Audit(i,t) = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of 
Big-6 audit firms and zero otherwise, Size(i,t) = the nature log of total assets of firm i in year t, Lev (i,t) = the book value of long-term debt and book value of 
shareholder’s equity for firm i in year t, Risk(i,t) = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock, and Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth 
opportunities, measured as market-book ratio. 
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TABLE 17 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS: POPULATION ANALYSIS 
         
Panel A: Comparability 
   
Difference in Volatility  
(Rules - Principles) 
Variables 
Volatility in 
Rules-based 
Period (σ2R)a  
Volatility in 
Principles-based 
Period  (σ2P)       σ2R -σ2P        P-value 
         
 (N=719) b  (N=3314)      
Earn 0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.005  0.010  -0.005  0.000 *** 
DA 0.005  0.010  -0.004  0.000 *** 
         
Panel B: Real Earnings Management (Abnormal Operating Activities) 
 
  Differences between Rules- 
versus Principles-based System 
 
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
  
 Mean  Mean  Mean (R-P)  
t-value of mean 
difference 
 (1839)  (3865)      
AbCOGS 0.078  0.048  0.030  14.87 *** 
AbPROD 0.085  0.071  0.014  4.78 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.062  0.042  0.020  7.82 *** 
AbDISEXP 0.028  0.020  0.008  4.46 *** 
         
Panel C: Accounting Earnings Management (Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals) 
 
  Differences between Rules- 
versus Principles-based System 
 
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
  
 Mean  Mean  Mean (R-P)  
t-value of mean 
difference 
 (1868)  (3891)      
  0.0820  0.0954  -0.0134  -3.8140 *** 
a Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period 
covers the more flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004. 
b The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. 
Comparability analysis is based on pooled regressions including controls as specified in the 
following equation: DV (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) + 
b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) + b13 
∆CS (i,t) + b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t) + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)   where DV=dependent 
variables, including earnings (Earn), total accruals (ACCR) and discretionary accruals (DA).  
I use volatility of earnings (Earn), total accruals (ACCR), and discretionary accruals (DA) as 
proxies for accounting comparability. The volatility (σ2) is measured as the variance of the 
residuals from the pooled regression of the interested variables on the control variables. Large 
(small) volatility signals low (high) accounting comparability across firms. The residuals are 
winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. Panel D reports the estimated coefficient.  
I base the real earnings management analysis on regressions including controls as specified 
in following equations: 
COGS(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t)   + e(i,t) 
∆INV(i,t) = b0  + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
PROD(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t) + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
DISEXP(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
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I use abnormal operating activities, including the absolute value of abnormal cost of goods 
sold (AbCOGS), change in inventory (Ab∆INV), production costs (AbPROD), and discretionary 
expenses (AbDISEXP), as proxies for real earnings management. The abnormal part of each 
interested variable is the residual from the pooled regression of the interested variables on the 
control variables. Large (small) residuals signals more (less) real (activities-based) earnings 
management. The residuals are winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. Panel D 
reports the estimated coefficient. 
Accounting earnings management is proxied as the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
All variables are defined as follows:  
Earn=total earnings scaled by average total assets;   
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in cash 
and equivelant+change in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average total 
assets;   
NDA= non-discretionary accruals is estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model developed 
in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-
CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the gross 
amount of property, plant, and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables are 
scaled by average total assets; 
DA= discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between ACCR and NDA; 
CA= current assets accruals are calculated as the sum of accounts receivables, inventory, 
and other current assets; 
CL= current liabilities accruals are calculated as the sum of accounts payable, taxes payable, 
and other current liabilities; 
COGS= cost of goods sold; 
∆INV = year-to-year change in inventory;  
PROD = production costs are calculated as the sum of COGS and ∆INV; 
DISEXP = discretionary expenses are the sum of selling expenses and general and 
administrative expenses; 
CFO = cash flows are estimated by deducting ACCR from Earn;  
P = monthly ending stock price four months after the end of fiscal year;  
R =accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen Index returns 
from four months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current fiscal year end; 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state,; 
PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is set 
to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of digit “4” 
from digit “8”);  
OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common shares 
controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t,  
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit firms 
and zero otherwise,  
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals; 
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute year-to-year change in prior income; 
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity;  
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock,  
Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio. 
∆CS = year-to-year change in common stock equity; 
∆LBT = year-to-year change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; 
∆Sale =year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
 111
TABLE 18 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS: INDUSTRY EFFECT ANALYSIS 
         
Panel A: Comparability 
   
Difference in Volatility  
(Rules - Principles) 
Variables 
Volatility in 
Rules-based 
Period (σ2R) a  
Volatility in 
Principles-based 
Period  (σ2P)       σ2R -σ2P       P-value 
         
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=2) 
 (N=149) b  (N=579)      
Earn 0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.004  0.007  -0.003  0.000 *** 
DA 0.004  0.007  -0.003  0.000 *** 
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=3) 
 (N=240)  (N=729)      
Earn 0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.004  0.013  -0.008  0.000 *** 
DA 0.005  0.011  -0.006  0.000 *** 
Transportation and Public Utilities (First-digit SIC code=4) 
 (N=49)  (N=232)      
Earn 0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.006  0.009  -0.003  0.149  
DA 0.008  0.011  -0.003  0.239  
Trade (First-digit SIC code=5) 
 (N=110)  (N=275)      
Earn 0.001  0.003  -0.002  0.000 *** 
ACCR 0.007  0.016  -0.010  0.000 *** 
DA 0.006  0.014  -0.008  0.000 *** 
Services (First-digit SIC code=9) 
 (N=113)  (N=245)      
Earn 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.797  
ACCR 0.006  0.011  -0.005  0.000 *** 
DA 0.007  0.011  -0.004  0.003 *** 
         
Panel B: Real Earnings Management (Abnormal Operating 
Activities)   
 
  Differences between Rules- 
versus Principles-based System 
 
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
  
 Mean  Mean  Mean (R-P)  
t-value of mean 
difference 
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=2) 
 (417)  (579)      
AbCOGS 0.080  0.067  0.014  2.36 ** 
AbPROD 0.090  0.083  0.008  1.12  
Ab∆INV 0.048  0.032  0.016  4.20 *** 
AbDISEXP 0.030  0.027  0.003  1.40  
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=3) 
 (597)  (733)      
AbCOGS 0.069  0.046  0.023  5.60 *** 
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AbPROD 0.089  0.074  0.015  2.73 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.058  0.041  0.017  4.37 *** 
AbDISEXP 0.027  0.029  -0.002  -0.92  
Transportation and Public Utilities (First-digit SIC code=4) 
 (160)  (232)      
AbCOGS 0.044  0.039  0.005  1.13  
AbPROD 0.049  0.043  0.006  0.90  
Ab∆INV 0.030  0.021  0.009  1.61  
AbDISEXP 0.019  0.021  -0.002  -0.54  
Trade (First-digit SIC code=5) 
 (263)  (279)      
AbCOGS 0.095  0.049  0.046  3.43 *** 
AbPROD 0.099  0.072  0.027  2.97 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.074  0.066  0.008  0.83  
AbDISEXP 0.035  0.032  0.004  1.10  
Services (First-digit SIC code=9) 
 (243)  (245)      
AbCOGS 0.065  0.045  0.020  3.09 *** 
AbPROD 0.118  0.076  0.043  4.34 *** 
Ab∆INV 0.081  0.076  0.005  0.55  
AbDISEXP 0.019  0.019  0.000  -0.03  
         
Panel C: Accounting Earnings Management (Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals) 
 
  Differences between Rules- 
versus Principles-based System 
 
Rules-based 
System ( R) 
 
Principles-based 
System (P) 
  
 Mean  Mean  Mean (R-P)  
t-value of mean 
difference 
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=2) 
 (417)  (579)      
Mean 0.0739  0.0922  -0.0183  -2.7573 *** 
Manufacturing (First-digit SIC code=3) 
 (597)  (733)      
Mean 0.0786  0.0928  -0.0142  -2.3615 ** 
Transportation and Public Utilities (First-digit SIC code=4) 
 (160)  (232)      
Mean 0.0981  0.1019  -0.0038  -0.2854  
Trade (First-digit SIC code=5) 
 (263)  (279)      
Mean 0.0953  0.1024  -0.0071  -0.7172  
Services (First-digit SIC code=9)      
 (243)  (245)      
Mean 0.0918  0.1209  -0.0291  -2.4901 ** 
a Rules-based accounting period starts from 1992 to 1997, while Principles-based period 
covers the more flexible, jurisdictionally-adopted IFRS accounting period from 2001 to 2004.
b The number in parentheses shows the number of firm-year observations. 
Comparability analysis is based on pooled regressions including controls as specified in the 
following equation: DV (i,t) = b0  +  b1SO (i,t) + b2PE*FD (i,t) + b3OC (i,t) + b4Audit(i,t) + b5 Loss(i,t) 
+ b6 DA (i,t-1) + b7 CFO(i,t) +  b8 AbsNI(i,t-1) + b9 Size(i,t)  + b10 Lev (i,t) + b11 Risk(i,t) + b12 Grow (i,t) 
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+ b13 ∆CS (i,t) + b14 ∆LBT(i,t) + b15ATTO(i,t) + b16 Sale (i,t) + b17 ∆Sale (i,t) + e (i,t)   where 
DV=dependent variables, including earnings (Earn), total accruals (ACCR) and 
discretionary accruals (DA).  
I use volatility of earnings (Earn), total accruals (ACCR), and discretionary accruals (DA) as 
proxies for accounting comparability. The volatility (σ2) is measured as the variance of the 
residuals from the pooled regression of the interested variables on the control variables. 
Large (small) volatility signals low (high) accounting comparability across firms. The 
residuals are winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. Panel D reports the estimated 
coefficient.  
I base the real earnings management analysis on regressions including controls as 
specified in following equations: 
COGS(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t)   + e(i,t) 
∆INV(i,t) = b0  + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
PROD(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t) + b1∆SALE(i,t) + b2∆SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
DISEXP(i,t) = b0  + b1SALE(i,t-1)  + e(i,t) 
I use abnormal operating activities, including the absolute value of abnormal cost of goods 
sold (AbCOGS), change in inventory (Ab∆INV), production costs (AbPROD), and 
discretionary expenses (AbDISEXP), as proxies for real earnings management. The 
abnormal part of each interested variable is the residual from the pooled regression of the 
interested variables on the control variables. Large (small) residuals signals more (less) real 
(activities-based) earnings management. The residuals are winsorized at the 1% level to 
control for outliers. Panel D reports the estimated coefficient. 
Accounting earnings management is proxied as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. 
All variables are defined as follows:  
Earn=total earnings scaled by average total assets;   
ACCR=the product of change in current accruals-change in current liabilities - change in 
cash and equivelant+change in short-term debt-change in depreciation scaled by average 
total assets;   
NDA= non-discretionary accruals is estimated using modified Jones (1991) Model 
developed in Dechow et al. (1995) and refined in Kothari et al. (2005) as follows: 
ACCR=b0+b1(CREV-CREC)+b2PPE+b3ROA+e 
where CREV is the change in net sales,  CREC is the change in receivables, PPE is the 
gross amount of property, plant, and equipment, ROA is the return on assets. All variables 
are scaled by average total assets; 
DA= discretionary accruals is calculated as the difference between ACCR and NDA; 
CA= current assets accruals are calculated as the sum of accounts receivables, inventory, 
and other current assets; 
CL= current liabilities accruals are calculated as the sum of accounts payable, taxes 
payable, and other current liabilities; 
COGS= cost of goods sold; 
∆INV = year-to-year change in inventory;  
PROD = production costs are calculated as the sum of COGS and ∆INV; 
DISEXP = discretionary expenses are the sum of selling expenses and general and 
administrative expenses; 
CFO = cash flows are estimated by deducting ACCR from Earn;  
P = monthly ending stock price four months after the end of fiscal year;  
R =accumulated monthly stock returns adjusted for Shanghai and Shenzhen Index returns 
from four months after the last fiscal year to four months after the current fiscal year end; 
SO = percentage of shares owned by the state,; 
PE*FD = interaction between a dummy variable, PE, and the frequency difference (PE is 
set to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise; FD is calculated by subtracting the frequency of 
digit “4” from digit “8”);  
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OC = ownership-concentration level, which is measured as the percentage of common 
shares controlled by the top three shareholders in firm i in year t,  
Audit = audit quality, which is set as one for a firm year if the firm hire any of Big-6 audit 
firms and zero otherwise,  
Loss = one if the firm reported a net loss for any of the two prior years and zero otherwise; 
DA(t-1)= lagged discretionary accruals; 
Abs∆NI(t-1)= Absolute year-to-year change in prior income; 
Size = the nature log of market value;  
Lev = the book value of long-term debt and book value of shareholder’s equity;  
Risk = the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the stock,  
Grow (i,t) = a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as market-book ratio. 
∆CS = year-to-year change in common stock equity; 
∆LBT = year-to-year change in long-term debt;  
ATTO = assets turnover ratio; 
Sale = sales scaled by average total assets; 
∆Sale = year-to-year change in sales scaled by average total assets. 
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FIGURE 1 
Continuum of Rules-based and Principles-based Standards in China 
        
Evolution Stage:  Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Governing Laws:  
Accounting System 
for Pilot Enterprises 
with Shareholding 
System (ASPESS) 
Accounting System 
for Shareholding 
Companies (ASSC) 
Accounting 
Standards for 
Business Enterprises 
(new ASBE) 
              
Year:  1992 1998 2001 Present
Characteristics of 
Accounting 
Rules/Standards: 
 
 
Very Rigid Rules-
based Standards 
 
 
 
 
Flexible Principles-
based Standards 
        
Note: Year 1992, 1998 and 2001 denote the starting year of a new accounting regime. 
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       FIGURE 2 
REALIZED FREQUENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN DIGIT FOUR AND EIGHT IN REPORTED 
EARNINGS 
Full Sample
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Non-state-owned Firms
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Note: This figure uses bar chart to show the frequency distribution differences in 
percentage (x-axis) between digit four and eight in each year (y-axis). Above-zero 
bars indicate that the observed frequency of digit four is higher than digit eight, and 
vice versa. 
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EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT 1 
Comparison of Old and New Chinese GAAP on Major Earnings Management 
 Relevant Items 
      
Items Old GAAP (1992-1997) New GAAP (2001-Present) 
Definition of 
assets 
An asset is a resource that is 
owned or controlled by an 
enterprise as a result of past 
transactions or events 
An asset is a resource that is (a) owned or 
controlled by an enterprise as a result of past 
transactions or events and (b) expected to 
generate economic benefits to the enterprise. 
   
Re-evaluation 
of fixed assets  
Re-evaluation is not allowed 
without official approval from 
government 
Provision of impairment loss are required if an 
asset is impaired  
   
Residual 
values for fixed 
assets 
 Required to be between three 
and five per cent 
Determined by firms according to the nature and 
usage of underlying fixed assets 
   
Depreciation 
method 
Usually only the straight-line 
depreciation method unless an 
enterprise get the approval from 
governing authority to use 
accelerated depreciation methods 
Reasonably selected by the enterprise 
according to technological developments, 
environmental and other factors. Applicable 
methods include straight -line method, unit of 
production method, sum-of-years’-digits method 
and double-declining-balance method. 
   
Economic life 
of fixed assets 
Determined by the state Estimated by the enterprise 
   
Short-term 
(Long-term) 
Investments 
No impairment loss. Provision for Impairment is required.   
   
The cost of 
intangible 
assets 
a. The actual purchase price, b. 
an estimated value if the 
intangible asset is contributed by 
investors, or c. the development 
cost 
a. The actual purchase price, b. an agreed value 
by investing parties if the intangible asset is 
contributed by investors, c. the development 
cost, d. the carrying amount of the debt 
receivable plus any relevant tax payments if the 
assets are obtained through debt collection, e. 
the carrying amount of the assets surrendered 
plus any relevant tax payments for non-
monetary transactions, or f. for donated 
intangible assets, the cost determined by 
documented value, or market value, or the 
present value of expected future cash flows of 
the asset 
   
Inventories Recorded only at historical cost all 
the time 
Recorded at the lower of historical cost or net 
realizable value at the end of a period 
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EXHIBIT 1 Continued 
      
Items Old GAAP (1992-1997) New GAAP (2001-Present) 
Revenue 
recognition 
No consideration of the 
collectibility of the economic 
benefits associated with the 
transaction 
Emphasizing that that one condition for revenue 
recognition is that the economic benefits 
associated with the transaction will flow to the 
enterprise 
Lease No finance and operating leases 
classification. A leased asset is 
stated at the cost of leasing. 
Classifies lease into finance leases or operating 
leases. A lessee record an asset leased under 
finance leases at the lower of the carrying 
amount of the asset in the books of the lesser 
and the present value of the minimum lease 
payments.  
   
Debt 
restructuring 
No specific regulation The difference between the carrying amount of 
the debt and the carrying amount of the non-
cash asset transferred in satisfaction of the debt 
should be recognized as capital reserve or as a 
non-operating loss in the current period. The 
carrying amount of the non-cash asset is 
estimated by its fair value.  
Note: Items represent dimensions where the old Chinese generally accepted accounting principles 
differ from the new ones. Old GAAP refers to the governing Chinese accounting rules over 1992-1997 
before the adoption of the International Accounting Standards. New GAAP refers to the governing 
Chinese accounting rules and standards since 2001 after the adoption of the International Accounting 
Standards.  
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EXHIBIT 2 
Comparison of Factors Affecting State and Private Enterprise Managers' Incentives to 
Manipulate Earnings 
Variables State-owned 
enterprises Private enterprises 
Managers' control over operation Weak Strong 
Managers' responsibility for losses Weak Strong 
Relation between earnings and 
compensation  Weak Strong 
Channel of re-financing More diversified 
More reliance on stock 
markets 
Heritage from traditional planning 
economy High Low 
Corporate governance/Monitoring system 
? (additional state 
monitoring is one plus) Strong 
Government supports Strong Low 
 
Note: Variables indicate aspects in which the state-owned enterprises are different from the private 
firms. State-owned enterprises include listed firms that are subject to either direct or indirect state 
controls through shareholdings. Private enterprises compose firms not under either direct or indirect 
state controls through shareholdings. Weak and strong (low and high) are relative measurement of the 
difference between state-owned enterprises and private firms. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: 
Summary of PRC Accounting Standards 
Accounting Standard Issue Date  Effective Date  Applies To  
Disclosure of Related Party Relationships and 
Transactions 
25-May-97 1-Jan-98 Listed  
Cash Flow Statements  20-Mar-98  1-Jan-98  
 (Revised 
January 
2001)  
(Revised 1 
January 2001)  
All  
Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date 12 May 1998 
(Revised 
2003)  
1 January 1998 
(Revised 2003)  
All who follow 
ASBE 
(starting 
2003)  
Debt Restructuring 12-Jun-98  1-Jan-99  
 (Revised 
January 
2001)  
(Revised 1 
January 2001)  
All  
Revenue  20-Jun-98 1-Jan-99 Listed  
Investments 24-Jun-98  1-Jan-99  
 (Revised 
January 
2001)  
(Revised 1 
January 2001)  
Joint Stock 
Limited 
Enterprises 
(JSLE)  
Construction Contracts 25-Jun-98 1-Jan-99 Listed  
25-Jun-98  1-Jan-99  Changes in Accounting Policies and Estimates 
and Corrections of Accounting Errors  (Revised 
January 
2001)  
(Revised 1 
January 2001)  
All (starting 
2001)  
Non-monetary Transactions 28-Jun-99  1-Jan-00  
 (Revised 
January 
2001)  
(Revised 1 
January 2001)  
All  
Contingencies  27-Apr-00 1-Jul-00 All  
Intangible Assets  18-Jan-01 1-Jan-01 Joint Stock 
Limited 
Enterprises  
Borrowing Costs 18-Jan-01 1-Jan-01 All  
Leases 18-Jan-01 1-Jan-01 All  
Interim Reporting 2-Nov-01 1-Jan-02 Listed  
Inventories 9-Nov-01 1-Jan-02 All who follow 
ASBE 
(starting 
2003)  
Fixed Assets 9-Nov-01 1-Jan-02 All who follow 
ASBE 
(starting 
2003)  
 Source: China Accounting Standards Overview, by Deloitte, 2006
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Appendix B:  
Comparison of current PRC GAAP (as of Jan 1, 2006) and IFRSs 
   
Item China Accounting Regulations and 
Standards 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
Property, plant 
and equipment 
(PPE) 
PPE are accounted at historical costs. 
Subsequent revaluation is principally not 
allowed. This is only allowed in 
restructuring of a State-owned 
enterprise. 
PPE are accounted at historical 
costs. Subsequent revaluation 
is allowed. 
Investment 
property 
Investment property is not specifically 
addressed. Properties held for 
investment purposes are accounted at 
historical costs (treated as PPE or 
inventory). 
Investment properties can be 
accounted at cost or fair value. 
Pre-operating 
expenses 
Expenses incurred prior to 
commencement of commercial operation 
are capitalized as long-term prepaid 
expenses. These are expensed in the 
month when commercial operations 
commence. 
Pre-operating costs are 
expensed when incurred. 
Amortization of 
intangible assets 
Amortization is made over a period of not 
more than 10 years when useful lives are 
not determinable. 
Impairment test is adopted 
where useful lives are not 
determinable. 
Investments (other 
than investments 
in subsidiaries and 
associated 
companies) 
Short-term investments are accounted at 
the lower of cost and net realizable 
value. Long-term investments are 
accounted at cost.  
Investments held to maturity 
are accounted initially at fair 
value and subsequently at 
amortized cost less impairment 
loss. Quoted investments held 
for trading are stated at fair 
value. Unquoted investments 
are stated at cost less provision 
for impairment. Investments 
held as available-for-sale 
financial assets are accounted 
at fair value. 
Research and 
development costs 
Research and development costs are 
expensed when incurred. 
Development costs shall be 
capitalized when certain criteria 
are met. 
Employee benefits There is no specific standard governing 
employee benefits. 
There are specific guidelines in 
accounting for employee 
benefits which are granted 
under a defined benefit plan or 
defined contribution plan. 
Excess of cost 
investment over 
net assets 
This is shown as investment difference 
and amortized over the term of the joint 
venture but not exceeding 10 years. 
Credit balance is taken to capital 
reserve. 
This is shown as goodwill. This 
is not amortized but tested for 
impairment. Negative goodwill 
is recognized in income 
statement. 
Income tax Income tax can be accounted under the 
tax payable method, deferral method or 
liability method. 
Income tax is accounted under 
the liability method. 
Tax payable Tax payable includes payables for 
income tax, business tax and VAT.  
Tax payable includes only 
payable for income tax. 
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Software costs These are classified as intangible assets. These can be classified as 
intangible assets or PPE. 
Land use rights These are classified as intangible assets 
until commencement of construction of 
building. 
These are classified as fixed 
assets or prepaid lease 
depending on the nature of the 
land use rights. 
Investment in 
subsidiaries 
This is accounted using the equity 
method. 
This is accounted at cost or in 
accordance with IAS 39. 
Staff and workers' 
bonus and welfare 
This is shown as appropriation from 
retained earnings. 
This is classified as an 
expense. 
Waiver of liabilities 
(creditors write-
back) and 
donations 
This is accounted under capital reserve. This is accounted as income in 
the income statement. 
Borrowing costs Borrowing costs on loans designated for 
specific purposes are capitalized as 
costs of the project. 
There is a choice of expensing 
or capitalizing borrowing costs 
on loans designated for specific 
purposes. 
Unutilized leave There is no guideline on the accounting 
treatment.  
This should be accrued and 
expensed. 
Government 
grants 
Grants awarded for technological 
improvement are accounted in the capital 
reserve while those awarded as a 
subsidy are accounted as other income. 
Grants awarded for capital 
expenditure are either 
accounted as deferred income 
or offset against cost. Those 
awarded as compensation for 
expenses/losses incurred are 
accounted as other income. 
Derivatives There is no specific standard. These are 
generally disclosed as off-balance-sheet 
items. 
Governed by IAS 39. 
Hedge accounting There is no specific standard.  Governed by IAS 39. 
Share-based 
payments 
There is no specific standard. These are 
generally disclosed as off-balance-sheet 
items. 
Governed by IFRS 2. 
Presentation of 
minority interests 
This is presented on the balance sheet 
separately from equity and liabilities, and 
in the income statement as a deduction 
before net profit. 
This is presented on the 
balance sheet as a separate 
component within equity. In this 
income statement, this is 
neither an income nor expense 
item. Net profit is allocated 
between amounts attributable 
to equity holders of the parent 
and minority interests. 
Business 
combination 
Purchase method is adopted. For 
combinations involving entities under 
common control, the pooling of interests 
method may be adopted. 
Only the purchase method is 
permitted. Business 
combinations involving entities 
under common control are out 
of scope of IFRS 3 on business 
combinations. 
Gain from debt 
restructuring 
This is credited to capital reserve. This is credited to income. 
   
Source: Doing Business in China, by RSM International. 
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Appendix C: 
Types of Shares Issued by Chinese Publicly Traded Companies 
Shareholder's Identity Listing 
Locationa
Liquidity Trading 
Currency 
Sate-Owned Shares N/A 
  Central and local governments, institutions and departments (including 
SOEs) designated by the State Council or by local governments. (In 
November 2002, The CSRC, MOF, and the State Economic and trade 
Commission, with the approval of the State Council, issued a circular 
permitting foreign investors to purchase such shares in certain 
circumstances.) 
SHSE or 
SZSE* 
Not allowed to be publicly traded or exchanged 
except with the explicit approval of the state 
authorized investing institution or department, 
such as the National Administrative Bureau of 
State-Owned Property at the central 
government level and the state asset 
management bureau of local governments 
 
Institutional Shares (denoted as Legal-Person Shares in China) N/A 
 Domestic institutions (enterprises or companies, or other economic 
entities enjoying legal person status). They are usually firms or 
institutions which have acted as promoter of the invested company. 
(Sales of legal person shares to foreign investors were allowed until May 
1996 when such sales were suspended.) 
SHSE or 
SZSE 
Not publicly tradable and subject to the same 
restrictions applicable to state-owned shares.  
Public Shares    
 “A” shares (domestic shares) 
 Chinese nationals or residents domiciled in China (Starting 1st December 
2002, certain “qualified foreign institutional investors (QRII)” have been 
allowed to purchase “A” shares.) 
SHSE or 
SZSE 
Freely traded in domestic stock exchanges Denominated in 
RMB, 
subscribed and 
traded in RMB 
 “B” shares (domestic shares) 
 Foreign natural and legal persons and other organizations, natural and 
legal persons and other organizations from Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan, PRC citizens residing overseas, and other investors as may be 
authorized by the CSRC. (Since the early 2001, Mainland investors with 
foreign currency deposits were allowed to access this market. 
SHSE or 
SZSE 
Freely traded in domestic stock exchanges Denominated in 
RMB, 
subscribed and 
traded in US$ in 
SHSE, and HK$ 
in SZSE 
“H”, “N”, “L” and “S” shares 
 N/A 
HKSE, 
NYSE 
London SE 
SXE 
Freely traded in overseas stock exchanges In the 
respective local 
currencies of 
the country of 
listing 
Employee shares SHSE or Employee shares are registered under the title Denominated in 
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  Staff and management of a listed company (usually at a substantial 
discount 
SZSE of the labor union (workers’ council) of the 
company. After an initial holding period of six to 
twelve months, the company may file an 
application with the CSRC to allow its 
employee to sell the shares on the open 
market 
RMB, 
subscribed and 
traded in RMB 
     
a SHSE=Shanghai Stock Exchange, SZSE=Shenzhen Stock Exchange, HKSE=Hong Kong Stock Exchange, NYSE=New York Stock Exchange, London 
SE=London Stock Exchange, and SXE=Singapore Stock Exchange 
* Cross-listing is prohibited    
Source: adopted from Towner, G. and G. Zhu, 2006, Asset Impairment Disclosures in Chinese Listed Companies, working paper, pp26  
 
